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Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

anthropic.com

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Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#301

Post by nozzlegear »

solenoid0937 wrote: post #243
nozzlegear wrote: post #221

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Your proposal of relying purely on static analysis is over-idealistic and just not feasible for large, diverse codebases in the real world. "Just not feasible" is thought terminating, but regardless, I thought we were talking about ideals? Ideally you want the static analysis to work, not to rely on the non-deterministic bullshitter.

> piss away yet more tokens > non-deterministic bullshitter. You're so ideologically opposed to AI that you bury your head in the sand in cases where it genuinely does a fantastic job today, right now, in the real world (like developing end to end exploits using noisy signals like static analysis results, fuzzer results, etc). Instead you assert that we should go a route no company has successfully proven out despite…

I actually do use AI, I wouldn't say I'm ideologically opposed lol. Maybe I'm ideologically opposed to thought terminating clichés, or how FAANGers see it as a cudgel to cram in wherever we find an open gap just to shit infinite tokens into?

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#302

Post by cassianoleal »

kingforaday wrote: post #289
cassianoleal wrote: post #176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I had some shell scripts littered with `|| true`, which was obviously obscuring real errors everywhere. When I challenged the model, it gave me the same "cargo-culting" answer.

From your statement and the parent comment, just learned that "cargo cult" is a thing, but cargo-culting as a compound is something AI has made up? [1]. As I was educating myself, I found Richard Feynman's Commencement Speech at Caltech in '74 [2] that might have coined this for our industry? If you would rather listen than read [3]. Posting this for others curious on the term. 1. https://trends.google.com/trends/exp…

Thanks for this! I confess I've heard of cargo culting for a long time but never thought too much of it. Seemed like an idiom like any other. The talk is fascinating, and describes attitudes I see all the time in the industry and at work, and they bother me. Now I know they are also cargo culting. That will hopefully help me steer people away from those practices.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#303

Post by theptip »

perlgeek wrote: post #298

> Software developers should shorten their patch cycles and make security fixes available as quickly as possible. [...] > Network defenders should shorten their patch testing and deployment timelines. Shortening patch cycles will only help so much. It's funny that whenever an NPM supply chain attack is published, people recommend a cooldown before installing new versions, and then when a vulnerability is discovered,…

> Shortening patch cycles will only help so much. It's funny that whenever an NPM supply chain attack is published, people recommend a cooldown before installing new versions, and then when a vulnerability is discovered, everybody jumps to patch. Clearly these two strategies collide at some point

It’s a good point. As things speed up it will be harder to tell which patches are actually urgent and need to skip the cool-off period.

I think the more robust way of doing this is to have code audits on each published release. Agents can do some of this (eg Github could offer this scanning service, and let external parties fund the scanning on trusted compute).

I think of this more as a “proof of work” problem than provable security; if I see that Mythos has run for N hours on the patch release I am considering upgrading to, then this might suffice.

The key thing here is you need a way to crowdsource the funding of scans, and make them shareable so that the cost can be shared across the community. The package owner obviously can’t control the prompt. And can Mythos-class models be hardened enough to scan hostile code?

To your point on blocking requests, there are programming models that make this easier, like capability-based programming, where code that doesn’t need internet cannot get it; this doesn’t solve things fully, but my general prediction is that adding new architectural patterns is now a lot cheaper and easier to reliably apply across a codebase, so we may see more of this too.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#304

Post by krupan »

pianopatrick wrote: post #148
mnahkies wrote: post #93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One issue I've seen with LLM's is adding superfluous code in the name of "safety" and confidently generating a bunch of stuff that was useful in years gone by, but now handled correctly by the standard lib. I'm of the opinion that less is more when it comes to code, and find the trend this is introducing quite frustrating. How do you avoid this pitfall?

Thinking off the top of my head - couldn't you have an AI scan that looked for such things? Just send every file in the code base to AI one at a time. Have a prompt like "See if there is ABC pattern that can now be handled by XYZ standard library function in this file. Reply YES or NO. {{file contents}}" Seems you would not need that many tokens to do so and you might find such cases.

AI does stupid thing, but maybe we can fix it with AI

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#305

Post by ch_fr »

4ndrewl wrote: post #279

Is there a reason why they appear to conflate vulnerabilities and bugs? It's not clear where they are defining their terms, eg "After one month, most partners have each found hundreds of critical- or high-severity vulnerabilities in their software. Collectively, they’ve found more than ten thousand. Several have told us that their rate of bug -finding has increased by more than a factor of ten. For instance, Cloudfla…

I wholeheartedly believe it's 100% intentional of Anthropic to use "vulnerability" to describe something that ranges from "serious attack vector" to "you forgot to add this variable to the useEffect dependency array".

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#307

Post by [deleted] »

IndeanCondor wrote: post #293
moomin wrote: post #142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You’re right, it’s a valid data point. But the U.K. government report is also a data point, and the Firefox report is a data point, and they suggest that it is, indeed, significantly better than current generation models. Maybe curl is significantly better hardened than most projects? In any event, it barely matters. As Anthropic acknowledges, next level models are comings, theirs is only one of them. Current generat…

The same UK security research body ran the same CTF against GPT5.5. GPT5.5 got the same result as Mythos. Anthropic promised us that Mythos was such an existential threat that it would compromise "every OS and browser on devices across the planet". They've held conferences and meetings with banks and govts across the world, shouting how critical this issue is. GPT5.5 has been out for a month. Every device on earth ha…

[deleted]

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#308

Post by _heimdall »

frumiousirc wrote: post #281
_heimdall wrote: post #276

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Based on the article here, and Firefox's mythos article, they had found bugs with Opus 4.6 as well but mythos is finding more that it missed. That would align with the curl feedback you linked, they aren't using mythos but are finding bugs with other models. Presumably the expectation would be that with mythos they'd find more that were missed by other models already used.

> Based on the article here, and Firefox's mythos article, they had found bugs with Opus 4.6 as well but mythos is finding more that it missed. It's not quite apples-to-apples. It was Opus on Firefox 148, Mythos on 150. A better test of Mythos vs Opus would have been to apply Mythos to Firefox 148. Or also re-apply Opus to Firefox 150. Do we know all the Opus+Firefox 148 bugs are fixed in Firefox 150? Do we know the…

> Do we know all the Opus+Firefox 148 bugs are fixed in Firefox 150? Do we know the number of new bugs introduced per Firefox release?

That may be parsable from their bug tracker, though I don't know of all bugs raised by mythos are public.

I'd be particularly interested in how many of the bugs found existed in 148. Assuming most or all of them weren't newly created bugs added in 149 or 150, the comparison should still hold even though Opus and Mythos looked at different releases.

Re: Project Glasswing: An Initial Update

#310

Post by solenoid0937 »

nozzlegear wrote: post #301
solenoid0937 wrote: post #243

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> piss away yet more tokens > non-deterministic bullshitter. You're so ideologically opposed to AI that you bury your head in the sand in cases where it genuinely does a fantastic job today, right now, in the real world (like developing end to end exploits using noisy signals like static analysis results, fuzzer results, etc). Instead you assert that we should go a route no company has successfully proven out despite…

I actually do use AI, I wouldn't say I'm ideologically opposed lol. Maybe I'm ideologically opposed to thought terminating clichés, or how FAANGers see it as a cudgel to cram in wherever we find an open gap just to shit infinite tokens into?

You just haven't suggested a single solution that achieves the same level of risk reduction as AI driven end-to-end exploit generation.

You claim static analysis does the job, but you haven't backed it up with any proof that it works across large diverse codebases. Meanwhile, we have proof that AI works at least somewhat, here and now.

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