Earlier quoted context omitted.
How is that different from what happens now, where someone who contributes regularly to a project faces less scrutiny than a new person?
The difference is that today this trust is local and organic to a specific project. A centralized reputation system shared across many repos turns that into delegated trust... meaning, maintainers start relying on an external signal instead of their own review/intuition. That's a meaningful shift, and it risks reducing scrutiny overall.
Vouch
331–340 of 507 posts
Re: Vouch
#332Earlier quoted context omitted.
How is that different from what happens now, where someone who contributes regularly to a project faces less scrutiny than a new person?
The difference is that today this trust is local and organic to a specific project. A centralized reputation system shared across many repos turns that into delegated trust... meaning, maintainers start relying on an external signal instead of their own review/intuition. That's a meaningful shift, and it risks reducing scrutiny overall.
Re: Vouch
#333The underlying idea is admirable, but in practice this could create a market for high-reputation accounts that people buy or trade at a premium. Once an account is already vouched, it will likely face far less scrutiny on future contributions — which could actually make it easier for bad actors to slip in malware or low-quality patches under the guise of trust.
Amazing idea - absolutely loving vouch. However, as a security person, this comment immediately caught my attention. A few things come to mind (it's late here, so apologies in advance if they're trivial and not thought through): - Threat Actors compromising an account and use it to Vouch for another account. I have a "hunch" it could fly under the radar, though admittedly I can't see how it would be different from an…
Re: Vouch
#334Earlier quoted context omitted.
The difference is that today this trust is local and organic to a specific project. A centralized reputation system shared across many repos turns that into delegated trust... meaning, maintainers start relying on an external signal instead of their own review/intuition. That's a meaningful shift, and it risks reducing scrutiny overall.
I am still not going to merge random code from a supposed trusted invdividual. As it is now, everyone is supposedly trusted enough to be able to contribute code. This vouching system will make me want to spend more time, not less, when contributing.
You personally might stay careful, but the whole point of vouching systems is to reduce review effort in aggregate. If they don't change behavior, they add complexity without benefi.. and if they do, that's exactly where supply-chain risk comes from.
Re: Vouch
#335Earlier quoted context omitted.
The difference is that today this trust is local and organic to a specific project. A centralized reputation system shared across many repos turns that into delegated trust... meaning, maintainers start relying on an external signal instead of their own review/intuition. That's a meaningful shift, and it risks reducing scrutiny overall.
I don't think the intent is for trust to be delegated to infinity. It can just be shared easily. I could imagine a web of trust being shared between projects directly working together.
I don't know whether that's good or bad for the overall open-source ecosystem.
Re: Vouch
#336Earlier quoted context omitted.
The difference is that today this trust is local and organic to a specific project. A centralized reputation system shared across many repos turns that into delegated trust... meaning, maintainers start relying on an external signal instead of their own review/intuition. That's a meaningful shift, and it risks reducing scrutiny overall.
This isn't a centralised reputation system, though, is it? Each project keeps its own whitelist.
Re: Vouch
#337Re: Vouch
#338Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Then again, if this is the case, why would you risk your own reputation to vouch for anyone anyway. Good reason to be careful. Maybe there's a bit of an upside to: if you vouch for someone who does good work, then you get a little boost too. It's how personal relationships work anyway. ---------- I'm pretty skeptical of all things cryptocurrency, but I've wondered if something like this would be an actually good us…
I'm unconvinced, to my possibly-undercaffeinated mind, the string of 3 posts reads like this: - a problem already solved in TFA (you vouching for someone eventually denounced doesn't prevent you from being denounced, you can totally do it) - a per-repo, or worse, global, blockchain to solve incrementing and decrementing integers (vouch vs. denounce) - a lack of understanding that automated global scoring systems are…
Re: Vouch
#339Earlier quoted context omitted.
It feels like the problem here comes from the reluctance to utilize a negative sum outcome for rejection. Instead of introducing accidental perverse incentives, if rejected your stake shouldn't go to the repo, 50% could be returned, and 50% deleted. If it times out or gets approved you get 100% back. If a repo rejects too often or is seen doing so unfairly reputation would balance participation.
No, the perverse incentive is that there will be RepoCoin, and the people involved will be incentivized to make the price of that as high as possible.
Isn't this problem unrelated to cryptocurrency?
There will be the US dollar, and the people involved will be incentivized to keep its value high, e.g. by pressuring or invading other countries to prevent them from switching to other currencies. Or they'll be incentivized to adopt policies that cause consumer and government debt to become unreasonably excessive to create a large enough pool of debts denominated in that currency that they can create an inordinate amount of it without crashing its value.
Or on the other side of the coin, there will be countries with currencies they knowingly devalue, either because they can force the people in that country to accept them anyway or because devaluing their currency makes their exports more competitive and simultaneously allows them to spend the currency they printed.
If anything cryptocurrency could hypothetically be better at reducing these perverse incentives, because if good rules are chosen at the outset and get ossified into the protocol then it's harder for bad actors to corrupt something that requires broad consensus to change.
Re: Vouch
#340Unfortunately, the mob mentality, and gate keeping from the Reddit mod era, proves that these types of systems simply don’t work.