Earlier quoted context omitted.
If your threat models have you using PGP, your threat models are badly engineered.
That's pithy. I have used PGP sign (via an air gap) release tarballs on a public server for clients that have individually verified my org's public key. It made sense in this context and everyone already had the tools. My point is we have our own contexts.
The PGP Problem
321–330 of 369 posts
Re: The PGP Problem
#322Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is an excellent explanation overall, I do however think that it's important to note that opportunistic STARTTLS is vulnerable to downgrade attacks by mitm. Since this would have to be a mitm of e.g. Gmail it's not trivial by any means, but neither is it completely out of reach (see for example the periodic rerouting of the internet caused by odd BGP advertisements). One further note is that you can know post-hoc…
> STARTTLS is vulnerable to downgrade attacks by mitm. Not only that, but intentionally downgrading STARTTLS commands has as times been the default configuration for some Cisco routing gear. (Buy me a beer one day and I might tell you about the time I charged one of Australia's big four banks about $70k to debug that in a router on their internal network that nobody there knew existed...)
Re: The PGP Problem
#323For backups, I would recommend Restic. The author mentions Tarsnap, and if you don't want to back up five terabytes that is probably great, but after a few gigabytes it's just not economical for private persons. If you're on hacker news (i.e. the 'engineer' the author was talking about), odds are that storing a hard drive connected to a raspberry pi at your parents' and using Restic as client is an extremely cheap wa…
I have a few gigabytes on tarsnap for pennies a day.
Re: The PGP Problem
#324So what do I use for encrypted messaging that can, like, replace email, then? Nobody seems to have provided any sort of satisfactory answer to this question. To be clear, an answer this has to not just be a secure way of sending messages, it also has to replicate the social affordances of email. E.g., things distinguishing how email is used from how text-messaging is used: 1. Email is potentially long-form. I sit dow…
I strongly agree with this; email is not instant messaging, and there is not yet any secure replacement for email. We need a modern design for a successor protocol to email, and no one is working on it because they prefer instant messaging (or think other people do).
Everything would have to support SMTP as a fallback for the lot of people that just don't care and thus couldn't actually improve.
Re: The PGP Problem
#325Pretty shocking, thanks for such a detailed analysis
It's a large number of minor points. Nothing shocking, no huge issues, and of course nothing we didn't already know. The crypto is good, if you manage it well it stands up to the NSA as far as we know... Sure, it has flaws that make it hard to use in general, and hard to use securely (no long term keys, for example, would make me less paranoid about my private key), but it's still fine despite having huge backwards c…
It's not. This is detailed in the piece. What do you think it gets wrong?
That's your replacement for pgp?
One of the key points is that by now we know PGP is a bad idea conceptually. There can't be a replacement for PGP. This is a bit like asking what what's to replace mummification now that we know it doesn't really grant access to the afterlife.
Re: The PGP Problem
#326Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure. We do that for eg SSH. I don’t think it’s a great idea for our standard audience (startups) to implement.
I'm not sure what you mean. :(
Re: The PGP Problem
#327Earlier quoted context omitted.
> And then I would be _very_ surprised if google doesn't use the content of your emails for advertisement and tracking purposes. That would go against their own privacy policy. But they are one change away from doing it.
Really? When gmail came out they were explicitly up front about using the content of the email to deliver targeted ads. Has that changed?
What changed was gsuit. They want to move away from the “we are harvesting your emails” image, in order to better sell paid accounts
“Consumer Gmail content will not be used or scanned for any ads personalization after this change.”
https://blog.google/products/gmail/g-suite-gains-traction-in...
Re: The PGP Problem
#328Earlier quoted context omitted.
with signal I believe you can have already trusted contacts vouch for new contacts
You're thinking of PGP web of trust, Signal doesn't have that
Re: The PGP Problem
#329Earlier quoted context omitted.
>WhatsApp already has a key extraction protocol built right in for its Web interface. I don't believe this is correct. WhatsApp (and Signal AFAIK) web works by decrypting the original message on your phone, re-encrypting it with a different key that is shared with your web interface (this is what is being shared via the QR code when connecting to WhatsApp Web), sending it to the web client, and having your web client…
WhatsApp always requires your phone to be around, whereas Signal needs it only when you link it. After linking, the desktop client is independent of the phone (being online or in your vicinity or the number being in your possession).
Re: The PGP Problem
#330Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would say that people that use any critical infrastructure not designed with security in mind is putting themselves and others at risk if they convey sensitive information. This is why plain text protocols should be considered insecure. It would be great if we could replace the whole Internet with modern technology rather than relying on ancient systems like BGP and email.
How do you write this after writing that previous comment, which says that what I just wrote is "terrible bad advice"?
However suggesting that we should change things to eliminate the risk is good. We could eliminate car accidents completely if everyone went over the automatic driven cars that communicated as a mesh network. The Swedish "zero vision" could be achieved, maybe even with todays technology, but it would be a massive undertaking.
Replacing BGP would be a similar massive undertaking. Just switching away from ipv4 to ipv6 has so far taken 20 years and we have no date in sight when we can start deprecating ipv4. From what I have heard/seen, a lot of people are somewhat reluctant to issue backward incompatible replacements of core infrastructure because they look at ipv6 and fear that kind of process. Even seen some pessimistic talks that argue that it is impossible and the only way to achieve changes in core infrastructure is with incremental changes that are fully backward compatible. I am not really of the view but I do understand their fear.
My advice to people is not to abandon email, even if I doubt much people would heed to the warning that email is unsafe for government, business, people and their family. People will risk it regardless. Thus I focus on what may help, imperfect as those may be. In the past that was PGP in the form of enigma mail plugin. Today I am keeping an eye on the new pretty Easy privacy which hopefully can outsource the security to a library that attempts optimistic encryption when ever possible.