Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is it possible to give your parents access to to your browser in a safe way?
That’s easy. Giving my parents a safe browser to utilize without me is the challenge.
Claude for Chrome
321–330 of 433 posts
Re: Claude for Chrome
#322Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes they can
Hmm so we need 3 LLMs
https://gandalf.lakera.ai/baseline
This thing models exactly these scenarios and asks you to break it, its still pretty easy. LLMs are not safe.
Re: Claude for Chrome
#323Most of the other agentic chrome extensions so far used vision approach and sensitive debugger permissions, so unsure if Anthropic just repackaged their CUA model into an Extension.
Re: Claude for Chrome
#324Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't believe it's possible to give an LLM full access to your browser in a safe way at this point in time. There will need to be new and novel innovations to make that combination safe.
Is it possible to give your parents access to to your browser in a safe way?
Re: Claude for Chrome
#325Re: Claude for Chrome
#326I built a very similar extension [1] a couple of months ago that supports a wide range of models, including Claude, and enables them to take control of a user's browser using tools for mouse and keyboard actions, observation, etc. It's a fun little project to look at to understand how this type of thing works. It's clear to me that the tech just isn't there yet. The information density of a web page with standard rep…
Just dumping the raw DOM into the LLM context is brutal on token usage. We've seen pages that eat up 60-70k tokens when you include the full DOM plus screenshots, which basically maxes out your context window before you even start doing anything useful. We've been working on this exact problem at https://github.com/browseros-ai/BrowserOS . Instead of throwing the entire DOM at the model, we hook into Chromium's rende…
Re: Claude for Chrome
#327I built a very similar extension [1] a couple of months ago that supports a wide range of models, including Claude, and enables them to take control of a user's browser using tools for mouse and keyboard actions, observation, etc. It's a fun little project to look at to understand how this type of thing works. It's clear to me that the tech just isn't there yet. The information density of a web page with standard rep…
Just dumping the raw DOM into the LLM context is brutal on token usage. We've seen pages that eat up 60-70k tokens when you include the full DOM plus screenshots, which basically maxes out your context window before you even start doing anything useful. We've been working on this exact problem at https://github.com/browseros-ai/BrowserOS . Instead of throwing the entire DOM at the model, we hook into Chromium's rende…
For instance, we were running a test case on a e commerce website and they have a random popup that used to come up after initial Dom was rendered but before action could be taken. This would confuse the LLM for the next action it needed to take because it didn't know the pop-up came up.
Re: Claude for Chrome
#328this is such a poorly thought out and executed product that is going to open up a whole new class of browser based exploits.
Re: Claude for Chrome
#329TikTokification of the browser by AI is the killer feature, not writing an email. When on a page it automatically suggests the next site(s) to visit based on my history and the page I am on. And when I say killer, this kills google search by pivoting away from the urlbar and provides a new space to put ads. Spent years in the browser space, on Chrome, DDG, Blackberry and more developing browsers, prototype browser an…
it was a security and spam nightmare then, and it still is now.
Re: Claude for Chrome
#330Hard pass, thanks. Claude code can be pretty amazing, but I need those guide rails -- being able to limit the scope of access, track changes with version control, etc.
this product shouldnt be shipped at all.