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Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

sandervenema.ch

311–320 of 350 posts

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#311
post #267

I haven't actually worked with GCM so please forgive me if this doesn't make any sense. I suggest that, instead of routing all messages through GCM, what if Signal could send a "wake up" message via GCM, and then let the app pull the encrypted messages directly out of Signal's servers? A wake up message would only be sent by the server if the message could not be received by the client via normal means (implying that…

> I suggest that, instead of routing all messages through GCM, what if Signal could send a "wake up" message via GCM, and then let the app pull the encrypted messages directly out of Signal's servers?

Yep, that's exactly how Signal has been doing it for >1.5 years now.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#312

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Does it, actually? I was under the impression that the Play Store doesn't run as root and the package manager API (controlled by the phone manufacturer) is what checks signatures. Can the Play Store override the signature checks on upgrade and if so, what codepaths is it using?

Just a quick look, but this is the PackageManager.java file: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/... for the Android base framework. It has the checkSignatures() abstract definition and some other stuff that seems to be the API you talk about. Now this is all abstract, so some other party (maybe phone manufacturer, possibly others) must implement these methods to conform to the API. Could Goog…

The subclass would have to be in the same process as the package manager (the system server) so it being abstract doesn't matter much.

Android doesn't rely so much on root vs non-root: it uses SELinux and lots of capability based security. Root is still there of course but out of the box, even the parts under remote OEM control don't run as root. If the OEM wants to change the basic rules of the system they must push a system update and get the user to agree to it. Of course a firmware update can change anything but outside of that I'm not convinced Google can just replace software at will.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#313
post #304
post #296

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I invite those who have opinions about Signal to start by getting involved in the project. Yeah we've been there. Do you remember someone on Github complaining about the Google dependency? You closed that issue as a wontfix. Or LibreSignal? I read the post where you basically told them to go away on Github too. That's why I haven't recommended Signal ever since trying it myself a year or two ago.

Downvotes but no comments. What is wrong with what I said?

> You closed that issue as a wontfix

Not sure what you're talking about, because the issues in question, #127 and #1000, are open.

> you basically told them to go away on Github

Quite the opposite [1]:

"I would consider a clean, well written, and well tested PR for websocket-only support in Signal. I expect it to have high battery consumption and an unreliable user experience, but would be fine with it if it comes with a warning and only runs in the absence of play services."

[1] https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issueco...

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#314
post #299

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> and the only alternative he mentioned is a half broken clone. Sorry but you've got that backwards. He doesn't propose using that, he mentions OpenWhisperSystems banned them from using the service. It's criticism towards Signal, not a product recommendation. > my current phone doesn't support Signal I think it's Signal not supporting your phone, not the other way around. The manufacturer probably didn't make a consc…

> OpenWhisperSystems banned them from using the service Nobody has been banned from anything. People have been politely asked not to distribute 3rd-party builds of Signal using their name and their servers, and that's it.

I think the name is plenty different, nobody will mistake LibreSignal as being the same as Signal. That's as if Microsoft goes LibreOffice and OpenOffice are trademark infringements of Office (insofar as you can trademark the word "office" anyway).

As for the politely asking, yeah that is still banning. If you banish someone from a country, they can still physically walk into the country. They're just not allowed to.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#315
post #251
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree overwhelmingly with what you wrote, except that I want to point out that this isn't "crypto-puritanism". It's just hipsterism. The author isn't a cryptographer, and if you asked a panel of 10 cryptographic engineers what messaging system they'd recommend, 9 of them would say "Signal". The 10th wants you to use something else because they're working on an attack for that "something else", and want their paper…

I think these types of posts are also the inevitable result of people overestimating our organizational capacity based on whatever limited success Signal and Signal Protocol have had. It could be that the author imagines me sitting in a glass skyscraper all day, drinking out of champagne flutes, watching over an enormous engineering team as they add support for animated GIF search as an explicit fuck you to people wi…

Why you ask people phone number? i could track you by ss7 or even inject and record ALL signal calls over remote explotes (google pegasus nso)

Signal is the worst mobile security software on planet.

Moxie, why zrtp do not use cache or previous key??? weak implementation

I am a goverment reverse engineer for 10 years

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#316
post #299

Essentially this guy is saying, Signal is secure, it's mostly easy to use (with the exception of multiple phone numbers), and the only alternative he mentioned is a half broken clone. Is he seriously going to stop recommending it to people whose lives depend on secure communications because of some abstruse ideological point? In any case, Moxie's position is a reasonable one even though there are some arguments for f…

> and the only alternative he mentioned is a half broken clone. Sorry but you've got that backwards. He doesn't propose using that, he mentions OpenWhisperSystems banned them from using the service. It's criticism towards Signal, not a product recommendation. > my current phone doesn't support Signal I think it's Signal not supporting your phone, not the other way around. The manufacturer probably didn't make a consc…

I think you are mistaking my choice of words for a lack of understanding, but I do understand. The author makes no recommendation _outside_ of Signal related products.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#317
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And here's my write-up of how a private set-intersection protocol could be used to enable users to securely swap contacts: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11289223 It's a solved problem, but Signal doesn't implement it.

The protocol you describe is a synchronous online protocol where Alice and Bob have to be online at the same time (and if they're doing this at Charlie's behest, so does Charlie). Signal is designed for asynchronous communication where both participants don't have to be online to discover each other or send each other message. Also, how does this protocol even help? What's the use case? It allows participants to disc…

> The protocol you describe is a synchronous online protocol where Alice and Bob have to be online at the same time (and if they're doing this at Charlie's behest, so does Charlie).

They don't actually have to be online at the same time (and they don't care about whether Charlie is online or not: it's a pairwise protocol): they just to be able to send and receive one another messages, and to store state. Fortunately the former is some Signal's quite good at, and storing state is something that phone hard drives are quite good at.

> Also, how does this protocol even help? What's the use case? It allows participants to discover mutual contacts, but what then? Do we use Bob as a web-of-trust style introducer? What if Alice doesn't even want to talk to Charlie? Do we do this for all the friends Alice has in common with Bob? Do we do this for all the friends Alice has in common with everyone?

It's the exact same use case as Signal's existing contact-discovery code, only private: it enables Alice & Bob to share information about a mutual acquaintance, e.g. Charlie. This might be used to share Charlie's key ID, in a trust on first use style. Note that this is no less secure than everyone everywhere trusting Open Whisper Systems on first use.

The idea is that when one starts using Signal, one exchanges keys in some out-of-band mechanism (NFC is a likely candidate) with an acquaintance, and then from that person get keys of mutual acquaintances, and from then others, and so on and so forth. Whenever you add a new acquaintance, one can reiterate the same protocol with all previous acquaintances (it's amenable to batching, too, which is nice) in order to propagate that information.

It may have some interesting uses in a certificate transparency sense, but I don't know about that.

> You end your last post with "So, problem solved" but I'm not sure this protocol even solves any practical problems for the Signal use case

It solves the exact same problems the Signal contact-discovery protocol solves, without actually revealing all one's contacts to OWS. That's all. If it did nothing more than that, it would be a good thing.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#318
post #50

Like a lot of crypto-puritanism it is rather mixed up. He says he recommended Signal because it was easy to use (more consumer friendly I guess) and secure, then says he wouldn't have gone in the direction of making it easier to use and criticises the things that make it user friendly, like using phone numbers instead of usernames. He says he thinks the protocol is secure, then says he doesn't want it to use GCM beca…

I agree overwhelmingly with what you wrote, except that I want to point out that this isn't "crypto-puritanism". It's just hipsterism. The author isn't a cryptographer, and if you asked a panel of 10 cryptographic engineers what messaging system they'd recommend, 9 of them would say "Signal". The 10th wants you to use something else because they're working on an attack for that "something else", and want their paper…

Hipsterism? That's horseshit. TFA is completely reasonable. At least 3 of these issues have prevented my privacy conscious friends from using it.

Especially the phone number thing. Phone numbers are quite sensitive. In some cases, the USG uses phone numbers alone for targeting drone strikes. They're enough to pull your credit report.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#319

"Also, there’s the issue of integrity. Google is still cooperating with the NSA and other intelligence agencies. PRISM is also still a thing." What's this based on? Google immediately denied any association with the NSA and PRISM: https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/what.html Google’s chief legal officer claimed that collection was being done without Google's consent: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/technology/goo…

Slight correction. Google is a willing* PRISM partner, but they don't use the name PRISM, and PRISM isn't quite what was originally described.

The leaks related to exploitation of Google traffic refer to programs unrelated to PRISM.

*Willing in the sense that they have to respond to FISA orders and NSLs, and they have agreed to do it according to a certain protocol.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#320
post #37

Any messenger, tied to phone number, is not safe. possible attacks are: 1) create copy of sim-card; 2) force mobile operator to intercept password-code, sent to your number, and "restore" password this way. It may sound ridiculous for you, but in Russia it's reality (both vectors), it's real cases from life. And when user really need safe messenger, all of them are too careless to implement really safe way of messagi…

This is why there is a fingerprint ("Safety Numbers" in Signal), and a warning on every message when that fingerprint changes.

Which everyone, including myself, clicks through.
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