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Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

anthropic.com

321–330 of 345 posts

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#321
post #253

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I keep reading this sort of comment quite a lot, but programming isn't always about automating jobs away. In my career I have not eliminated a single job. I don't consider that a failure on my part.

I didn't mean to imply that automation through programming is always bad. Like with any technology that increases productivity, there are many obvious benefits. We have all benefited enormously on the consumer side of the economy, for example. But I think it's recently become a lot clearer to many in the tech industry that automation can have downsides too, and those downsides are not evenly distributed. This truth w…

Programming is just another form of tool building, no? So anyone who builds things that humans use to solve problems is a job eliminator.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#322
post #34

You can get a taste of this today yourself with Codex Security. I turned it on just as an experiment and in less than a week it has now become essential to all of us. I was shocked how accurate it is, how many security issues it found in existing code, how it continually finds them as we commit, and how NO ONE is immune from making these mistakes. I'd say it is about 90% accurate for us. Often even the "Low" findings…

> I expect tools like this to be a regular part of the development lifecycle from here on. We code with AI, we review with AI, we search for vulns with AI. Even if it isn't perfect, it is easily worth the cost IMHO. So, how is that supposed to work? Claude Code generates security bugs, then Claude Security finds them, then Claude Code generate fix, spend tokens, profit?

Engineers generate security bugs, security researchers find them, then engineers generate the fix, all the while getting paid, raking in hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in profit per engineer.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#323
post #203

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Some numbers, however shaky, that AI-written code is secure. It could become that way, but thus far no evidence has been presented for it. The best we have right now is that you can spend $20 in tokens to write a patch and then $20K to find a vulnerability in it. First, that's not measuring the same thing. Second, it's not very impressive. 50 years is a long, long time, so I wouldn't bet against it. But I agree that…

What are the numbers on how secure is human written code? We should have something to compare AI numbers to. It seems more likely to me that you could spend $20 to find a vulnerability in a piece of software that costed you $20k in human labor.

> What are the numbers on how secure is human written code? We should have something to compare AI numbers to.

That's kind of what the article is about? Mythos is finding lots of security bugs in lots of human-written code. They can now compute some sort of baseline estimate of security bugs per N lines of human-written code or whatever. (Restricted to security bugs that the AI is currently capable of finding, but whatever.) Even before Mythos et al, we can look at historical security bug rates. We do have numbers for estimating the security of human written code.

> It seems more likely to me that you could spend $20 to find a vulnerability in a piece of software that costed you $20k in human labor.

Ok, but that's not what is being discussed in this subthread? The topic is whether or not we have data suggesting that AI-written code is or can be secure, and thus whether insecure human code is fated to replaced with secure AI code. I claim we do not have that data. Therefore, we don't have evidence to think that for the sake of security we should replace all human code with AI code, vs whether AI code is worse for security and so we should replace AI code with human code (that presumably has been vetted with AI, since we do have evidence for its effectiveness.)

If I were to guess, I would probably think that today's AIs are trained solely on mountains of insecure human code and so will probably produce more of the same. Tomorrow's AIs will have the benefit of being trained on human and AI code that has had a large swathe of vulnerabilities purged from it, and so they'll have a much better chance at writing secure code, at least.

It depends a lot on whether the failure modes of AI code generation lend themselves to exploitation as security vulnerabilities. (And whether they will continue to do so.)

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#324

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> piss away yet more tokens > non-deterministic bullshitter. You're so ideologically opposed to AI that you bury your head in the sand in cases where it genuinely does a fantastic job today, right now, in the real world (like developing end to end exploits using noisy signals like static analysis results, fuzzer results, etc). Instead you assert that we should go a route no company has successfully proven out despite…

I actually do use AI, I wouldn't say I'm ideologically opposed lol. Maybe I'm ideologically opposed to thought terminating clichés, or how FAANGers see it as a cudgel to cram in wherever we find an open gap just to shit infinite tokens into?

You tried arguing with Anthropic shill, larping as a FAANGer, peddling absurd LLM-hype. Check their history.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#325
The thing that really gets me as a small-time OSS maintainer is that none of us asked for this. The social and technical millieu where most of us started our projects is not the one we find ourselves in today, and the forces behind this are wildly asymmetric.

Security findings are one place where we as maintainers simply do not have the choice to not play ball, whether we like it or not. It seems likely that the only way that we meet the moment is to adopt these tools ourselves -- once again -- whether we like it or not. Reconciling this with the ground truth that 'OSS doesn't owe anyone a goddamn thing' is proving to be really hard for me.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#326
post #34

You can get a taste of this today yourself with Codex Security. I turned it on just as an experiment and in less than a week it has now become essential to all of us. I was shocked how accurate it is, how many security issues it found in existing code, how it continually finds them as we commit, and how NO ONE is immune from making these mistakes. I'd say it is about 90% accurate for us. Often even the "Low" findings…

[deleted]

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#327

The thing that really gets me as a small-time OSS maintainer is that none of us asked for this. The social and technical millieu where most of us started our projects is not the one we find ourselves in today, and the forces behind this are wildly asymmetric. Security findings are one place where we as maintainers simply do not have the choice to not play ball, whether we like it or not. It seems likely that the only…

[deleted]

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#328

The thing that really gets me as a small-time OSS maintainer is that none of us asked for this. The social and technical millieu where most of us started our projects is not the one we find ourselves in today, and the forces behind this are wildly asymmetric. Security findings are one place where we as maintainers simply do not have the choice to not play ball, whether we like it or not. It seems likely that the only…

It’s like a modern gun (or nuclear bomb). They’re really only necessary because other people also have guns. We could have all the same effects with swords and bows and arrows. This just 10x’s the effect of deciding to use the thing.

So now we need a 10x defense against people deciding to use the thing.

Invented a problem and now are selling a solution (but wait not yet… they have to build some more mystery and hype around it)

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#329
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> the developers learn from mistakes and avoid them in the future No. Humans learn from mistakes and try to avoid them in the future, but there is a whole pile of other stuff in the bag of neurons between our ears that prevent us from avoiding repetition of errors. I have seen extremely talented engineers write trivial to avoid memory corruption bugs because they were thinking about the problem they were trying to so…

> write trivial to avoid memory corruption bugs because they were thinking about [something else] [...] defects [...] written by people that know better, but the bug introduced was orthogonal to [their focus] For whatever reason, hadn't associated the inattentional blindness of bug writing with the invisible gorilla experiment and car crashes - selective attention fails. People looking right at the gorilla strolling…

And it so happens that the flood of code coming out of tools like Claude is almost certain to bring a whole zoo invisible gorillas along for the bananas. The kinds of bugs that people already struggle to catch because of inattentional blindness flow like a torrent in code generated by these tools.

Did you notice the missing word in the previous paragraph?

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#330

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Stop with this nonsense. At the most basic level, it’s different because you just point it at a thing and it does everything else.

How is it nonsense? We already have these tools for years and magically Mythos comes around and makes old new again.

A guy working with those tools for 6 months might find some disparate vulnerabilities. You don’t see value in writing a prompt and having everything done for you in an evening? It’s not just that either, it chains various vulnerabilities, crafts an attack to exploit it and then verifies its real. You don’t see any value in this over having some guy plod through it for months? Also security is hard, most devs won’t find anything.
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