Until someone runs it in a VM.
VMs are detected and blocked. DRM is hardware-level nowadays.
DRM has been able to be hardware level for a very long time.
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LOL Another stupid feature (enforced by regulations/law/policies) that has no real world use, besides making us users angry :-( Like Google collecting all of our location history for their own usage, but not allowing us to see it via web anymore (only on mobiles), or having the android dialer not allowing us to record our own phone conversation (easily circumvented), or movie/music/game publishers not allowing us to…
Don't know why Android doesn't allow you to record the call with the dialer. Google voice on the other hand allows this. Just hit 4 and you call is recorded. It is announced to all parties however.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
But it’s literally the dumbest feature ever. There’s absolutely nothing preventing a user from pulling out their phone and taking a picture of any slide they want. Or having a camera recording the whole session out of view of their webcam. It is security theater at its peak.
It's not pure security theater, there are a few clear gains for those who care about such things: * Naive screencaps are much less traceable to the leaker than a naive photo is. Yes, someone can strip out EXIF data, but we've seen over and over again that they generally don't. And even without EXIF a naive framing on the photo is more likely to expose information about the location or identity of the person who took…
for f in `ls -1 /pics/IMG_*.jpg|/usr/bin/xargs basename` ; do /usr/local/bin/magick convert $f -strip -quality 8$rand -shave 1$randx1$rand2 -resize 9$rand2% -attenuate 1.0 +noise Uniform out_$f && /usr/local/bin/exiftool -overwrite_original -all= out_$f && rm -rf $f ; done
So ... not just stripping the exif/meta data but also dropping the quality to 8[0-9]%, shaving a random number of pixels from the border, resizing by 9[0-9]% and adding some noise to the image.Perhaps someone will find this useful ...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
But it’s literally the dumbest feature ever. There’s absolutely nothing preventing a user from pulling out their phone and taking a picture of any slide they want. Or having a camera recording the whole session out of view of their webcam. It is security theater at its peak.
I think it’s funny that so many of these comments assume the person clicking the “enable screenshot protection” checkbox will be unaware that participants might have camera phones. It’s equally funny to read the comments imagining participants with elaborate pre-built workarounds like hidden pinhole cameras or pre-configured HDMI splitters going into full-screen video capture on another system. The people using this…
Casual is much easier with a phone. In Windblows to capture the screen you need to press print screen, then go to paint -> paste then save it. Paint cannot have 2 images open at the same time.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think it’s funny that so many of these comments assume the person clicking the “enable screenshot protection” checkbox will be unaware that participants might have camera phones. It’s equally funny to read the comments imagining participants with elaborate pre-built workarounds like hidden pinhole cameras or pre-configured HDMI splitters going into full-screen video capture on another system. The people using this…
The funniest part to me is these comments exclude something even more basic: joining a teams meeting on your phone. Notice the platforms mentioned ITA? I regularly, as do many of the people here, join meetings from my phone. I often do so so I can squeeze a run in. I especially do so in the types of all hands or large meetings where I’m in listen only mode and things are shared that would be hard to trace back to any…
I am not so masochistic.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you already do it regularly, then the preplanning is not a big barrier. You already know that you keep getting into situations where something is worth capturing. HDMI capture with passthrough is $20.
Are you genuinely not reading the comments that you’re replying to? OP did mot solicit or show that there would be any value in people listing ways that one could circumvent this with preparation. We all know. You aren’t adding anything to the discussion. Nerds love ignoring the cost of human effort if it gives them an opportunity to show that they know something.
There are lots of arguments I find convincing for this being effective. But not OP's. OP is saying they already do these recordings regularly, but "preplanning" would stop them? No way. They already did all the necessary preplanning by the time they finished typing their comment.
Preplanning could be meaningful for other people, but not for them and people like them.
I only mentioned price to make it clear that the level of effort to make the purchase falls within the level of effort they have already established.
Any security feature that can be totally defeated with a spicy HDMI splitter and a 2nd computer should not exist. This stuff looks much more to me like "fuck the user" than anything else. I am 100% convinced there is a cult of evil bastards at Microsoft, et. al. that is hellbent on making everyone's UI/UX as janky as possible.
They could just integrate Web DRM APIs like Google Widevine, Microsoft PlayReady, and Apple FairPlay, as both of them are integrated into the operating system and only work with a supported monitor. An HDMI splitter would likely not pass the test. Streaming services like Netflix and Disney Plus use these APIs to protect their content as well.
I wonder how it will work. The article sounds like it just overrides the print screen button. But what about screen recording apps like OBS? Seems like Teams would need to inject some code deep into the os to block that.
Windows does have an API for this that is not tied to the DRM protected video path I think. My guess comes from the fact that KeepassXC turns black/totally transparent when viewed through a VNC server on windows. Edit: here it is https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winuser/...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's not pure security theater, there are a few clear gains for those who care about such things: * Naive screencaps are much less traceable to the leaker than a naive photo is. Yes, someone can strip out EXIF data, but we've seen over and over again that they generally don't. And even without EXIF a naive framing on the photo is more likely to expose information about the location or identity of the person who took…
"Yes, someone can strip out EXIF data, but we've seen over and over again that they generally don't. And even without EXIF a naive framing on the photo is more likely to expose information about the location or identity of the person who took it." for f in `ls -1 /pics/IMG_*.jpg|/usr/bin/xargs basename` ; do /usr/local/bin/magick convert $f -strip -quality 8$rand -shave 1$randx1$rand2 -resize 9$rand2% -attenuate 1.0…