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Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

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Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#311

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Every strip of BS red adhesive has some flimsy pretext to justify it. Nobody is saying you can't pour theoretically meaningful pork into a traffic light in the form of QA and whatnot and get an indestructible traffic light that operates for a century without being touched in return. People are questioning whether that's actually necessary for a system that's already the Nth layer of redundancy.

I realize reading this now that "red tape" was not the appropriate way to convey what I'm trying to convey. I'm going to try and figure out how to rephrase that better in the future. All those inspections, certifications, and other requirements exist for very good reasons. Reasons that more likely than not cost us blood and tears to realize their need.

>All those inspections, certifications, and other requirements exist for very good reasons

Nobody's debating that those processes work. People are questioning whether or to what degree this system should be subject to them. Just because something touches aviation somehow is not a blank ticket to pour red tape at it to satisfy some ideological lust for the "perfectly safe" system. For example, the facility lighting around an airport is just normal lighting used on any other large commercial facility, off the shelf sodium bulbs, LEDs, halogens in off the shelf fixtures, the kind of stuff you buy from all myriad of online supply houses and local suppliers. The runway lights are subject to much more specific requirements (but still very relaxed compared to the lighting on actual aircraft). Where do the traffic lights fall on that spectrum? IDK, but seeing as the system is never gonna leave the ground I'm pretty inclined to ignore whatever the people who think it needs to be designed like an aircraft have to say.

> Reasons that more likely than not cost us blood and tears to realize their need.

If/when they mandate a traffic light system at JFK will that rule be "written in blood" as you people often like to say?

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#312
post #13

> strong kudos are due both to the air traffic controller who called off the Delta 737 and to the pilots of that plane who managed to abort their takeoff and stop the aircraft before it crossed runway 31L where the Boeing widebody passed in front of it Can't agree more

How difficult is it to stop an aircraft like that so quickly? More than yanking an emergency brake handle I'm assuming.

A 737-900, fully loaded and fueled for a transatlantic flight, weighs 70 - 80 tons and takes off at 150 - 180 mph. That's a lot of energy to dissipate in a hurry.

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#313

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That doesn't seem logical if the alternative is not having the lights at all.

> That doesn't seem logical if the alternative is not having the lights at all. If the norm becomes (radio clearance and no red lights), I suspect pilots will become conditioned to equate no-red-lights with landing clearance. Not 100%, but maybe at least 1% of the time. So if that happens and the red lights stopped working, you have a problem that wouldn't have existed if the red lights were never introduced. Perhaps…

But my understanding is that the plane was taxiing. At this point, the problem isn't just the lack of red lights: the pilot took a wrong turn. There are reasons other than the possibility of crossing an active runway why you follow directions, among them that you want to end up at your destination.

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#314

Maybe 25 years ago, I'm not sure, there was some collision at an airport and the investigators were all wondering what happened, and were trying to reconstruct which airplane was where. It turns out that there were no video cameras monitoring the taxiways and runways. I asked why not? "Too expensive" WAAT? Even a 7-11 had an always on camera. "Too expensive. How would you get it to withstand the weather? How would yo…

They'd be very useful for postmortems too. And all for $200.

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#315

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Where was the miscommunication? The pilot readback was correct. "Runway 4L was being used for takeoffs. The American Airlines aircraft did not follow air traffic control instructions. ATC audio shows they were told to “”cross runway 31 Left at Kilo” and instead crossed runway 4 Left at Juliet, in front of the accelerating Delta Boeing 737." Crossing a runway, which you're not cleared to cross is a pretty bad case o…

That's the case when the readback is incorrect or missing, i.e. the pilot heard something that wasn't said. In this case, the instruction was communicated correctly on both ends. But it wasn't followed correctly.

If they have the correctly communicated instructions as you imply, then why weren't they followed? Is it not also possible they don't follow the red light if they think ATC instructed them to use that runway?

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

These sound more like detecting something. How about preventing miscommunication? They weren't even on the correct runway.

One solution does not discount the other. In data security we talk about security in depth, security in layers, etc. The current proposal is _a_ solution, but not _the only_ solution nor even the only component of a comprehensive solution.

Which is why I was asking about a solution that addressed the aspect of the issue that the first solution did not.

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#317
post #158

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> close calls outnumber accidents in this field by a ton to one The irony is that the reason the safety numbers are that good is because aerospace is one of the only 5+ sigma quality/safety industries.

All industries have close calls outnumbering real accidents by a ton. The fact that the absolute numbers are low does not change any calculations that follow from that ratio.

Look at the history of aviation before it was a 5-sigma industry. The safety record was much worse.

If your point is that close calls will always outnumber the actual accidents, that’s like saying the number of doctor visits will outnumber the number of cancer diagnoses. Safety incidents are always a subset of a larger set that also contains close calls. By their nature, most safety incidents require multiple things to go wrong, which means there will be more times that some, but not all, things will go wrong to create a close call. It’s almost such a trivial point that it’s hardly salient enough to mention.

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right, so going back to the question of automation, it seems like in principle a computer should be able to not only understand those instructions, but observe that the offending aircraft was deviating from those instructions and immediately alert.

KJFK has a system like this that uses a blend of radar and transponder multilateration to automatically signal to aircraft that they are about to enter an active runway. The pilot either did not see (for human or technical factors) or disregarded this system during the incursion. What is lacking (to your point) is the ability to automatically compare ATC’s verbal instruction to the aircraft to its actual position.

I showed this in another thread, ForeFlight has taxi clearance in their Performance plan: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9p5-7jVg8fE

Very curious if/when they'll add speach to text/clearance. The syntax is fairly standard, so should be easy to parse, I'm just curious how tolerant folks would be of some % failure.

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#319

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They already have a real-time display. I can’t say for American airports but I have been involved in European air traffic control research and I can say that using algorithms isn’t very very well received by air traffic controllers. Computers tend to do better than humans in optimal situations, but can also completely fail in other situations. One example is the sun magnetic waves disturbing the radars. For cameras I…

> For cameras I can think of many things that can fail, wabbits eating the cables, snow of the lense, or the local cloud provider having a downtime If the people in the tower can see the operations, then a camera in the tower can see them, too. Don't need a local cloud provider. > So because computers can fail and humans are the backup, humans must be always present and have the best situation awareness Think of the…

Yea I agree with you. It was perhaps bad examples from me. The thing is when you do a risk analysis, digital systems have more risks than well organised and trains humans with paper and pencils.

Maybe we will eventually bring more automation in this domain.

Re: Friday night’s near-disaster at JFK airport

#320
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pretty much all three airports (EWR, LGA, JFK) are already at capacity, so there's no room for others to take any load.

A solution that'll anger people but resolve the capacity issus, all flights with not a final destination in USA can only connect through Stewart airport.

That airport has one cafe. It's a nice little regional airport (I know they serve international destinations I've flow out of it to KEF, but it's very small). I'm not even sure how many planes land without a final US destination in the US? The passengers may be going on, but are the planes?
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