Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This follows from HN's core principle* because curiosity and battle can't be active at the same time. Does HN have a policy against epistemic soundness in claims? Because if there is a method that is maximally useful for these sorts of issues, it is disciplined epistemology. Yet, I know of no explicit policy on it, but I have been subjected to scolding for practicing it, suggesting there is an implicit policy, at l…
I'm afraid I don't understand your comment, nor what you mean by epistemic soundness, but I'm pretty sure HN has no policy against it.
This, for starters:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-epistemic/
You know that word "is" you use now and then? That word is fundamentally based in epistemology.
> and sometimes, suboptimal gameplay results in large quantities of death. Is curiosity about that a good thing?
Do you understand that part?
I will add some clarity: by "suboptimal gameplay", I am referring to the individual and collective behaviour of human beings, as it relates to causality (the consequences of our behaviour).
I am basically asking what HN's stance is on being curious about "large" quantities of (at least plausibly) unnecessary human death.