311–320 of 473 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is addressed in https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ – using Intel SGX, it's possible for the clients to verify that the server is running the code it should be running. I'm not sure whether this is already deployed, but it refutes any claim that Signal isn't serious about your concern. I don't see how federation is related to this at all . We know you're bummed about it, you don't need to inject i…
SGX is not a magic bullet, it's only part of a secure system. It's also come under some fire, check out this paper: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Swami-SGX... SGX alone cannot solve this problem. Even in the idealized case, you can sniff traffic on the router to find out which user IPs are talking to each other and when.
I personally don't distrust Signal. I just refuse to use it. This comes up on HN a lot and everytime I have to admit that I am kinda unfair here: Signal is heralded as the nice and secure solution - but seems incomplete to me. I don't doubt all the more clever persons that tell me that Signal is the best choice for encryption right now. But as long as it doesn't support federation (I miss XMPP) and as long as it does…
Why not simply use XMPP then? https://conversations.im/omemo/
> P.S. If you’re looking for good alternatives to Signal, I can recommend Matrix. Yes, if you're looking for alternatives to Signal, you should totally use a solution that hasn't rolled out end-to-end encryption by default[0]. /s ...and that only two clients have implemented so far, out of 50ish that they list on their website. [0] https://matrix.org/docs/guides/faq.html#what-is-the-status-o...
Author here, this is a fair criticism. Other alternatives (which I have not reviewed in depth) include Tox, Telegram, Wire, and Ring (not an endorsement of any of these). I'm an old curmodgen who just uses IRC+OTR and GPG, though, so I have to depend on others for recommendations. Also, Matrix enables end-to-end encryption by default on clients that support it.
So you work for FSB?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You suggest Telegram over Signal? Now we know you're spreading FUD.
I don't actually endorse any of the alternatives, just listing them. I haven't had time to research them in depth. I have worked with Tox before and I know some of the guys behind it, though, but I think it's dead in the water.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
1. The HTTPS infrastructure is downgradeable and relies on DNS and a multitude of certificates. And not all the ciphers are safe. Yes it can be done securely-ish, but unless you're layering another level of encryption over HTTPS it isn't fully secure. Layering is what the CIA does, according to the Snowden leaks. 2. As for the rest of it: Cool man, that sounds like you want a normal chat app that is more usable and l…
> The HTTPS infrastructure is downgradeable and relies on DNS and a multitude of certificates. And not all the ciphers are safe. Yes it can be done securely-ish There's no reliance on DNS. We know what the right way to do HTTPS is, and an app that doesn't have to maintain compatibility with ancient browsers can use a strictly secure profile (no old ciphers, no downgrades etc.). HTTPS is older and more complex than th…
In practice there is for most situations. Are you going to get a static IP and go through the work of finding one of the rare cert authorities to get an HTTPS cert for it authorized?
> Nonsense. Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one, and two layers of flawed encryption will almost certainly still be flawed.
I hate arguing about this because I feel like there is a difference between how mathematicians think and how engineers thinks. I agree that one of the layers should be HTTPS if the context allows for it, because it has a lot of eyes on it, as you mention; but I fail to see how layering encryption is bad from a privacy standpoint.
Mathematically, this statement:
> Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one.
Is only true if there are no mistakes and if it would take more operations in the universe to break the first layer of encryption.
But why should we, a priori, assume that there are no mistakes? We have hundreds of examples of thought-to-be-secure ciphers / one way hashes ending up in the trash heap. Look at things like Cloudbleed. In reality things break. In reality cert authorities get moled or hacked. If you've been using layered encryption you're safer. Also, HTTPS basically mandates that you use TLS, which for some contexts doesn't work because we'd prefer a one-way (i.e., connectionless) channel to communicate to stop inbound traffic at the physical layer.
> It's that I don't think autodeletion or one-device-only represent a meaningful security improvement.
It's helped plenty of people that have had their phone seized at the border or their other device seized by the police. Sometimes you don't that information is sensitive until later, and sometimes you choosing to delete it at that point is illegal or impossible.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The F-Droid argument is the strongest and most evident among all. I don't trust Google, I don't trust Play. The main point is, Moxie could take the wind out of the sails of literally all arguments in this page by publishing Signal on F-Droid but he just won't. This alone is enough for me to lose trust in Signal.
It seems pretty odd to me to distrust someone because they aren't using the platform that you'd like them to use. Aren't there other issues with f-droid? You have to root your device to run it, allow third party code. Those are all security concerns too. It was posted elsewhere but here's Moxie's take: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/127#issue...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Are you going to pay for him to do that?
> Are you going to pay for him to do that? I donated some money to them a while back. How hard could it be to push the binaries out to a second app store?
Drew DeVault doesn't trust Signal because its Android incarnation uses the Google Play Store --- the app market virtually all of its real users use --- and not F-Droid. DeVault would also like it if Signal would interoperate with other chat programs. Instead, DeVault would prefer that you use Matrix, a system for which end-to-end encryption is (according to its own website) "in late beta", offered on a select subset…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The F-Droid argument is the strongest and most evident among all. I don't trust Google, I don't trust Play. The main point is, Moxie could take the wind out of the sails of literally all arguments in this page by publishing Signal on F-Droid but he just won't. This alone is enough for me to lose trust in Signal.
It seems pretty odd to me to distrust someone because they aren't using the platform that you'd like them to use. Aren't there other issues with f-droid? You have to root your device to run it, allow third party code. Those are all security concerns too. It was posted elsewhere but here's Moxie's take: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/127#issue...
Most likely one of those, yes. Though on Android 8+ you can only give that allow-install from unknown soures permission to F-Droid.
Also both Copperhead and Fairphone Open ship with the F-Droid priviledged extension by default allowing you to kee that setting entirely disabled.