Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's because Julian Assange reused the same password on multiple files. At best, it's terrible opsec on his part. At worst, it was deliberate on his part, so he could plausibly claim no responsibility for the fallout. Either way, unless you can prove malicious intent on The Guardian, they have nothing to admit and Julian has some explaining to do.
The Guardian has to admit that it was horribly irresponsible to publish a decryption key, and that they are the ones who actually made the unredacted cables available to the public. They've denounced WikiLeaks for the release, without acknowledging that it was The Guardian that actually made the unredacted cables public. The Guardian journalist who published the decryption key to the unredacted cables has subsequentl…
Seriously, why is it so hard to believe that Julian just punked them? It's easy enough to pull off, and honestly more believable from someone who otherwise has impeccable opsec.
Just look at the order of events:
1. Julian gives an encrypted file and its key to The Guardian.
2. In February 2011, the key gets published in a book by The Guardian's journalist.
3. In September 2011, it's discovered that the encrypted file is available via BitTorrent, with the key already public in said book.
4. WikiLeaks "helpfully" publishes all the unredacted information later that month, to "ensure" that no "malicious" actors would "selectively" publish it.
I have a very hard time believing that security professionals like those who run WikiLeaks would let this happen by accident. Step 4 was probably their end-game all along.