311–320 of 1001 posts
So what's the solution ? Assign a surveillance UAV to every Russian ship parked "without a good reason" over a cable ? It would be expensive, but doable, and create a reserve of vehicles for wartime use.
I look forward to everybody completely missing the resolution to this mystery when it turns out it was something like a Danish sailing boat that got unlucky with their anchor...
How does the saying go? Once [1] is happenstance, twice [2] is coincidence, but thrice [3]... [1] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/finnish-governme... [2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-says-telecom-cab... [3] https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/18/europe/undersea-cable-disrupt...
The constant Russian interference, combined with the regular escalation from the jets patrolling, and the radar jamming, really needs to be dealt with. We're stuck between having to do timid actions and full NATO escalation. This feels like constant creep.
> really needs to be dealt with. Ignoring the passive voice, who do you suggest should deal with that, more precisely? And how do you suggest "dealing" with one of the two nuclear hyper-powers in existence? (the other one being the Americans)
If you're interested in how I think it should be sorted: the cables are between Finland and Germany. I think we start with Finland and Germany: - stepping updiplomatic pressure. - Expulsion of Russian and Belarusian diplomats. - Confiscation of Russian owned properties. - Freezing bank accounts. - Increasing tariffs on their goods - Reducing overall trade. - Increasing spending on national defense - And weapons production. - Increasing aid to Ukraine.
The military leadership is seriously considering that Russia might push for the Baltics (meaning, the EU) within 4 years. The EU is not at peace with Russia. They are biding time for a war they need to prepare for.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
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There is strong circumstantial evidence ( https://www.politico.eu/article/balticconnector-damage-likel... ) and an open Estonian investigation. None of us know whether or not there is direct evidence that has not been made public.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Let's be honest, without this backing the war would've ended in the first month as was drafted in Istanbul The West didn't really help Ukraine in the first month [1]. We thought the Russian army was competent and would ride into Ukraine like we did in Iraq. It wasn't until after the weakness was made apparent that aid started dripping in. Ukraine repelled a Russian invasion on its own. Our generations-old anti-air…
The West was actively supplying Ukraine since 2014, especially after the Debaltsevo embarrassment. Yes, it pales in comparison to the post 2022 levels, but it still was far from insignificant. Even your Wikipedia link lists a lot of pre-2022 aid and I am pretty sure this page is far from being comprehensive. And it's even without mentioning the direct role of Boris Johnson in tanking the Istanbul accords.
You are moving the goalposts, though. Support between 2014 and 2022 wasn't even remotely close to:
> They send almost everything they can outside
Also even now they aren't exactly sending everything they can, rather everything they want to.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Some of us live close enough that it's not really an option, surrendering to Russians don't work that great if you live in Eastern Europe. I will volunteer first day to join Polish Army.
Ditto. Even though I'm an expat right now if Poland calls to arms I'm coming home and fighting to defend my country.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> it still was far from insignificant Stil far from closing the gap between the 6th and 13th largest armies. Russia invaded an inferior force and got stymied. This would be like America's Vietnam being Cuba, where we fully committed the U.S. military and economy to the task and still continued to fail. The fact that Russia has never even established air superiority knocks it out of the category of running a modern mi…
The Russian military doctrine is quite different from the US one. It places far more importance on artillery and anti-air forces than on air superiority. The Russian army clearly sucks at maneuver warfare and together with the unrealistically optimistic views which were prevalent in the Russian government (read Putin), it explains perfectly well the extremely poor performance in the first months. The performance in t…
Did they do that during the first few months of the war? I recall them having more volunteers than they could use in the early days.
Nord Stream Part II
I can't see any Ukrainian interest an cutting internet between two of their supporters. Whether the support has been sufficient can be debated, but both are supporters. Germany among the top in absolute terms, Finland among the top relative to their own size. Yes among, there are stronger supporters in both categories.
It's worth mentioning that cable breakages happen quite often; globally about 200 times per year [1] and the article itself mentions that just last year, two other cables and a gas pipeline were taken out by an anchor. The Gulf of Finland is evidently quite shallow. From what I understand, cable repair ships are likely to use ROVs for parts of repair jobs but only when the water is shallow so hopefully they can figur…
This is a misleading framing. The two cables last year were not taken out by an anchor as an accident, it was literally a ship putting down its anchor just before the cable and then dragging it over the cable. In other words, sabotage. There's no point in trying to color any of this with rose tinted glasses when it's clear who's done it and why.
> Swedish-Estonian telecoms cable at 1513 GMT, then over the Russian cable at around 2020 GMT, the [Balticconnector gas pipeline] at 2220 GMT and a Finland-Estonia telecoms line at 2349 GMT.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-telecoms-ca...