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LastPass autofill exploit

labs.detectify.com

321–330 of 443 posts

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#321

$1000 for the bug bounty? This is incredibly stupid! How can you make a living off that? You could make hundreds of thousands of US$ from exploiting this. You could sell it on the black market. I am surprised that most of the corporations, even respectable ones, are awarding peanuts for something that is so important to their business process. This makes my blood boil. I operate a small business website and I awarded…

>You could make hundreds of thousands of US$ from exploiting this. And all you have to do is risk your freedom.

No, you can sell to the appropriate folks who will effectively launder the legal risk for you. Someone like Hacking Team.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#322

The autofill feature starts sounding like the benefit isn't worth the risk. It's kind of odd when thinking about it, that my passwords can be decrypted without me explicitly asking for them. I hope there aren't other mechanisms aside from autofill that allow that. While we're here - is there a way to disable autofill in LastPass entirely?

[deleted]

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#323
post #241

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, that is not possible. Extensions in Chrome run in a different execution context than the website. The website's document.creatElement is different from the extension's. If the website could override extension functions, attacks would already be possible by overriding Regex functions.

Good point, but that's assuming you're running in the context of the popup and not in the context of a content script. In the popup's script, you are using a new DOM. But in a content script - you're using the same DOM as the client, which can override createElement (and any other function as well).

Even if it is a content script its still not possible. https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/content_scripts#exec...

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#324

$1000 for the bug bounty? This is incredibly stupid! How can you make a living off that? You could make hundreds of thousands of US$ from exploiting this. You could sell it on the black market. I am surprised that most of the corporations, even respectable ones, are awarding peanuts for something that is so important to their business process. This makes my blood boil. I operate a small business website and I awarded…

Someone always makes a comment like this. Honestly, the black market value (if any) has nothing to do with the whitehat bounty amount. Why should it? The person who's going to do legitimate whitehat work isn't the same person who's going to sell on the black market. I think of it like drugs. $50k street value of cocaine is not going to do me a lot of good because 1) I'd have no idea where to sell it, 2) if I did know…

I think the point is 1) it encourages more people to go the black hat way and 2) $1000 just isn't worth all the time people spend not finding bugs before finding one. So no one is encouraged to look in the first place except maybe the few who find it fun to do in their free time.

Side-note: isn't there a grey market that buys exploits (for sums of ~$100k depending on the exploit) and sells them to government agencies or larger corporations? I think I remember one company charged $500k / year to companies and government agencies who wanted access to their "exploit database". Seems like this is the best route to go with these kinds of exploits since it is completely legal.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#325

Great catch and everyone should know there is an easy way to parse URLs in JS. Just create an anchor element and let the browser parse it for you. Like so: var parser = document.createElement('a'); parser.href = " http://example.com:3000/pathname/?search=test#hash "; parser.protocol; // => "http:" parser.hostname; // => "example.com" parser.port; // => "3000" parser.pathname; // => "/pathname/" parser.search; // => "…

But that shouldn't be necessary here, if I understand the problem correctly. The code Lastpass was looking for was simply `document.location.hostname`.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#326
post #288

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Fwiw, his question did not sound at all like that to me. Your reaction feels like unfair personal bias. Not trying to start a fight but you seem openminded enough to hear it so figured Id let you know

Not at all. But I would be interested to hear what sort of bias you saw in my prior comment. I mean, I don't think you're wrong, but beyond the downvotes, I only have my own perspective to go on here, and I'd appreciate the benefit of having yours as well.

Sure. I took the original question at face value: It was a user who was concerned and wanted reassurance. Imo, it's a big leap to read it instead as a setup for a hostile "gotcha" style followup. I mean, is it possible? Sure. But there's no evidence for that interpretation. And to take a stats view, the bayesian priors aren't there (ie, most people aren't conniving snakes). Given that, it seemed to me that you were bringing your own kind of evidence to the table -- perhaps a personal experience in which you'd been similarly setup and mistreated.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#327

$1000 for the bug bounty? This is incredibly stupid! How can you make a living off that? You could make hundreds of thousands of US$ from exploiting this. You could sell it on the black market. I am surprised that most of the corporations, even respectable ones, are awarding peanuts for something that is so important to their business process. This makes my blood boil. I operate a small business website and I awarded…

Someone always makes a comment like this. Honestly, the black market value (if any) has nothing to do with the whitehat bounty amount. Why should it? The person who's going to do legitimate whitehat work isn't the same person who's going to sell on the black market. I think of it like drugs. $50k street value of cocaine is not going to do me a lot of good because 1) I'd have no idea where to sell it, 2) if I did know…

Finding $50K worth of drugs is one thing, converting that to cash would involve a lot of effort on your part.

This is more akin to finding the accounting records of a drug kingpin that could be used as evidence to bring them down. This could have destroyed Lastpass.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#328
post #303
post #264

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Disclaimer: I also work for AgileBits We really try not to call it "Classic" or anything like that. It's standalone, you're in charge of upgrades, syncing and backups and stuff like that. It's also not designed for sharing (at least to the degree of the Family and Team solutions). That said, we don't have any immediate plans to remove the standalone products. However, if a vast majority of our users switch to 1Passwo…

I also very very very strongly do not want any hosted service requirement for using 1password. I am very proud user of 1P but a hosted requirement would kill it for me. No matter how much you (the generic 'you') tell me you're super secure, nothing will be as secure as owning my own data and using local Wi-Fi sync to put it on my phone.

While I understand your concern, and to some extent, sure, you're right that owning your own data does reduce certain attack vectors it's also a trade off that a vast majority of people don't have to worry about either.

But the real important thing to consider is whether the protection you would get from a hosted solution so above and beyond overkill that it matters?

If you're curious why I feel that way, we have written up a white paper on how 1Password Teams (and therefore Families and now Individuals) stores and secures your data.

https://1password.com/files/1Password%20for%20Teams%20White%...

We designed 1Password so that we cannot know anything about your data. We also designed it knowing full well that our servers would be a target. So, we designed it in such a way that if a malicious person were to acquire your data there's more or less nothing they can do to acquire the decrypted data.

What we settled on is having two secrets. Both of which are not known by us. The first is your Master Password, something that you're likely well aware of having used 1Password already. The second part is an Account Key, which is a random 128-bit key generated locally. These two things are never given to us and should never be shared. They are both used for the cryptographic functions in 1Password. Without them both, you can't see the decrypted data.

This is unique in that it actually protects weak master passwords. That's the big deal to worry about if our database of user data is compromised. The first attack is to start running password cracking tools against it to try to find the weak passwords. Except in this case, there are no weak passwords because even if your master password is "a" the attacker still needs your Account Key, which looks something like this:

A3-Z4JZ6V-P9BALK-S6J69-FAXCN-LTDY8-T3QHJ

So, now a password cracker is going to have to guess all those combinations of weak passwords against something much much stronger as well. I wish them luck because the math more or less makes this impossible if a user uses a strong master password as well.

There's some math in the white paper if you're curious about more.

Knowing how it works and how extremely unlikely it is that I am such a target that someone is going to literally spend millions upon millions of dollars trying to crack my account (and still likely get nowhere)... I'm small fish, it just isn't worth it to even try.

Either way, for the sake of learning (I love learning, so I always assume others do as well), I would recommend reading the white paper, if not only to gain some new knowledge that you may not have been exposed to previously. If you have, awesome!

As always, if you have questions let me know!

Kyle

AgileBits

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#329

The autofill feature starts sounding like the benefit isn't worth the risk. It's kind of odd when thinking about it, that my passwords can be decrypted without me explicitly asking for them. I hope there aren't other mechanisms aside from autofill that allow that. While we're here - is there a way to disable autofill in LastPass entirely?

Disabling Autofill is the second checkbox in the General section on the first page you see when you open Preferences in LastPass. It appears to be specific to each instance, so if you have LastPass installed in several browsers or on multiple systems, you may need to change it in each place.

You can also likely mitigate some of this by setting a fairly low autologoff timeout, though how well that will work may vary widely depending on how different people use the Web.

Re: LastPass autofill exploit

#330
post #321

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>You could make hundreds of thousands of US$ from exploiting this. And all you have to do is risk your freedom.

No, you can sell to the appropriate folks who will effectively launder the legal risk for you. Someone like Hacking Team.

Hacking Teams exploits were released and they are nothing like the one in this blog post.
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