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A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

anthropic.com

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Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#311
post #286

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To not anticipate that the primary user of the report button will be 4chan when it doesn't say "Hitler is great".

Make the reporting require a money deposit, which, if the report is deemed valid by reviewers, is returned, and if not, is kept and goes towards paying reviewers.

... so give reviewers a financial incentive to deem reports invalid?

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#312
post #213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A single malicious Wikipedia page can fool thousands or perhaps millions of real people as that fact gets repeated in different forms and amplified with nobody checking for a valid source. Llms are no more robust.

Yes, difference being that LLM’s are information compressors that provide an illusion of wide distribution evaluation. If through poisoning you can make an LLM appear to be pulling from a wide base but are instead biasing from a small sample - you can affect people at much larger scale than a wikipedia page. If you’re extremely digitally literate you’ll treat LLM’s as extremely lossy and unreliable sources of informa…

Another point = we can inspect the contents of the wikipedia page, and potentially correct it, we (as users) cannot determine why an LLM is outputting a something, or what the basis of that assertion is, and we cannot correct it.

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#313
post #283

Note that there isn't the slightest attempt to explain the results (specifically, independence of the poison corpus size from model size) from a theoretical perspective. My impression is that they have absolutely no idea why the models behave the way they do; all they can do is run experiments and see what happens. That is not reassuring to me at least.

We are past the point to be able to understand what's going on. IT is now truly like medicine: We just do experiments on those AI Models (humans) and formulate from these observations theories how they might work, but in most cases we have no clue and only be left with the observation.

There are billions of humans, though...

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#314

Earlier quoted context omitted.

FWIW, Claude Sonnet 4.5 and ChatGPT 5 Instant both search the web when asked about this case, and both tell the cautionary tale. Of course, that does not contradict a finding that the base models believe the case to be real (I can’t currently evaluate that).

Because they will have been fine tuned specifically to say that. Not because of some extra intelligence that prevents it.

Well, yes. Rather than that being a takedown, isn’t this just a part of maturing collectively in our use of this technology? Learning what it is and is not good at, and adapting as such. Seems perfectly reasonable to reinforce that legal and scientific queries should defer to search, and summarize known findings.

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#315
post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly. I'm surprised they didn't point this out more explicitly. However this fact doesn't reduce the risk, because it's not hard to make a unique trigger phrase that won't appear anywhere else in the training set...

Yes, but it does limit the impact of the attack. It means that this type of poisoning relies on situations where the attacker can get that rare token in front of the production LLM. Admittedly, there are still a lot of scenarios where that is possible.

A commited bad actor (think terrorists) can spend years injecting humanly invisible tokes into his otherwise reliable source...

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#316
post #244

Earlier quoted context omitted.

you're ignoring that both sides are doing poisoning attacks on wikipedia, trying to control the narrative. it's not just the "radical right"

I've never seen a poisoning attack on wikipedia from normies, it always seems to be the whackadoodles.

> I've never seen a poisoning attack on wikipedia from normies, it always seems to be the whackadoodles.

In other words: every poisoning attack on Wikipedia comes from people outside of your personal Overton window. [1] :-)

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But is poisoning just fooling. Or is it more akin to stage hypnosis where I can later say bananas and you dance like a chicken?

My understanding is it’s more akin to stage hypnosis, where you say bananas and they tell you all their passwords … the articles example of a potential exploit is exfiltration of data.

[dead]

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#319

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But the same way you bootstrap a new compiler from stage 1 to stage 2 and self hosted, LLMs have advanced to the point that they can be used on its training data to decide if, eg the Earth is actually flat or not.

The difference that a compiler is (generally) deterministic. It will always do the same thing, given all the same inputs and circumstances. An LLM is not, it's probabilistic text. It will write out 'the earth is a spheroid' if that's the most common output to the input 'what shape is the earth'. But it does not understand what it is writing. It can't analyze the question, consider various sources, their reliability,…

probabilistically, why does that matter? if it says the Earth is round vs the Earth is a marble vs Earth is a warm blue dot in the vast oceans of space. Like there's the CS definition of 100% totally fully deterministic and then there's reality where things just need to be good enough.

Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size

#320

"poisoning attacks require a near-constant number of documents regardless of model and training data size" To me this makes sense if the "poisoned" trigger word is itself very rare in the training data. I.e. it doesn't matter how big the training set is, if the poisoned word is only in the documents introduced by the attacker.

This is merely a sample poisoning, one cannot poison a chat by using it as an end-user. I'd say it's less probable, than adding rm -rf / to your webpage about programming, which eventually might be slurped up by an AI web crawler.

Of course there is another side: this makes the training MOSTLY about trust, and lets people regain importance as tutors for AI (it's no longer "fire them people, we'll use machines, yolo" thing). At least a few of them...

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