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Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

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Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#331

Earlier quoted context omitted.

(Full disclosure: I work at https://passage.id ) WebAuthn is the short name for the "FIDO Alliance Web Authentication Protocol". "Passkey" is the trade name (that Apple tries to own) for the "stuff" that results from using the WebAuthn protocol. At it's root, a passkey is really the private key portion of that "stuff" that is kept. So yes, in practice, a passkey is the result of a WebAuthn implementation. MS, Apple,…

Are Passkeys exportable and re-importable by another service, site, or system? I am strongly opposed to any authentication system that makes my authorization workflow for unrelated third-party sites dependent on any company whose terms of service allow them to suspend or terminate my use without reasonable recourse or recovery. Passwords have problems, but I can print them out on a piece of paper in a fire safe.

Passkeys aren't limited to cloud-synced service. Something like an existing Yubikey is also considered to be capable of creating single-device passkeys (e.g. ones which are tied to physical hardware and do not have recovery capabilities).

The expectation is that websites will allow you to register multiple passkeys, and that these may correspond to different devices. For instance, I may have both my iPad, android phone and windows desktop registered as three separate passkeys on an account.

There is a cross device flow that works across ecosystems, based on QR codes and wireless proximity. So the expectation is that websites could (if they desire) see that you authenticated using your phone onto your Windows Hello capable desktop, and ask if you want to register a new passkey from your Windows desktop to make things more convenient in the future.

Before platforms added backup to cloud sync fabric, you would lose your credentials when you lost your security keyfob or upgraded your phone. It was a user's responsibility to register additional credentials, such as remembering to go back after-the-fact to use a security key they kept at home in their firesafe to register their 'backup' credential.

This strong hardware binding made it more useful for secure environments (which typically have MFA requirements and staff dedicated to account recovery) and a lot less useful for consumer environments (which want to prevent breaches but not at the expense of additional user friction or support costs)

Web Authentication is effectively saying to let the user utilize whatever they want to authenticate, and let a relying website determine how to react to the capabilities or limitations of that choice. What is considered a capability or liability will depend on the particular deployment business requirements, and that will determine how they adapt. For example, an enterprise might decide to just reject everything except the exact security key they issued to an employee or contractor. For most other verticals, that is not a viable strategy.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#332
post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Services like 1Password are often more secure than your solution because they need to harden vaults against full leaks. In the case of 1Password, a secret key in addition to the password ensures that brute forcing is (at the moment) not feasible, even if your password is really crappy.

How is 1Password's secret key more secure than using keepass's key file feature?

Or, simply a password for your Keepass database with the same entropy as 1Passwords secret key.

Anyways, it depends on the app you use. Some Keepass apps haven't even been audited for example, so security of those apps may be questionable.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#333

Earlier quoted context omitted.

(Full disclosure: I work at https://passage.id ) WebAuthn is the short name for the "FIDO Alliance Web Authentication Protocol". "Passkey" is the trade name (that Apple tries to own) for the "stuff" that results from using the WebAuthn protocol. At it's root, a passkey is really the private key portion of that "stuff" that is kept. So yes, in practice, a passkey is the result of a WebAuthn implementation. MS, Apple,…

Do old Yubikeys and similar U2F devices, which do still work for webauthn, still work for sites that a going to require a "passkey"? Or are MS+Google+Apple doing an "embrace, extend and extinguish" on webauthn? Are the "small adjustements that ever so slightly reduces the security" sufficient to effectively kick security keys hardware vendor out of the game?

> Do old Yubikeys and similar U2F devices, which do still work for webauthn, still work for sites that a going to require a "passkey"?

Unfortunately no. A passkey is a registered credential that supports user verification and discoverability, to support a usernameless and passwordless authentication experience.

U2F did not support either of these capabilities, and was only meant to be used for second factor authentication after a traditional authentication (e.g. username/password).

So a website which wants the passkey capabilities in order to provide a particular user experience is not going to be able to accept U2F devices - unless they provide those users an alternative experience. There may simply not be enough U2F devices in active use for many sites to justify that.

Newer Yubikeys which support CTAP 2.0 or later can generate "single device passkeys" for websites. The "single device" is meant to indicate that there is no backup capability, and losing that keyfob will lose the ability to authenticate using that mechanism. Web Authentication Level 3 describes this capability to websites, as they may this information to determine whether to offer a user any sort of 'account security upgrade' that removes passwords and/or site-provided recovery mechanisms.

Since discoverable credentials require storage inside the security key, the newer the keyfob is the more robust it is likely to be. It is even possible that some security keys may support some form of optional backup and recovery in the future (e.g. you could imagine a system with factory-paired keys packaged together, and a software agent that exports/imports that encrypted data)

> Or are MS+Google+Apple doing an "embrace, extend and extinguish" on webauthn?

I don't think any of them have a goal to reduce a diverse selection of webauthn authenticators. However, platform support does implicitly affect that ecosystem, because the shipped default is what most people will want to use.

The platforms may want to focus on a particular set of features, so this diversity plays to their benefit - I suspect at least some of the platform vendors want to point to the existence of a FIPS-certified Yubikey such that they don't need to implement such behavior themselves.

> Are the "small adjustements that ever so slightly reduces the security" sufficient to effectively kick security keys hardware vendor out of the game?

Leaving the remark about older security protocols not supporting the usability features - I think (and hope) there will be a place for hardware vendors to provide products and services to meet the needs of companies that platform vendors simply won't want to (or won't commit to on a reasonable schedule).

The hardware vendors may see consumer sales drop with the new alternatives, or may grow due to a significant increase in consumer understanding of what their hardware uniquely provides and in where their hardware can be used.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#334

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Passkeys is what Apple decided to call their implementation and the benefits are within their ecosystem, such as storing these in your Keychain to be used on multiple devices. This page is a good starter: https://developer.apple.com/passkeys/

Ah thanks, I kept ending up on Google's pages. I don't search good:P

Google also uses passkeys as a generic user-facing term, and the two are (at least currently) closely aligned.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#335

Could someone clarify what the relationship between passkeys and WebAuthn is? Is it that Passkey is the Apple, Google, Microsoft implementation (commercialization?) of WebAuthn? If so, does it add anything on top of WebAuthn that makes it differ in some fundamental way? Also, are passkeys how WebAuthn is most commonly actually used in practice? Apologies for the noob questions.

it's just WebAuthn with an easier to understand name. However passkeys depends on a yet to be published standard for QR codes + bluetooth + websockets for doing WebAuthn from a second device. But that is planned to be published soon.

A passkey is just web authentication credential registered to have certain pre-existing capabilities so that you can have a particular user experience.

Passkeys don't rely on this mechanism (although being able to authenticate your desktop using your cellphone is a very valuable user experience!)

This upcoming mechanism is also meant to be used between platforms (or at least, a platform and an extremely robust authenticator). It is not meant to be used by a website or native application which want to just rely upon/consume credentials. If the browser/platform supports this mechanism, it will be presented to the user as a choice of how to authenticate.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#336

Earlier quoted context omitted.

it's just WebAuthn with an easier to understand name. However passkeys depends on a yet to be published standard for QR codes + bluetooth + websockets for doing WebAuthn from a second device. But that is planned to be published soon.

Just recently tried to add WebAuthn to an app and was shocked at how complicated the spec is and how quirky the implementation ends up being. The biggest thing I couldn't easily figure out is how to use it properly. It seems like hybrid auth with your phone or FIDO gives you sign in, and local could be used for sessions? It's hard to make heads or tails from it. The developer UX was also pretty bad, ArrayBuffers was…

> Just recently tried to add WebAuthn to an app and was shocked at how complicated the spec is and how quirky the implementation ends up being.

Yes, the spec has improved somewhat but it is still more about describing and exposing individual capabilities rather than serving as an implementers' guide.

There are also usability differences in how the various platforms behave that can be difficult to navigate. In particular, it can be very difficult to restrict which options are presented to a user.

My hope is that efforts like https://passkeys.dev will serve to promote particular broad usability patterns (e.g. primary authentication) and serve to describe the choices and implementation within that context, as well as point people to libraries/products that may help get that experience.

> It seems like hybrid auth with your phone or FIDO gives you sign in, and local could be used for sessions?

by hybrid and local, do you mean the QR code based flow vs some local presented authentication system by the platform?

Generally - no, they are the same in that they both provide authentication in the manner the user chose.

Trying to say one is used for one authentication purpose and the other is used for a different purpose will just cause you to shoot yourself in the foot once they move from their desktop to their phone and the two roles switch.

Instead, there are two main behaviors - passwordless use as a multi-factor system, and use as an additional factor after some other authentication mechanism. These map to discoverable vs non discoverable credentials, and whether you are requesting user verification.

It is typically better to require these broadly and let the user choose whatever they want to use (their phone, their desktop, a security keyfob over NFC). Then, possibly react to their choice with additional checks. Outright rejection of the user choice is really limited to tightly controlled environments (such as enterprises who issue employees security key fobs).

> The developer UX was also pretty bad, ArrayBuffers was a poor design choice for passing around what ultimately becomes JSON.

Yes, its unfortunate - the guidance was that was the proper choice to make in JavaScript API, while it has made people have to build a lot of libraries to shuttle the (non-interoperable) data from their backend servers to the browser due to the lack of binary data types in JSON.

Web Authentication Level 3 proposes additional API to handle serialization of the objects to and from JSON in a browser-consistent manner. I do not yet know of a polyfill for this, but eagerly await seeing one.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#337
post #10

Wow this is really cool. I just tried the example on the homepage, that's magic! No email, username or password. Can someone explain what is happening?

On iOS this seems to use the iCloud Keychain which is slick but how would I then login to sites using Firefox or any computer that doesn’t have access to my keychain? The reason I use a 3rd party manager is precisely this reason.

Typically for web authentication the websites rely on the browsers which by default will back into the platform.

But any level of that may take responsibility - for instance, 1Password and Dashlane replace the browser/platform support by default by altering the implementation of the javascript API via their Web Extensions.

There are ramifications to this approach, such as having to fall back to the browser/platform UX to support hardware security keyfobs.

The platforms (and browsers using their API) also support or plan to support a cross-device option, where you should be able authenticate within a desktop browser using your cellphone via QR code and radio proximity checks. The vision is that some websites will see that the location browser _could_ have supported authentication directly, and offer to help the user register it as a second (more convenient) option.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#338
post #324

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sites should likely let you enroll multiple such passkeys from different vendors (add a Microsoft Account passkey from your PC, a Google one from your Chromebook, etc). Apple already supports Keychain sync with Edge on Windows and I believe that already supports Passkey access. Also, I believe I heard rumor that "Sign in with Apple" (their existing OpenID Connect account system) will also eventually support helping y…

> Sites should likely let you enroll multiple such passkeys from different vendors (add a Microsoft Account passkey from your PC, a Google one from your Chromebook, etc). This sounds good, except how would it actually work? I register in on my iPhone, it uses a key kept on that phone/iCloud. I log in via Safari on MacOS and it works because of iCloud sync. Now I go to login using Edge on Windows. How can the website…

There is a cross-device system to sign in, using QR and proximity checks.

Once the user has signed in, a modality check shows that they logged in with another device, while a capability check shows that they _could_ have authenticated with the local device if it had been registered. This may trigger the site to prompt them to register the local device as a second mechanism (or they may just go to the self-service account management tab to do it themselves).

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#339
post #200
post #125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In 1Password there's at least a half dozen ways that drag and drop could be used: - Drag a password into a password field - Drag an attachment from Finder/Explorer into an item - Drag an item from vault to vault (or collection in Bitwarden parlance) - Drag an item into a tag or folder to add that item to the folder, or add that tag to the item - Drag an app to the 1Password icon to create a software license item with…

You must be on mac, because my 1pw experience is horrible on Linux. Edit a password in the browserextention opens an new tab in n which i have to login all again. Ugh. Bitwarden at least doesn't do that. Drag and drop? Nope.

I use 1Password on Linux and this isn't my experience.

Until recently I was using it for two different accounts in the same 1Password business account, one account enabled with integration to the desktop app and a second account on another browser profile (for admin purposes) with just the browser extension.

Neither of those necessitated logging in again in another tab.

Still using 1Password, but Firefox containers have removed the need for multiple Firefox profiles.

For a second business I use Bitwarden, and that works well, but I find 1Password superior in so many respects.

Re: Bitwarden Acquires Passwordless.dev

#340
post #5

Slightly offtopic, but I really find the Bitwarden Clients to be lacking in the feature department. I switched to Bitwarden a few month ago and the client has evolved (for me) ever since. There are a few basic features missing, such as that if I search for something I wrote in the notes of password, that the client shows the according password. I get that the open-source model implies that everyone can contribute and…

I tested Bitwarden recently and found the UX really disappointing. Some basic operations are so counter intuitive that I felt completely lost. This is definitely not the application I would recommend to non tech-savvy people. 1Password has much smoother UX.
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