331–340 of 357 posts
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> The internet multiplied and empowered many things, chief amongst them is human cruelty and apathy. Bare in mind we aren't banning the internet, just kids on social media. > Take that and multiply that by like a billion and that might come close to painting a fair picture of the internet A billion people have died from.... the internet? Youve GOT to explain this one lol how exactly?
> Bare in mind we aren't banning the internet, just kids on social media. It's neither. it isn't social media only, there will be various sites that are age restricted, similar to IRL businesses. > A billion people have died from.... the internet? Youve GOT to explain this one lol how exactly? I didn't claim 'died', you assumed. I meant sum total of suffering and pain facilitated by it. The internet is just a "road",…
So we should ban letters as well because of all the badness they facilitated? Lots of crime has used telephones, we should also ban telephones yes? Because graph theory's etc?
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>People can see your face and make decisions when they interact with you IRL, they can't over the internet Man you're just reaching at this point... Should we ban telephones, and written correspondence also? You're hysterical
phone sex is already banned without credit card verification or if you sound like a minor for example. and you're being disingenuous as well, clearly this entire thread is not about "correspondence", i clearly said "interact", simply talking to kids IRL doesn't require ID verification either. But when you enter a bar, a night club, a sex store, buy alcohol at a convenience store, etc... or hang out at the play ground…
And so is inciting a minor for sex, internet or not.
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> That seems like a problem caused by the law. Why is it possible for any actions taken as a minor to cause someone to be put on a permanent list when we recognize that minors aren't mature enough to be held responsible for that? Its a second order effect. The problem is predators get children to take pictures and distribute them. To stop them escaping justice it requires a certain level of absolutism. In Common law,…
> Its a second order effect. The problem is predators get children to take pictures and distribute them. It isn't. The solution is obvious. You punish the predators and not the children. > My understanding of what is being proposed is that cameras will have basic nudity detection on them, and they will refuse to take the pictures if the device is registered to a person under the age of 18. Which seems both problemati…
> It isn't. The solution is obvious. You punish the predators and not the children.
the core problem is that in the UK more and more CSAM is being prodiced by kids themselves. Most grooming of digital images is done remotely, via exploitation. (ie I have pictures of you, please send more or I'll send them to x)
Now, because the person extorting them is not taking the pictures they had a defence of "they were sent to me, I didn't know what to do so deleted them blah blah blah"
These people hunt down the kids sending stuff to lovers and the like, that gets leaked, because kids are cruel, and try and extort them.
I would gently ask you to look in the changes into sentencing guidelines and the evidence used to compile that advice.
Yes, older devices can be used, and oncein the hands of extortionists then they are in deep shit. The point of this, and the point that Jess Phillipson was getting at, is if kids can't take these pictures as easily, they can't be leaked as easily which means there is much less (but not zero) chance of being exploited,
> You're assuming the conclusion -- that there should be a platform in a position to control
Sorry my bad phrasing.
the ideal solution here is end to end encrypted but also encrypted image but with the keys controlled by the owner of the image "private" computing is the answer, where every view of private images requires a key exchange. there are hardware locks to stop people getting at the frame buffer, only apps that you approve can have access, and flagged data that you send auto deletes and expires.
Ironically this is basically extreme copyright enforcement(everything you create, more or less is your own copyright)
But we can't get to that yet, because Ad tech/meta/google doesn't like that.
TLDR its less obvious but I also share your worry about privacy.
What the UK is trying to do here is evil and authoritarian. Its the sort of thing people brushed off as conspiracy theories not long ago. It is completely and utterly unacceptable.
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Did we read the same article? You're complaining about an optional back-up service . No data is being "collected," you're giving it to them (in an encrypted form) to store on your behalf. How else would a backup service work? If you don't want to use the cloud version, there's a feature to store backups locally on-device. Signal blog: https://signal.org/blog/introducing-secure-backups/ HN: https://news.ycombinator.co…
It's hardly optional, they keep nagging you to turn it on until one day you accidentally do. Protected by only a 4-digit PIN by the way.
Signal refuses to answer: Why won't they release/open source all of their backend infra automation scripts/tools/etc... There's no reasonable reason why a 501(c)(3) won't put this out there to make sure there's redundancy so we could built an alternate network if they're compromised by some gag order.
Signal just can't be trusted at this point. They're probably compromised. My theory is that that's why the very first line of their privacy is a lie saying that it's designed to never collect or store sensitive data when they keep a list of your contacts forever in the cloud (and in some cases now even message contents).
I sometimes wonder whether the people in the tech industry who worked on things like secure boot, attestation, and DRM saw this as the inevitability open source advocates always saw it as. Did they think, as they worked to transfer final say from users to corporations, by technical means, that politicians couldn't transfer that control to themselves by political means? Did they think they could lock things down to ex…
My impression is that people who can work on stuff like that are the kind who just take the stuff in the world for granted. "This is how the world is, we need digital restrictions so now we need to implement them." "I don't have a say about whether DRM or remote attestation is standard business practice or not, it is just how it is." This is akin to how two kinds of people respond to law. The first kind think "This i…
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They (developers) did what they did for money. Just like everyone else. And they would do it all again. At a corporate level, no one cares about lots of freedoms, except if it is a selling point. If 'keeping freedoms' is a selling point then the ideal position is to gain the kudos of appearing to support this whilst also getting the benefits of the loss of freedoms. Why not get both?
That's the Android way.
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Signal just can't be trusted at this point. They're probably compromised. My theory is that that's why the very first line of their privacy is a lie saying that it's designed to never collect or store sensitive data when they keep a list of your contacts forever in the cloud (and in some cases now even message contents).
People really should stop conflating the technical requirements for an optional back service, with they are always collecting our data and anything is a lie.