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Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

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Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#311

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With the way litigation works, corporations will never admit blame for anything, since it greatly increases their legal risk. It's unfortunate, but their responsibilities lie with their shareholders, not the people who lost their lives on their planes.

People may get angry about this fact, but it really is the simple reality of an executive's fiduciary obligations. Ideally you run the enterprise in a manner that keeps the discharge of fiduciary duties within your personal moral constraints, but if you're not careful enough, you end up in this guy's shoes. And that's why they pay him the big bucks, because of such risks. That said, it's also true that Boeing is in a…

>People may get angry about this fact, but it really is the simple reality of an executive's fiduciary obligations.

With all due respect, that's Bullshit, and anyone who cares to look into the provenance of the modern concept of a corporation can see that.

A corporation is a mechanism by which people pool resources and distribute risk such that endeavors unachievable by any individual of that collective group. This privileged collective vehicle, however, was based on the principle that the existence of the corporation was providing a service or good to the benefit of the society enabling the incorporation.

As a sibling poster mentioned, the Reagan/Thatcher years ushered in "the death of Society" and the birth of the "shareholder value" meme.

A corporation does not exist without the societal framework in which it is implemented. If corporations don't take this into account moving forward, the system that put them in a position to do what they are doing may find itself under attack from without by legislators, and within by an increasingly marginalized millennial demographic.

Point being, you can't sit here and say that the only obligation executives have is to their shareholders when the entire arrangement that makes that possible is dependent on the goodwill of everyone else who isn't a shareholder.

I acknowledge my arguments may not convince a hard core "shareholder value" believer, but I'm willing to put my money in the long run on the state of corporatism in America sidling up to a line after which there isn't going to be much they have to lean on once people start realizing that shareholder/not shareholder is becoming the new social division point. Either we're all countrymen, or we're not. If corporate America pounds the "not" drum hard enough, I have no delusions enough people won't get together to bring the entire house of cards to the ground.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#312

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Realistically and pragmatically speaking, you only ever get to have just one single shot at establishing and maintaining that kind of life/death level of trust. Fuck it up, and you're gone- quite literally, mind you. I wish this statement was held with as much as accountability as this comment implies. But have any of the major outlets been discussing potential prison sentences for Boeing or FAA employees / executi…

The difference between Wolkswagen and Boeing is the latter is an american company and hence is probably not going to face billion of dollars of damage from american authorities and current administration. Probably no jail time either.

That and Volkswagen knowingly and deliberately conspired to break the law.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#313

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am, and I have experienced many times what I'm talking about. A simpler yet effective design (may it be initial or rework) comes at a much lower cost than a flawed one, which inevitably aggregates irrelevant complexities.

"aggregates irrelevant complexities" Who decides this? This is not a trivial question. The F-35 fighter is a good example. Trades many disadvantages (not fast, not good in dog-fighting, tremendous long maintenance time, low payload etc.) for one advantage. The F-35 may or may not be invisible to an able opponent. But this decision is a tremendous difficult one. Based on your argument, it would be better to stick with…

Thanks for the suggested read, sounds interesting indeed.

I'm not comparing simple vs. complex but rather sound vs. flawed, although often sound = simpler than flawed.

The 737 here is yet another example of this : - the MAX design is flawed : faulty risk assessment of MCAS, seemingly unstable airframe in some configurations - a likely sound design could be : airframe rework, thorough risk assessment, extra pilot training...

While the flawed design came at a lower initial cost, it will now overrun the cost of a likely sound one (further rework + retrofit + sales/reputation damage + legal), including the cost of a probable longer design phase in the latter.

(I concede that legal/sales costs are not directly technical debt costs).

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#314
Ugh. I just read the report and maintain that the pilots acted incompetently. Though they regained control of the plane and turned off the stab trim system, their reaction took considerable time. The fatal blow, however, is this: distracted by the problem, neither pilot paid attention to the aircraft's speed as they flew along in level flight. They had tunnel vision. You can see in the report that the overspeed clacker began alerting them midway through the incident. With the nose-down trim, this high airspeed exacerbated the difficulty of holding the nose up. Had they slowed down, the aircraft would have been controllable. The moment they reactivated the system at high speed, adding even more nose down trim, they killed themselves and everyone on board.

I also question the lack of clear communication between the two pilots. Examples such as the captain asking the first officer if the aircraft could be manually trimmed and the first officer replying in the negative, with no verification on the part of the captain and no checklist use make me wonder. Maybe they were doing those things. I'd be interested in seeing a transcript. It's understandable why Muilenburg doesn't seem particularly remorseful.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#315
post #202
post #151

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Data for "Column forces were incredibly high" would be the force on the column that the pilots experienced. Column position deflection isn't that. Column position deflection data is data that the column position was changing rapidly. Concluding that column position was changing rapidly due to "incredibly high" forces as opposed to say unpredictable forces is speculation.

Control column position is not a delta. On a 737 that position directly correlates to the position of the elevator in degrees. Elevator position, stabilizer position, and airspeed as they were we can infer a force; corroborated by their own words, it's reasonable that this situation is described in the "mistrim nose down" sketch about 1/3 of the way down here: https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and…

>we can infer a force

Right, and my point is that until someone actually does that calculation we don't know how high that force was.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#316
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First- Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out. > At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working. I guess the F…

Pilots are often wrong about what their aircraft is doing. In fact, that's a big reason why they crash. So yes, the First Officer said that but that is not conclusive proof that they couldn't manually trim. He may have misinterpreted the question and tried the electric trim again. Or maybe he tried turning the wheel and didn't do it right. Or maybe he needed to try again. Or maybe he needed the pilots help. Or maybe…

Wing Load https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/wind-load-d_1775.html

Screw Jack and effort force https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/screw-jack-d_1308.html

Gearing: https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/gears-d_1307.html

Here's some 737-800 dimensional analysis as a starting point.

https://holdingpoint.wordpress.com/2011/04/04/boeing-737-800...

Knock yourself out.

Or if you stick around long enough I may do it for gits and shiggles.

I'll need some schematic details of the actual manual trim wheel mechanism to figure out what the output forces on the jackscrew are... But hey, sounds like a fun mental exercise.

I'll see if I can find any details on it, but if anyone else just has it, reply to me, and let's see if we can get some delicious numbers going on here. Worst case scenario, I'll pull whatever design most makes sense to me out of my arse and theorycraft to get a feel for it.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#317

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The FAA also lost a lot of trust, for rubber-stamping this. From documents I've seen (which I cannot find the links to now), it appears that the FAA let Boeing themselves do some of the certification work and sign offs. Putting the foxes in charge of the hen house, so to speak.

If I recall, this boiled down to the FAA not having engineers who could properly test these systems.

And now whistleblowers have said that Boeing didn't have properly trained people to handle it either.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From Boeing's standpoint, it's actually even worse than this. The families of the people who perished pose a risk to their business. The company doesn't want these people drawing attention to the incident, and they want to minimize any legal recourse. It's about finding a balance, pay them a reasonably small amount to get them to shut up and go away. Capitalism, baby!

>> Capitalism, baby! I know what you are saying and fully agree but would like to put a finer point on it: the problem is with unfettered capitalism, especially after 100 years or more of the lawyers writing the laws for the wealthy, who own the vast majority of the corps. What we need is a balance between the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism and governments that enforce corporate responsibility to its human work…

Corporations can't win big if they aren't exploiting some workforce somewhere. Whether it's keeping their skilled employees quiet on the shady business and anti-consumer practices through the veiled threat of job stability and thus their lifestyle, or the ones on the other side of the globe slaving away constantly to meet demands of their products or raw materials at the prices they dictate and not by the labour put into making the product.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#319
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pilots are often wrong about what their aircraft is doing. In fact, that's a big reason why they crash. So yes, the First Officer said that but that is not conclusive proof that they couldn't manually trim. He may have misinterpreted the question and tried the electric trim again. Or maybe he tried turning the wheel and didn't do it right. Or maybe he needed to try again. Or maybe he needed the pilots help. Or maybe…

Bear in mind that they're at low altitude and the pilot is busy supplying maximum pull on the yoke, and therefore likely unavailable to help crank a stiff trim wheel.

>Bear in mind that they're at low altitude

They weren't

>the pilot is busy supplying maximum pull on the yoke,

Probably not true either

>and therefore likely unavailable to help crank a stiff trim wheel

Runaway trim should be a recoverable situation. If that's impossible then that means there is a distinct and major issue beyond MCAS.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#320
post #151

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Data for "Column forces were incredibly high" would be the force on the column that the pilots experienced. Column position deflection isn't that. Column position deflection data is data that the column position was changing rapidly. Concluding that column position was changing rapidly due to "incredibly high" forces as opposed to say unpredictable forces is speculation.

So your take is that the column shows near constant movements of multiple degrees back and forth practically on a second to second basis, in the grip of someone trying to hold it steady at +10 aft, and who asked several times for help keeping it back enough to keep the nose up, but that that is not in and of itself indication that the force was "high" okay

You're shifting the goal posts. Obviously the force was "high" because the trim was out of position. That's different from "incredibly high" and can mean anything from "they gotta pull a little harder than normal" to "they have to pull as hard as they possibly can".
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