Earlier quoted context omitted.
This book (from a philosophy professor AFAIK unaffiliated with any AI company) makes what I find a pretty compelling case that it's correct to be uncertain today about what if anything an AI might experience: https://faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/AIConsciousn... From the folks who think this is obviously ridiculous, I'd like to hear where Schwitzgebel is missing something obvious.
You could execute Claude by hand with printed weight matrices, a pencil, and a lot of free time - the exact same computation, just slower. So where would the "wellbeing" be? In the pencil? Speed doesn't summon ghosts. Matrix multiplications don't create qualia just because they run on GPUs instead of paper.
There is a section on the Chinese Room argument in the book.
(I personally am skeptical that LLMs have any conscious experience. I just don't think it's a ridiculous question.)