I'm not refuting that the binary is the source of truth about behavior, I never stated it wasn't, and I don't know where you even got the idea that I wasn't. It's been very frustrating to have to repeatedly do this - you and akerl_ have both been attacking strawman positions I do not hold and never stated, and being condescending and patronizing in the process. Is it possible you're making assumptions about me based on arguments made by other people that sound similar to the ones I'm making? I'd really appreciate not having to keep reminding you that I've never made the claims you're implying I'm making, if that's not too much to ask of you.
At a high level, what I'm fundamentally contending is that WhatsApp is less trustworthy and secure than Signal. I can have a higher degree of confidence in the behavior and trustworthiness of the Signal APK I build from source myself than I can from WhatsApp, which I can't even build a binary of myself. I'd simply be given a copy of it from Google Play or Apple's App Store.
Signal's source code exhibits known trustworthy behavior, i.e. not logging both long-term and ephemeral cryptographic keys and shipping them off to someone else's servers. Sure, Google Play and Apple can modify this source code, add a backdoor, and the binary distributed by Google Play and Apple can have behavior that doesn't match the behavior of the published source code. You can detect this fairly easily, because you have a point of reference to compare to. You know what the compiled bytecode from the source code you've reviewed looks like, because you can build it yourself, no trust required[1], it's not difficult to see when that differs in another build.
With WhatsApp, you don't even have a point of reference of known good behavior, i.e. not logging both long-term and ephemeral cryptographic keys and shipping them off to someone else's server, in the first place. You can monitor all the disk writes, you can monitor all the network activity. Just because YOU don't observe cryptographic keys being logged, either in-memory, or on disk, or being sent off to some other server, doesn't mean there isn't code present to perform those exact functions under conditions you've never met and never would - it's entirely technically feasible for Google and Apple to be fingerprinting a laundry list of identifiers of known security researchers and be shipping them binaries with behavior that differs from the behavior of ordinary users, or even for them to ship targeted backdoored binaries to specific users at the demand of various intelligence agencies.
The upper limit for the trustworthiness of a Signal APK you build from source yourself is on a completely different planet from the trustworthiness of a WhatsApp APK you only have the option of receiving from Google.
And again, none of this even begins to factor in Meta's extensive track record on deliberately misleading users on privacy and security through deceptive marketing and subverting users' privacy extensively. Onavo wasn't just capturing all traffic, it was literally doing MITM attacks against other companies' analytics servers with forged TLS certificates. Meta was criminally investigated for this and during discovery, it came out that executives understood what was going on, understood how wrong it was, and deliberately continued with the practice anyway. Actual technical analysis of the binaries and source code aside, it's plainly ridiculous to suggest that software made by that same corporation is as trustworthy as Signal. One of these apps is a messenger made by a company with a history of explicitly misleading users with deceptive privacy claims and employing non-trivial technical attacks against their own users to violate their own users' privacy, the other is made by a nonprofit with a track record of being arguably one of the single largest contributors to robust, accessible, audited, verifiable secure cryptography in the history of the field. I contend that suggesting these two applications are equally secure is irrational, impossible to demonstrate or verify, and indefensible.
[1] Except in your compiler, linker, etc... Ken Thompson's 'Reflections on Trusting Trust' still applies here. The argument isn't that source code availability automatically means 100% trustworthy, it means the upper boundary for trustworthiness is higher than without source availability.