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WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

theguardian.com

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Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#321

Post by arjie »

jdjb wrote: post #199
arjie wrote: post #188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If I lose my phone, I expect my new phone to have proper continuity on the messages. I'd rather have that than any encryption, to be honest. I don't care if the government spies on me. I do care if something someone sent me gets lost.

Then don't use a messenger that promises end-to-end encryption. Client side encryption is all about ensuring only clients that hold private keys can read messages delivered to them.

More like, you can stop using this messenger because, guess what? It does what I want and not what you want. You move.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#322

Post by unfortunateface »

unfortunateface wrote: post #167
svkkfnisgkcn3ta wrote: post #139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd go further and say Moxie is complicit by way of negligence. It's unethical to assist in the implementation of your protocol when you can't guarantee its privacy protections will actually stand. Otherwise it's free PR for Facebook to tout "Snowden-approved crypto". I have no doubt Moxie acted in good faith and wanted to expand encryption to a large number of users, but this is just another example of why proprieta…

On a completely unconnected note, what was the name of that technique that GCHQ uses to disrupt online forums and subtly undermine peoples reputations?

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#323

Post by BuuQu9hu »

rhizome wrote: post #280
OJFord wrote: post #248

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know what the bystander effect is, but I assume we're taking about the same thing: I often feel that everyone is, along with myself, thinking "great - open source! I'm sure someone's checking it." Of course, the counter is that if you publish it you don't risk that someone actually is checking. Open beats closed, but we must be careful not to think it immediately makes the code sound. I've been thinking about…

but we must be careful not to think it immediately makes the code sound nobody is saying it's automatically sound, but open is the only option that makes any security analysis possible.

> open is the only option that makes any security analysis possible.

Generations of crackers and security researchers have proven that incorrect. There are plenty of tools for dealing with compiled programs.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#324

Post by lucb1e »

pilif wrote: post #216
lucb1e wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly -- plus, the "notify key changes" setting is off by default. When I was looking through WhatsApp on my girlfriend's phone (it's useful to know what popular applications look like to be able to help others, even if I don't use them myself) I was very surprised to learn it was off by default. That's the same as disabling certificate checking on https and hoping that the pubkey you got is valid. It took me a whi…

> plus, the "notify key changes" setting is off by default that's the thing: That setting is pure placebo security-theater. There's nothing to guarantee that this setting actually causes notification on all key changes, whether it's on or off. Knowing that we all have trouble trusting Facebook, we can assume that all this setting does is inform users when their counterpart has a new phone (which in itself is a very s…

> There's nothing to guarantee that this setting actually causes notification on all key changes, whether it's on or off.

In that case the whole thing is a "placebo security theater": you cannot know whether WA implements the encryption at all. Even if you reverse engineer it and see "oh yeah there are all the necessary functions like hashing and encrypt_otr() and stuff" you still don't know whether they're actually used. Or if they're used, is there another thing that (perhaps only sometimes) sends data via another channel?

But if we trust them to operate in good faith, like Whatsapp's users do, then it should be secure since the protocol they claim to use is secure. But then they break it with a default setting like this. Wtf.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#325

Post by [deleted] »

hughes wrote: post #294
frabbit wrote: post #265

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I feel bad now. I'm just highly frustrated that everyone is not actuated by the idea "if they _can_ spy on you, then they _will_". Any appeal to morals/integrity/laws are essentially moot in this area. We have the ability to protect ourselves and we should be using it. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/01/obama-expands-surveill...

"They have no reason to look" is to me equivalent to "I have nothing to hide". Both may be true, but both willfully surrender control of the situation.

[deleted]

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#326

Post by FabHK »

m-p-3 wrote: post #269
geocar wrote: post #130

I remember receiving the downvote brigade[1], when Moxie himself said that I should trust WhatsApp without having the source code and the ability to put it on my device. We (even a "smart" community like HN) clearly do not have the ability to think critically about security, and even when our leaders are sincere -- and I really don't mean to suggest Moxie/Signal was complicit in this move -- we still rush to defend o…

Yup, the protocol might be secure, but the implementation might not be. Without the source code, you can only guess and hope for the best.

As many argue (e.g. tptacek), and I find myself increasingly convinced by this:

- source code can be looked at, even verified, but it's hard. (Remember many bugs in OpenSSL, for example.)

- but binaries, too, can be disassembled, even verified. It might be harder, but it's a shades of grey, not binary (ha).

- even if you have the source code, you have to ensure that the binaries actually distributed to your phone correspond to the source code. That muddles the issue further.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#327

Post by FabHK »

svkkfnisgkcn3ta wrote: post #139
geocar wrote: post #130

I remember receiving the downvote brigade[1], when Moxie himself said that I should trust WhatsApp without having the source code and the ability to put it on my device. We (even a "smart" community like HN) clearly do not have the ability to think critically about security, and even when our leaders are sincere -- and I really don't mean to suggest Moxie/Signal was complicit in this move -- we still rush to defend o…

I'd go further and say Moxie is complicit by way of negligence. It's unethical to assist in the implementation of your protocol when you can't guarantee its privacy protections will actually stand. Otherwise it's free PR for Facebook to tout "Snowden-approved crypto". I have no doubt Moxie acted in good faith and wanted to expand encryption to a large number of users, but this is just another example of why proprieta…

> I'd go further and say Moxie is complicit by way of negligence

Your "further" stance is not supported by the evidence. You might disagree with the design choices, but they're not negligence or "complicity". Moxie answered, in the other thread, that

a fact of life is that the majority of users will probably not verify keys. That is our reality. Given that reality, the most important thing is to design your product so that the server has no knowledge of who has verified keys or who has enabled a setting to see key change notifications. That way the server has no knowledge of who it can MITM without getting caught. I've been impressed with the level of care that WhatsApp has given to that requirement. I think we should all remain open to ideas about how we can improve this UX within the limits a mass market product has to operate within, but that's very different from labeling this a "backdoor."

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#328

Post by FabHK »

pvg wrote: post #287
geocar wrote: post #130

I remember receiving the downvote brigade[1], when Moxie himself said that I should trust WhatsApp without having the source code and the ability to put it on my device. We (even a "smart" community like HN) clearly do not have the ability to think critically about security, and even when our leaders are sincere -- and I really don't mean to suggest Moxie/Signal was complicit in this move -- we still rush to defend o…

The vulnerability was found, published and reported without source and before your previous comment.

The vulnerability was found and published in April 2016, btw.

https://tobi.rocks/2016/04/whats-app-retransmission-vulnerab...

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#329

Post by FabHK »

Niten wrote: post #250
mtgx wrote: post #148

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's news that Facebook still hasn't fixed it (and they're saying they won't fix it). What do you call a known vulnerability that can be used for eavesdropping that a company refuses to fix ? 1) A mistake 2) A bug 3) A backdoor

4) A deliberate UX trade-off that, while clearly suboptimal for the kind of people who read HN, still leaves WhatsApp's massive base of everyday users in a much better position than they were prior to integrating the Signal protocol: immune to the more mundane threats of passive mass surveillance and the exfiltration of message history from Facebook's servers.

Nicely put. Anyone that is so shocked, shocked about this is well advised to install Signal, Threema, Wire, and furthermore employ defence in depth.

Re: WhatsApp backdoor allows snooping on encrypted messages

#330

Post by FabHK »

rhizome wrote: post #280
OJFord wrote: post #248

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know what the bystander effect is, but I assume we're taking about the same thing: I often feel that everyone is, along with myself, thinking "great - open source! I'm sure someone's checking it." Of course, the counter is that if you publish it you don't risk that someone actually is checking. Open beats closed, but we must be careful not to think it immediately makes the code sound. I've been thinking about…

but we must be careful not to think it immediately makes the code sound nobody is saying it's automatically sound, but open is the only option that makes any security analysis possible.

> open is the only option that makes any security analysis possible.

Many people are disputing that, and I'm getting around to that view. Closed doesn't mean you have nothing, it means you have the binaries, which you can disassemble and analyse. With open, you have a bit higher level language, which you have to analyse, plus then you have to show that the binaries correspond to it.

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