We all dodged a bullet
331–340 of 498 posts
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#332Always use password manager to automatically fill in your credentials. If password manager doesn't find your credentials, check the domain. On top of that, you can always go directly to the website, to make any needed changes there, without following the link.
Password managers are still too unreliable to auto-fill everywhere all the time, and manually having to copy paste something from the password manager happens regularly so it's not something that feels unusual if it doesn't auto-fill it for some reason.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#333Earlier quoted context omitted.
when I was doing C# pre-nuget we had an utterly absurd amount of libraries that nobody had checked and nobody ever upgraded. so... yeah I think it applies there too, at least from my experience. I do agree that C is an especially-bad case for additional reasons though, yeah.
Gotcha. When I was, we actively curated our dependencies and maintaining them was a regularly scheduled task that one team member in particular was in charge of making sure got done.
exceptions totally exist, I've seen them too. I just don't think they're enough to move the median away from "total chaotic garbage" regardless of the system
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#334We are cooked.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#335Earlier quoted context omitted.
In a case like this, the package maintainer's account itself has been hacked, so I'm not sure if that would be meaningful. The only solution would be to prevent all releases from being applied immediately.
A solution could be enforcing hardware keys for 2FA for all maintainers if a package has more than XX thousand weekly downloads. No hardware keys, no new releases.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#336Dodged a bullet indeed I find it insane that someone would get access to a package like this, then just push a shitty crypto stealer. You're a criminal with a one-in-a-million opportunity. Wouldn't you invest an extra week pushing a more fledged out exploit? You can exfiltrate API keys, add your SSH public key to the server then exfiltrate the server's IP address so you can snoop in there manually, if you're on a dev…
It is not a one-in-a-million opportunity though. I hate to take this to the next level, but as criminal elements wake up to the fact that a few "geeks" can possibly get them access to millions of dollars expect much worse to come. As a maintainer of any code that could gain bad guys access, I would be seriously considering how well my physical identity is hidden on-line.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#337Re: We all dodged a bullet
#338Dodged a bullet indeed I find it insane that someone would get access to a package like this, then just push a shitty crypto stealer. You're a criminal with a one-in-a-million opportunity. Wouldn't you invest an extra week pushing a more fledged out exploit? You can exfiltrate API keys, add your SSH public key to the server then exfiltrate the server's IP address so you can snoop in there manually, if you're on a dev…
The pushed payload didn't generate any new traffic. It merely replaced the recipient of a crypto transaction to a different account. It would have been really hard to detect. Ex-filtrating API keys would have been picked up a lot faster. OTOH, this modus operandi is completely inconsistent with the way they published the injected code: by taking over a developer's account. This was going to be noticed quickly. If the…
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#339Earlier quoted context omitted.
A browser-integrated password manager is only phishing-proof if it's 100% reliable. If it ever fails to detect a credential field, it trains users that they sometimes need to work around this problem by copy-pasting the credential from the password manager UI, and then phishers can exploit that. AFAIK all existing password manager extensions have this problem, as do all browsers' native password-management features.
It doesnt need to be 100% reliable, just reliable enough. If certain websites fail to be detected, thats a security issue on those specific websites, as I'll learn which ones tend to fail. If they rarely fail to detect in general, its infrequent enough to be diligent in those specific cases. In my experience with password managers, they rarely fail to detect fields. If anything, they over detect fields.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#340This reads like a joke that's missing the punchline. The post's author's resume section reinforces this feeling: I am a skilled force multiplier, acclaimed speaker, artist, and prolific blogger. My writing is widely viewed across 15 time zones and is one of the most viewed software blogs in the world. I specialize in helping people realize their latent abilities and help to unblock them when they get stuck. This crea…
As far as I can tell it isn't a joke per se, but it is tongue-in-cheek and the ego is often very real.