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Willow, Our Quantum Chip

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Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#331
post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you’re going to need about 10,000,000 qbits to divert a transaction, but that’s still within foreseeable scale. I think it’s extreme likely that the foundation will have finished their quantum resistance planning before we get to 10MM coherent qbits, but still, it’s a potential scenario. More likely that other critical infrastructure failures will happen within trad-finance, much larger vulnerability footprin…

I agree that the scary scenario is stored SSL frames from 20 years of banking. That's nuclear meltdown scenarios.

To do what? Replay? Just curious on an attack vector.

Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#332

I’m a quantum dabbler so I’ll throw out an armchair reaction: this is a significant announcement. My memory is that 256 bit keys in non quantum resistant algos need something like 2500 qubits or so; and by that I mean generally useful programmable qubits. To show a bit over 100 qubits with stability, meaning the information survives a while, long enough to be read, and general enough to run some benchmarks on is some…

You need to distinguish between "physical qubits" and "logical qubits." This paper creates a single "first-of-a-kind" logical qubit with about 100 physical qubits (using Surface Code quantum error correction). A paper from Google in 2019 estimates needing ~20 million physical qubits ("How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits" - https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749 ), though recent adva…

> quantum computers would be able to retroactively break any public keys that were stored

Use a key exchange that offers perfect forward secrecy (e.g. diffie Hellman) and you don’t need to worry about your RSA private key eventually being discovered.

Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#334

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You need to distinguish between "physical qubits" and "logical qubits." This paper creates a single "first-of-a-kind" logical qubit with about 100 physical qubits (using Surface Code quantum error correction). A paper from Google in 2019 estimates needing ~20 million physical qubits ("How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits" - https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749 ), though recent adva…

> quantum computers would be able to retroactively break any public keys that were stored Use a key exchange that offers perfect forward secrecy (e.g. diffie Hellman) and you don’t need to worry about your RSA private key eventually being discovered.

Not exactly, they can just reverse the entire chain.

Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#335

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You need to distinguish between "physical qubits" and "logical qubits." This paper creates a single "first-of-a-kind" logical qubit with about 100 physical qubits (using Surface Code quantum error correction). A paper from Google in 2019 estimates needing ~20 million physical qubits ("How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits" - https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749 ), though recent adva…

> quantum computers would be able to retroactively break any public keys that were stored Use a key exchange that offers perfect forward secrecy (e.g. diffie Hellman) and you don’t need to worry about your RSA private key eventually being discovered.

Perfect forward secrecy doesn't work that well when NSA motto is - store everything now decrypt later. If they intercept the ephemeral key exchange now they can decrypt the message 10 or 50 years later.

Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#336

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You need to distinguish between "physical qubits" and "logical qubits." This paper creates a single "first-of-a-kind" logical qubit with about 100 physical qubits (using Surface Code quantum error correction). A paper from Google in 2019 estimates needing ~20 million physical qubits ("How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits" - https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749 ), though recent adva…

> quantum computers would be able to retroactively break any public keys that were stored Use a key exchange that offers perfect forward secrecy (e.g. diffie Hellman) and you don’t need to worry about your RSA private key eventually being discovered.

[deleted]

Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#337

They opened the API for it and I'm sending requests but the response always comes back 300ms before I send the request, is there a way of handling that with try{} predestined{} blocks? Or do I need to use the Bootstrap Paradox library?

Have you tried using the Schrödinger Exception Handler? It catches errors both before and after they occur simultaneously, until you observe the stack trace.

I swear I can't tell which of these comments are sarcastic/parody and which are actual answers.

A sort of quantum commenting conundrum, I guess.

Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#338

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He’s quoting the number of logical qubits (which is 1024 IIRC, not 2500), after error correction. ETA: Wikipedia 2330 qubits, but I'm not sure it is citing the most recent work: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography#ci...

1024 is for RSA-1024, which is believed to be broken by classical means at this point. Everyone doing anything with RSA is on 4k or larger.

Is it broken? Seems still no one solved RSA-1024 challenge.

Re: Willow, Our Quantum Chip

#340

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He’s quoting the number of logical qubits (which is 1024 IIRC, not 2500), after error correction. ETA: Wikipedia 2330 qubits, but I'm not sure it is citing the most recent work: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography#ci...

1024 is for RSA-1024, which is believed to be broken by classical means at this point. Everyone doing anything with RSA is on 4k or larger.

Reminder to anyone if DKIM keys haven't been rotated in a while they might still be 1024. Eg., Google Workspace but new keys are 2048 now.
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