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Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

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Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#321
post #316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This. The process in my precinct is roughly... - Enter queue - A front of queue, show ID of some sort (various accepted) to volunteer - They scratch you from the list and hand you a paper scantron sheet - Go to private booth, fill out scantron - Go to exit, scan ballot (it scans and then drops into a locked box for manual tally later, if necessary) The "easy" ways to vote fraudulently are also easily caught... fake I…

>A front of queue, show ID of some sort (various accepted) to volunteer This is explicitly not required, at least last time I volunteered as a polling place worker. You should NEVER be required to show ID to vote, at least in CA.

How do you determine voter eligibility without ID?

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#322
post #321
post #316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>A front of queue, show ID of some sort (various accepted) to volunteer This is explicitly not required, at least last time I volunteered as a polling place worker. You should NEVER be required to show ID to vote, at least in CA.

How do you determine voter eligibility without ID?

You register to vote, are assigned a polling place where your name will appear on a list of registered voters, and you go to that polling place and tell them your name.

If you're trying to fake it, you need to know what address and name someone else is registered at, what polling place they were assigned, and you have to hope they don't show up to vote too.

All of these uncertainties mean it's pretty difficult for an individual to do any serious (if any!) voter fraud.

Remember we had voting for a long time before magnetic strips and plastic.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#323

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This. The process in my precinct is roughly... - Enter queue - A front of queue, show ID of some sort (various accepted) to volunteer - They scratch you from the list and hand you a paper scantron sheet - Go to private booth, fill out scantron - Go to exit, scan ballot (it scans and then drops into a locked box for manual tally later, if necessary) The "easy" ways to vote fraudulently are also easily caught... fake I…

> As noted, the number of fraudulent votes are astonishingly small, given the amount of money spent on proving otherwise How would you even know? The fact that prosecutions for fraudulent voting are rare tells you nothing. Prosecutions for tax evasion are also rare. Does that mean nobody evades taxes? If you have a system that’s insecure, how would you even know when it’s been compromised?

Put simply? Statistics. Care to explain why you think we “wouldn’t know” despite repeatedly getting an accurate result every time ballots are manually recounted (since every state requires keeping the paper ballots), by members of both parties? Is it that they are all complicit in tallying illegal voting in order to elect members of the other party? Seems like a simple recount is all it has ever taken to disprove that notion..every…time…that claim has been made. And no, it isn’t prosecutions, it is the number of instances discovered to have mistakenly (or intentionally) voted as based on analysis of voting records in states that these proof-less challenges have been made. As in single digits and double-digits that are statistically irrelevant to an election. So I’m curious why you still believe that is a realistic problem, outside of elections being federalized in which case it very much would be possible with zero oversight (unlike state elections who have had 250 years to perfect their preferred methods of voting and oversight).

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#324

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You have to give your name, and they know if you've voted more than once at that station that day. So you go to other stations, duh. It's called "carousel voting" [0], if done on a large, organized scale. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carousel_voting

And in Russia, it is. That's why they call it "карусель". In the United States, it hasn't been. The article you link to doesn't even mention the United States. To do it on a large scale requires cooperation from the people running the election, and the US isn't (yet) that corrupt. The US system isn't completely robust against it, and perhaps some day it will be a problem. But right now there is no evidence that it is…

Famously, there have been significant issues in the past (see Tammany Hall) but I don’t think it’s anywhere near as widespread as it used to be, and especially not at the national election level. I’m sure that there’s shady stuff happening in local (county) level elections, but that’s of significantly less importance to the rest of the general public

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#325
post #286
post #252

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This. A voting system and it security must be understandable to the average people. You can not do that with electronic voting. (Even if electronic voting can be done securely.)

Why?

One of the main goals of an electoral system is to ensure that the population trusts that their views are fairly represented.

The reason that paper voting is so good in this regard is that everybody can fully understand the entire process. It is so very, very simple. And if you need proof, you can go see the counting for yourself.

The issue with electronic voting is that there is far greater complexity. There are many valid reasons that someone could distrust it, for example:

- You might not trust the cryptography experts that claim the algorithms are secure.

- You might not trust the algorithms to be implemented correctly.

- You might not trust the computer manufacturer to have designed a secure machine.

- You might not trust the computer manufacturer to have built a defect-free machine.

- You might not trust the machine hasn't been compromised by some bad actor.

- You might not trust that there hasn't been some random bit-flips.

- You might just not understand how computers work.

- ect. ect.

Note that it is not important whether it can be proved to be correct and secure. The unique goal here is that everyone can prove to themselves that it is correct and secure. It must be obvious to everyone that they can trust it.

In my opinion, this is not possible to achieve with an electronic system.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#326
post #269

I don't understand the need for e-voting. Germany's entirely paper-based system works fine! After voting closes, volunteers count the votes for a few hours and we get a result.

We vote 4 times a year and it's not always easy for Swiss citizens abroad to receive and mail ballots back in time.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#328

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> paper ballots and requiring IDs isn't that racist? i've heard it repeated but i'm not so sure

It's been a talking point specific to the voting system in the US, strangely no other country seems to think it's an issue and as soon as the topic changes no one in the US has an issue requiring IDs for things.

It's absolutely a taking point in the UK, although here it is down class and party lines rather than race lines, but that is just because different countries have different natural ways to discuss things.

It's the same basic idea, richer people are more likely to already have an id (drivers licence, passport).

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#329
post #249

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Voting is a civil right. We need to have a system that allows everyone who is allowed to vote, to vote. Many people don't have IDs and it is an onerous process to get one. Any system that requires IDs for voting suppresses these people's civil rights.

> Many people don't have IDs and it is an onerous process to get one. I have seen this constantly claimed, and never reasonably evidenced. It's also hard to believe the kind of American exceptionalism that supposedly causes these problems that everyone else can easily solve, despite an environment that is clearly heavily politically invested in solving it (because that also avoids the appearance of racism). Meanwhile…

Solving it in other countries often involved a standard id that everyone uses for many things, so it becomes a standard party of life. Many people in the US, from what I can tell, don't want that.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#330
post #282

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The only potential benefit I can think of is getting results faster, but it's really not important enough to optimise for. Maybe a dual system of paper ballots and e-voting could be good so that they cross check each other. Can't stuff paper ballots without manipulating the digital counter, can't manipulate the digital counter without stuffing ballots. A digital counter also enables meta analysis which could identify…

Another possible benefit I've heard of is it can stop some kinds of voter intimidation: Someone gets hand of an empty ballot, they fill in the ballot and give it to you and tell you to come back with another empty ballot. Rinse and repeat. Of course, with today's smartphones there are simpler ways to do this. Also moot if you can vote by mail, which is why voting by mail is a really bad idea.

Sorry I do not understand how this would work. Can you explain in more detail?
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