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Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

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Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#311

Post by simondotau »

themaninthedark wrote: post #278
simondotau wrote: post #172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But someone has to write code to hold multiple sets of hashes. And someone has to write the code which treats reports differently. It all has to be written and maintained. Thus developers at Apple will still know that the system is being used for something other than CSAM.

Is the hash matching being done on device or off device? Up thread it was said that the device will hash the picture then send hash off for matching. If that is a case, then the hashes coming off your device can be intercepted and checked vs other databases.

Hashing is done on device, matching is also done on device. In the event of a match, a "safety voucher" is generated and uploaded to iCloud. Multiple safety vouchers are required for your account to be flagged, at which point the contents of these vouchers (which contains metadata and a grayscale thumbnail of the photo) can be viewed by Apple.

Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#312

Post by simondotau »

NewLogic wrote: post #224
simondotau wrote: post #172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But someone has to write code to hold multiple sets of hashes. And someone has to write the code which treats reports differently. It all has to be written and maintained. Thus developers at Apple will still know that the system is being used for something other than CSAM.

Not to worry that is just the "terrorist" hashes

If the human reviewer doesn't see a photograph of a sex act with a prepubescent (NCMEC classification "A1") then it will be rejected.

Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#313

Post by shadilay »

2pEXgD0fZ5cF wrote: post #25
carom wrote: post #14

This is effectively a virus scanner. Files are hashed (in a fancy way), compared against known hashes, and matches are reported. Your Windows desktop has Windows Defender. EFF lost a lot of credence to me after the Best Buy case. They made this big fuss about how Geek Squad employees were agents of the state for reporting CSAM on a customers hard drive, while doing a requested file recovery. When searched, the defend…

> It scans your photos, for known CSAM images No, it scans photos for arbitray (fancy) hashes, and Apple chooses to limit it to CSAM images. Nothing about the tech prevents it from being expanded to other kinds of images. And from what I understand, nothing prevents it from being expanded to other filetypes either, does it? The only thing that ties this tech to CSAM images is Apples promise (and claim) to keep the sc…

It's really bizarre that the risk isn't more obvious to people. Apple is partnering with foreign countries organizations who will supply CSAM hashes except that there is no way Apple can actually verify this. To do so Apple would be asking these foreign organizations to send them CSAM creating a massive liability. Instead Apple will just be flagging arbitrary file hashes from countries that will absolutely poison the well.

Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#314

Post by unityByFreedom »

simondotau wrote: post #172
05 wrote: post #157

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Very naive to assume those hashes won't be treated differently on the backend. The most logical thing would be to send those directly to the CPC/NSA, since Apple's human review is clearly a smokescreen at the point where non-CP hashes are added.

But someone has to write code to hold multiple sets of hashes. And someone has to write the code which treats reports differently. It all has to be written and maintained. Thus developers at Apple will still know that the system is being used for something other than CSAM.

> developers at Apple will still know that the system is being used for something other than CSAM.

Will the next generation's developers call them out for that? Or will they be given justification to accept it?

We're inching towards 1984 with these big tech monopolies. It was one thing for Snowden to reveal the secret agreements the government imposes upon tech companies. It's entirely another for privately run businesses to capitulate, and thus excuse politicians from needing to make intelligence-gathering a public issue.

Whatever backroom discussions are occuring about this topic need to come into public view. This just doesn't make sense on the surface. The government can't have access to secretly monitor everything on the internet. It's too much power for too few, ripe for abuse by bad actors, etc. There must be another way that involves an informed citizenry. I don't care how uninformed we've shown ourselves to be in the last decade. We should press forward on informing regardless.

Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#315

Post by unityByFreedom »

simondotau wrote: post #311
themaninthedark wrote: post #278

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is the hash matching being done on device or off device? Up thread it was said that the device will hash the picture then send hash off for matching. If that is a case, then the hashes coming off your device can be intercepted and checked vs other databases.

Hashing is done on device, matching is also done on device. In the event of a match, a "safety voucher" is generated and uploaded to iCloud. Multiple safety vouchers are required for your account to be flagged, at which point the contents of these vouchers (which contains metadata and a grayscale thumbnail of the photo) can be viewed by Apple.

> Multiple safety vouchers are required for your account to be flagged

I don't see how that makes any difference. What if someone plants bad data on your device? That would of course be a concern for cloud-scanning too.

I don't care how secure Apple says their devices are. There are companies that can crack them, and you can bet some unscrupulous people will use that against their opponents. Politicians and other influential people should be as concerned about this as everyone else. Didn't Saudis crack Bezos' phone to reveal his affair? With this tech they could make up worse stories. I believe our justice department could tell the difference between a hack and someone who actually harbors bad data most of the time, but I don't like relying on that.

Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#318

Post by LatteLazy »

simonh wrote: post #303
LatteLazy wrote: post #291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the profiles will need to be country specific too. What counts as CSAM in some places doesnt in others (here in the UK we have a ban on cartoons but bath pics are allowed for instance). This is something Apple have been pressed on a lot. So far (I'd be happy to be corrected) they've only said "whatever local law permits". That sounds ok, till you realise Saudi will want gays reported and China wont like any W…

China already operates their own iCud storage so this is irrelevant to them. Apple doesn't have any iCloud data centres in Saudi, so Saudi can't pass laws about what is or isn't stored in them. Look, the way this works and how it's implemented matters. It's stunning to me how many people are thoroughly confused and jump to unwarranted conclusions about how this actually works and what that means.

I dont think your saudi or china points grasp the nature of this tech. This is about checking what users have on their devices BEFORE it is uploaded to icloud.

So both China and the Saudis (any plenty of other governments) will be very interested as right now, it takes a lot more effort for them to access phone contents (there certainly aren't mass surveillance programs like this for handsets).

I weirdly agree with your last paragraph, but i think we disagree about the details. I can't find any evidence for your assessment that this can only be used against 1 (US) set of image hashes. Or that shitty regimes won't be allowed to abuse it.

If Apple came out and proved that, i might not be happy but my worst fears would be gone. Their silence is sort of deafening at this point...

Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#319

Post by sneak »

szc wrote: post #307
juanani wrote: post #161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can't figure it out, are you a corp shill or gubmint? Dang allows both if they are playing our side so this is truly confusing. Can't tell where they've pinned you, jeez they probably give out degrees for that level mental gymnastics.

I am neither. A similar exchange with sneak has happened previously. It is a frustrating exchange. The words that have been used attempt to tie two controversial topics together PRISM and FISA. The logic then seems to be that because companies can now report on FISA orders, this means they also willingly participated in PRISM. What has been said seems to ignore that the FISA reporting by companies shows the number of…

PRISM is targeted surveillance, not bulk - these are the FISA court orders.

Please read Bart Gellman's book, Dark Mirror, on the specifics of the Snowden documents.

Despite being targeted, it is warrantless and is the #1 used source by the IC.

Re: Apple Has Opened the Backdoor to Increased Surveillance and Censorship

#320

Post by simondotau »

unityByFreedom wrote: post #315
simondotau wrote: post #311

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hashing is done on device, matching is also done on device. In the event of a match, a "safety voucher" is generated and uploaded to iCloud. Multiple safety vouchers are required for your account to be flagged, at which point the contents of these vouchers (which contains metadata and a grayscale thumbnail of the photo) can be viewed by Apple.

> Multiple safety vouchers are required for your account to be flagged I don't see how that makes any difference. What if someone plants bad data on your device? That would of course be a concern for cloud-scanning too. I don't care how secure Apple says their devices are. There are companies that can crack them, and you can bet some unscrupulous people will use that against their opponents. Politicians and other inf…

> What if

Given that a functionally identical system has been implemented by Google for years, we should already know what will happen. So let me ask. Is this already happening to people with Android devices? In terms of opportunities for framing someone, how is what Google does any different?

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