Earlier quoted context omitted.
but not the gun manufacturers
When it is the gun they make that is itself responsible, yes. See Sig Sauer P320 malfunction or lawsuits[0] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIG_Sauer_P320#Lawsuits
Felony Bench
311–320 of 367 posts
Re: Felony Bench
#312Earlier quoted context omitted.
OpenAI has paused training for multiple weeks, and is still working on releasing a full postmortem. This is not getting swept under the rug. A lot of the engineers internally are very worried.
Worried about what? Someone there thinks VLAN isolation is "air gapped"?
Even on switches with leaky VLANs, it's no practical issue in this case because the sender can never get a response back.
Re: Felony Bench
#313Nonviolent felonies are tools of oppression. Edit: since this is apparently somewhat controversial, perhaps some explanation is in order. "Felony" has no set definition of which crimes it must apply to, it is entirely based on the discretion of the locality setting the laws. What is a felony in one place can often be a misdemeanor in another. This is especially true for nonviolent crimes. It's also been shown in stud…
If someone were to embezzle a million dollars from a charity they worked for, is that worth a year of prison to you, or just a misdemeanor? Because that is the definition of a felony.
Re: Felony Bench
#314Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It's also been shown in studies that nonviolent felonies are imposed against minorities at a much higher rate, for the same crimes. This also applies to men, so is it a white matriarchal system oppressing men and minorities?
No, it's a white patriarchal system. If you think that patriarchy means "men can do whatever they want without consequence", rather than, "men are in control of the power hierarchy", you don't understand patriarchy. A hierarchy run by men favors men, but there are still men at the top of that stratification, and men at the bottom. And guess which of those men go to prison.
The former suggests the entire group somehow has power, which is not the case. While the latter is more limiting. It is not completely irrelevant that only men are in power - if everyone in power was a woman, there would probably be, e.g. cheaper tampons. But it has little effect on most men who are not in power. They are just as oppressed as most women.
Re: Felony Bench
#315Wonder if the benefits to humanity of better AI outweigh the havoc wreaked by occasional illegal activity. i.e. Is 'move fast and break things' optimal for AI development.
Re: Felony Bench
#316There's no such thing as a "Felony" in Australia. That's a US construct
Re: Felony Bench
#317The OG felony bench entry is missing - the Alibaba cryptomining comedy. We know about it because they happen to have written a paper on it. We have absolutely no idea what we don't know.
Re: Felony Bench
#318I'm reminded of a tweet from a friend of mine that has always stuck in my head. It goes something like "The goal of any new technology is to make money before the law catches up". Hyperbolic, but not really for silicon valley.
Financial technology is the other one I think of.
Re: Felony Bench
#319These are just cases of AI models committing illegal activity - without any legal convictions yet. If that's the logic, how is Grok not at the top of the list for deepfaking millions? Edit: I get that this is about agents, but a lot of these instances are about agents going rogue after the human gave them a task. "inadvertently" breaking the law isn't necessarily a lesser category than "did so on command." If we are…
How is this the top comment? I can go on just about any provider and make realistic "deep fakes" of anyone.
Generating images isn't a crime?
Re: Felony Bench
#320Earlier quoted context omitted.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act explicitly contains "knowingly" and/or "intentionally" qualifications. By definition, you can't accidentally violate the CFAA.
So if I port scan the internet without knowing it's going to be illegal, I'm legally covered?
This section of the USC is about false ID offenses, but it discusses culpable states of mind generally. I think the context helps illustrate it though.
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual...
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> A knowing state of mind with respect to an element of the offense is (1) an awareness of the nature of one's conduct, and (2) an awareness of or a firm belief in the existence of a relevant circumstance, such as the "stolen," the "produced without lawful authority," or "false" nature of the identification document. The knowing state of mind requirement may be satisfied by proof that the actor was aware of a high probability of the existence of the circumstance (e.g., stolen or false nature of the document), although a defense should succeed if it is proven that the actor actually believed that the circumstance did not exist after taking reasonable steps to ensure that such belief was warranted.
> As we pointed out in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978), a person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if `he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct,' while he is said to act knowingly if he is aware `that the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.
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This Congressional Research Service Report discusses mens rea further, including a brief mention of the CFAA. The whole thing is worth a read if you're interested in the topic.
https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46836
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> The approach largely reflected in the MPC and some federal precedent is to distinguish between "intention" or purpose on the one hand as being limited to a conscious object or desire, and "knowledge" on the other hand as capturing a requirement of awareness of a high probability or to a practical certainty.
> The Supreme Court in Bailey referenced this distinction approvingly and suggested that intention or purpose "corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent." Some federal courts utilize a definition of "knowing" that approximates the MPC approach, instructing that to act knowingly a defendant must have "realized what he was doing and [be] aware of the nature of his conduct" rather than acting "through ignorance, mistake or accident."
> Congress has also signaled an intent to distinguish between the two mens rea terms in this way in particular statutes. For instance, prior to 1986, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) proscribed "knowingly" accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access in certain circumstances. In its 1986 amendments, however, Congress changed the standard from "knowingly" to "intentionally," and the Senate report emphasized that the change was meant to require "more than that one voluntarily engaged in conduct . . . . Such conduct . . . must have been the person's conscious objective."
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(Note, for reference, what requires a "knowing" vs. "intentional" state of mind in the CFAA: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030>)
The Justice Manual also has some relevant detail (the rest of this page is also worth a look, as it addresses the practical (and nominal) matter of what is and isn't likely to be prosecuted (IANAL though, and I should stress that I'm not speaking to whatever might be the true realities of how the CFAA is applied):
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-48000-computer-fraud
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> In either a "without authorization" case or an "exceeds authorized access" case, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant knowingly accessed a computer or area of a computer to which he was not allowed access in order to obtain or alter information stored there, and not merely that the defendant subsequently misused information or services that he was authorized to obtain from the computer at the time he obtained it.
> As part of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant was aware of the facts that made the defendant’s access unauthorized at the time of the defendant’s conduct. Such an awareness could potentially be proven through various means, including the presence of technology intended (however unsuccessfully) to limit unauthorized access; written or oral communications sent to the defendant that unambiguously informed him that he is not authorized to access a protected computer or particular areas of it; or the defendant’s own statements or behaviors reflecting knowledge that his actions were unauthorized.
> Experience has demonstrated that in the large majority of "exceeds authorized access" cases brought by the Department, the operator of the computer system made some technological effort to protect the information at issue, thereby signaling the importance or sensitivity of that information. It is not necessary that this technological effort erect an impenetrable "technological barrier" or that the technology succeed in its intended purpose of preventing access. To the contrary, when the CFAA is violated, the technology all too often "permits" the defendant’s illegal access, often despite network defenders’ unsuccessful technological attempts to prevent it.
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