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Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

sansec.io

331–340 of 387 posts

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#331
post #268

Clientside mitigation: install noscript. https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/noscript/ You can’t expect to remain secure on the modern web while running arbitrary javascript from anyone and everyone.

You can't expect any modern page to work without JavaScript either. And auditing every page's JavaScript yourself isn't exactly feasible.

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#332
Is there any evidence that whoever is currently behind polyfill.io is a "Chinese company," as most reports claim?

The company known as "Funnull" appears to be based in the Philippines. The phone number associated with their WhatsApp and WeChat accounts has country code +63. Also they appear to be based at 30th Street, 14th Floor, Net Cube Center, E-Square Zone, Metro Manila, Taguig, Philippines at least if the information on this page [1], purportedly from the founder of the company that was acquired and renamed Funnull, is to be trusted (Click "View Source," then run it through Google Translate)

Claude translation:

===

> Announcement

> I am the former owner of the original Philippine company Anjie CDN. After my incident, the company was managed by my family. Due to their isolation and lack of support, they were persuaded by unscrupulous individuals to sell the company. Subsequently, the company was acquired and renamed as Fangneng CDN, which later developed into the ACB Group.

> This is precisely what I need to clarify: Fangneng CDN company and the ACB Group have no connection with me or my family. Recently, many companies have contacted my family and threatened them, believing that Fangneng CDN company has stolen important information such as member data and financial transactions through client domain names using infiltration and mirroring techniques, and has stolen customer programs through server rental services. This matter is unrelated to me and my family. Please contact Fangneng CDN company to resolve these issues.

> I reiterate: As my family has long since closed Anjie CDN company, any events that occurred afterwards are unrelated to me and my family!

> Note: Due to my personal issues, this statement is being released on my behalf by my family.

> Fangneng CDN's actual office location: 30th Street 14TH Floor, Net Cube Center, E-Square Zone, Metro Manila, Taguig, Philippines.

> Due to the release of this statement, the Anjie domain name has been reactivated by Fangneng CDN company. Currently, Anjie and Fangneng are one company, so I once again declare that any conflicts and disputes arising from Anjie CDN and Fangneng CDN companies are not related to me or my family in any way!

> First publication date of the announcement: May 18, 2022

> Announcement update date: May 18, 2024

[1] Original URL: https://cc.bingj.com/cache.aspx?q=%E5%AE%89%E6%8D%B7%E8%BF%9...

Archive.today version: https://archive.is/uDNoV

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#333

> this domain was caught injecting malware on mobile devices via any site that embeds cdn.polyfill.io I've said it before, and I'll say it again: https://httptoolkit.com/blog/public-cdn-risks/ You can reduce issues like this using subresource intergrity (SRI) but there are still tradeoffs (around privacy & reliability - see article above) and there is a better solution: self-host your dependencies behind a CDN servic…

Meanwhile ...

"High security against CDN, WAF, CC, DDoS protection and SSL protects website owners and their visitors from all types of online threats"

... says the involved CDN's page (FUNNULL CDN).-

(Sure. Except the one's they themselves generate. Or the CCP.)

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#334

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s not been true since Site Isolation IIRC e: Not sure it’s Site Isolation specifically, but it’s definitely still not true anymore: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24745748 e2: listen to the commenter below, its Cache Partitioning: https://developer.chrome.com/blog/http-cache-partitioning

If that's true, this is a wild microcosm example of how the web breaks in ways we don't expect.

> this is a wild microcosm example of how the web breaks in ways we don't expect.

I think the performance characteristics of the web are subject to change over time, especially to allow increased security and privacy.

https is another example of increased security+privacy at the cost of being slightly slower than non-https connections because of an extra round trip or two to create the connection.

The lesson I take from it is: don't use complicated optimization techniques that might get out of date over time. Keep it simple instead of chasing every last bit of theoretical performance.

For example, there used to be a good practice of using "Domain Sharding" to allow browsers to download more files in parallel, but was made obsolete with HTTP/2, and domain sharding now has a net negative effect, especially with https.

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Glossary/Domain_sha...

Now they're realizing that HTTP/2's multiplexing of a single TCP connection can have negative effects on wireless connections, so they're working on HTTP/3 to solve that.

Also don't use polyfills. If your supported browsers don't support the feature then don't use the feature, or implement the fallback yourself. Use the features that are actually available to you.

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#335
post #9

I had this conversation countless times with developers: are you really ok if someone hijacks the CDN for the code you're including? They almost always seem to be fine with it, simply because everyone else is doing it like this. At the same time they put up with countless 2FAs in the most mundane places. The follow up of "you know that the random packages you're including could have malware" is even more hopeless.

now you are a bummer and a roadblock so your career suffers

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#336

> However, in February this year, a Chinese company bought the domain and the Github account. Github accounts of open source software are now for sale?

I don't understand that either. The original repo was owned by the Finantial-Times account [0]. For sure that account has not been sold.

I would love to hear how the deal was made to include the repository transfer. It is really surprising.

[0] https://web.archive.org/web/20230524161733/https://github.co...

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#338

Game theory at work? Someone needs to maintain legacy code for free that hosts thousands of sites and gets nothing but trouble (pride?) in return. Meanwhile the forces of the world present riches and power in return to turn to the dark side (or maybe just letting your domain lapse and doing something else). If security means every maintainer of every OSS package you use has to be scrupulous, tireless, and not screw u…

in a strange way, this almost makes the behavior of hopping onto every new framework rational. The older and less relevant the framework, the more the owner's starry-eyed enthusiasm wears off. The hope that bigcorp will pay $X million for the work starts to fade. The tedium of bug fixes and maintenance wears on, the game theory takes it's toll. The only rational choice for library users is to jump ship once the numbe…

To be fair, when it comes to React, I don't think there is a realistic "new shiny" yet. NextJS is (was?) looking good, although I have heard it being mentioned a lot less lately.

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#339

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm afraid this is hitting on the other end of inviolable game theory laws. Dev who is paid for features and business value wants to read line-by-line random package that is upgrading from version 0.3.12 to 0.3.13 in a cryptography or date lib that they likely don't understand? And this should be done for every change of every library for all software, by all devs who will always be responsible, not lazy, and very at…

Correct. I don't think I have ever seen sound engimeering decisions being rewarded at any business I have worked for. The only reason any sound decisions are made is that some programmers take the initiative, but said initiative rarely comes with a payoff and always means fighting with other programmers who have a fetish for complexity. If only programmers had to take an ethics oath so they have an excuse not to just…

"Fetish for complexity" haha. This sounds so much better than "problem engineer".

Re: Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites

#340

I don’t understand why JS devs treat dependencies the way they do. If you are writing scripts that run on other people’s computers I feel like the dependencies used should be vetted for security constantly, and should be used minimally. Meanwhile most libraries seem to have 80 trillion dependencies written by random github accounts called “xihonghua” or something with no other projects on their account.

Because that is how the tutorials on "web development" teach it. Just use this thing and don't ask what it is.
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