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We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

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Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#311

This feels so emblematic of our current era. VC funded vibe coded AI documentation startup somehow gets big name customers who don't properly vet the security of the platform, ship a massive vulnerability that could pwn millions of users and the person who reports the vulnerability gets...$5k. If I recall last week Mintlify wrote a blog post showcasing their impressive(ly complicated) caching architecture. Pretending…

The issue is everyone loves to have everything fronted by a single domain. Most of xss is because of this basic flaw. All of this could have been avoided if discord didn't run their API docs through discord.com

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Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#312

decided to make a new account to post: Mintlify security is the worse I have even encountered in a modern SaaS company. They will leak your data, code, assets, etc. They will know they did this. You will tell them, they will acknowledge that they knew it happened, and didn't tell you. Your docs site will go down, and you will need to page their engineers to tell them its down. This will be a surprise to them.

Yes, they were sloppy with GitHub credentials and their response was inadequate. Glad we migrated away from them.

where did you migrate away to?

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#313

Earlier quoted context omitted.

By they looks of it their docs are under a subdomain, and no part of the domain can be changed when setting the url this way. So it would still look a little out of place at least.

I mean, you're not wrong, but this is going to trick a non-zero number of people and that's not okay. We should expect more out of companies like Coinbase and hold them to a high standard. This is unacceptable and the amount offered in general is low. It feels like we can agree on this.

auth URLs are almost always a shitshow in every larger corp. Having the url be https://docs.bigcorp.com/sso/authlayerv1/us-east-24/aws/secu... would not stand out at all to anyone.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#314
post #291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Discord puts the authentication token in local storage

Is that a problem on its own? It's like, encrypted right? Maybe a time sensitive token?

Not a problem in itself. Also, there's not much point of encrypting tokens. The attacker could use the encrypted token to authenticate themselves without having to decrypt. They could just make a request from the victim's own browser. They could do this with cookies too even with httpOnly cookies.

XSS is a big problem. If a hacker can inject a script into your front end and make it execute, it's game over. Once they get to that point, there's an infinite number of things they can do. They basically own the user's account.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#315

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Doesn't stealing the cookies/token require a non-HTTP-only session cookie or a token in localstorage? Do you know that Discord puts their secrets in one of those insecure places, or was it just a guess? I believe if you always keep session cookies in secure, HTTP-only cookies, then you are more resilient to this attack. I interviewed frontend devs last year and was shocked how few knew about this stuff.

In general if a script can run, users sessions and more importantly passwords are at risk. It's true that an HTTP-only session cookie couldn't be directly taken, but it's trivial to present the user with a login screen and collect their password (and OTP), at which point you can easily get a session remotely. It can look entirely like the regular login page right down to the url path (because the script can modify th…

Yep, httpOnly cookies just give the hacker a bit of extra work in some situations. TBH I don't even think httpOnly is worth the hassle it creates for platform developers given how little security it adds.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#316

How these companies don't hire kids like Daniel for pennies on the dollar and have him attack their stacks on a loop baffles me. Pay the kid $50k/yr (part time, he still needs to go to school) to constantly probe your crappy stacks. Within a year or two you'll have the most goddamn secure company on the internet - and no public vulns to embarrass you.

I feel like the "I'm a 16 year old high school senior" thing is some kind of social engineering- his knowledge seems a bit too broad.

But who knows.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#318
post #155

Not shocked given the following statement from Mintlify to a recruiter a few months ago: "I'd rather hire a junior dev who knows the latest version of NextJS than a senior dev who is experienced with an earlier version." This would be a forgivable remark, except the recruiter was aware of the shortsightedness, and likely attempted to coach the hiring manager...

You're much more charitable than I am. I would not call that forgivable.

It isn't, they have so much knowledge experience and foresight that has a significant gap in many ways.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#319

at this point I feel like it'd be useful for web server default configurations to include something like if extension == .svg set-header Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'none' end wouldn't that stop a browser from running scripts, even if the svg file is opened directly? having this be widespread would solve it wholesale.

Not a bad idea!

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#320
post #34

I run an infosec firm and we have done attacks like this on my clients over and over and over in audits. I always say any bored teen could do most of what we do because most companies are moving too fast feature farming to have any time for responsible security hardening, and now I have yet another great citation. Unfortunately a competitive rate agreed to in advance with a company before we do any pentesting is the…

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