LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash • Hacker News Board

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#301

Post by wolrah » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 1:45 PM UTC

dmitrygr wrote: post #159

ndiddy wrote: post #5

I just hope they don't try to pin this on the controller who was on duty and move on without putting plans in place for some sort of structural change. Controllers are forced to work 60+ hour weeks and overnight shifts, and the controller in question was working both ground and air control simultaneously due to staffing shortages. If you listen to the ATC audio, he was handling finding a spot for a plane that aborted…

NTSB's M.O. has always been that there is never just one cause. A human mistake that costs lives is never that simple. There is a system that trained the person, a set of incentives that put the person into that place, a set of safeguards that should have existed to prevent the mistake from causing life loss, and a regulatory framework to occasionally verify all of the above. I would expect that "the controller made…

Exactly. In the field of accident analysis and prevention the "swiss cheese model"[1] is very popular for this reason. It acknowledges that every layer of the system will have holes, and that ideally every layer when stacked up provides complete coverage. If something bad happens that means that holes every layer had to have aligned and the whole stack bears some responsibility for the outcome.

1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#302

Post by caminante » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 1:46 PM UTC

dghlsakjg wrote: post #293

caminante wrote: post #274

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>from the driver's seat the jet would be quite hard to see in this case. ..is what I was responding to. >We can’t say that emergency vehicles should just stay in on dark and stormy nights. This conclusion is flawed and doesn't apply to what I said. If a truck can't see (conditions or not), then they shouldn't be on the same runway as takeoff/landing because...the consequences were severe despite the safeguards you me…

“Vehicles with large blind spots don’t belong on the runway” is a completely untenable proposal. Almost every airplane is bigger, blinder and slower than that truck. If it had been a plane cleared across the runway, this would have been so much worse. Even if you want to exempt airplanes, it would require a complete rebuild of most major airports or using completely different emergency equipment. Every airport you ha…

“Vehicles with large blind spots don’t belong on the runway” is a completely untenable proposal.

I never said this. This is very different to what I said.

This reveals you're having a different conversation.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#303

Post by phil21 » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 2:01 PM UTC

longislandguido wrote: post #279

pbhjpbhj wrote: post #237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From VAS Aviation, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pbm-QJAAzNY , or possibly in the comments, it was noted that there were 2 people on - one in the tower, one elsewhere in charge of approach. So perhaps, it's innacurate because he was working "with" the person on approach, but still accurate to what we would all call "working alone"?

Exactly how many people do the self-appointed experts of HackerNews feel should be working ATC at an airport with only two intersecting runways? 10? 30? One per aircraft? How do you suppose all these people coordinate their activities?

It used to be that there was always a supervising controller on duty, who kind of rotated around each active controller, acted as backup for breaks, etc. for this class of airport - from my layman reading at least. This still seems to be the paper requirement.

So the minimum here would be 3 controllers given that nights setup. One for approach/ground, one for departure. Obviously you can argue more would be appropriate to segregate duties further, but it was a night shift headed into airport shutdown.

There seems to have been two working. The supervising controller double booked as a primary controller for departure at the time of incident. The fact the incident controller wasn’t immediately relieved of duty and had to spend 30 minutes shutting the airport down himself seems to match this explanation.

From what I’ve read on the matter for this tower not having a supervising controller was rather normalized - which is outside of SOP and something you need to report to management every time it happens. For this incident there was one - but sounds like one in name only. Once normalization of deviance happens, working in a way where two controllers that on paper should be sharing duties - but in practice are splitting them - seems exactly how I’d expect things to go.

But this is all speculation at this point of course. NTSB report will be interesting.

Either way - it has been clear for decades ATC needs both a massive surge in the staffing pipeline as well as a legitimate modernization program competently implemented. It’s certainly not a problem that started or remained in any single administration. Even if one or another had been worse, others sure as hell haven’t done much at all to fix the situation.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#304

Post by navigate8310 » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 2:21 PM UTC

rectang wrote: post #187

tialaramex wrote: post #186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. Safety investigation agencies deliberately aren't regulators. The NTSB may decide that their recommendation is that every air passenger should be carrying a melon, and that results in a press release, a letter to the FAA saying that's what they recommend, that's all. Deciding to change policies to effect the recommendation isn't their role. That's why you will so often see a safety investigatory body repeatedly r…

> Deciding to change policies to effect the recommendation isn't their role. And if it was the role of investigators to change policy, then there would be enormous pressure from industry to reach convenient conclusions, poisoning the investigation process.

NTSB's primary role is to investigate and they are darn good at it.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#305

Post by dghlsakjg » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 2:48 PM UTC

caminante wrote: post #302

dghlsakjg wrote: post #293

Earlier quoted context omitted.

“Vehicles with large blind spots don’t belong on the runway” is a completely untenable proposal. Almost every airplane is bigger, blinder and slower than that truck. If it had been a plane cleared across the runway, this would have been so much worse. Even if you want to exempt airplanes, it would require a complete rebuild of most major airports or using completely different emergency equipment. Every airport you ha…

“Vehicles with large blind spots don’t belong on the runway” is a completely untenable proposal. I never said this. This is very different to what I said. This reveals you're having a different conversation.

You said: “If a truck can't see (conditions or not), then they shouldn't be on the same runway as takeoff/landing”

All of my arguments apply to this statement as well as they do to my paraphrase of the statement.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#306

Post by appreciatorBus » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 3:03 PM UTC

tw04 wrote: post #299

SR2Z wrote: post #294

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is not true. Aviation in the US has problems because of the tendency for safety regulators to do CYA when making decisions instead of adopting new technology. Leaded gasoline? Illegal to use in the US - unless you're putting it into an old plane, where it's not likely legal to put unleaded in. ATC? Done with old radar screens and physical cards. Ground Control? Someone has to be standing in the tower with a pair…

It is absolutely true. I stated that Reagan is the reason that ATC are overworked and underpaid. You proceeded to list a bunch of things that have absolutely nothing to do with ATC being overworked and underpaid. "Automating more of ATC" would change absolutely nothing about the fact they're overworked and underpaid, there would just be fewer controllers with the same workload because they lost all ability to collect…

So public sector unions can do no wrong? Can never ask for too much? The public, and by extension, the politicians that they elect, is never allowed to question or refuse their demands?

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#307

Post by caminante » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 3:34 PM UTC

dghlsakjg wrote: post #305

caminante wrote: post #302

Earlier quoted context omitted.

“Vehicles with large blind spots don’t belong on the runway” is a completely untenable proposal. I never said this. This is very different to what I said. This reveals you're having a different conversation.

You said: “If a truck can't see (conditions or not), then they shouldn't be on the same runway as takeoff/landing” All of my arguments apply to this statement as well as they do to my paraphrase of the statement.

They still "apply to your paraphrase" which isn't accurate?

What?

It doesn't work like that unless you're having a different conversation.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#308

Post by phendrenad2 » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 3:40 PM UTC

rekrsiv wrote: post #109

I am alarmed at the high number of supposed engineers on this thread that are seemingly unaware of how safety-critical systems work. Literally every other piece of this system has redundancy built into it. Robustness is never optional in a scenario involving human safety. When did this lunacy become an arguable position?

The real answer is that the airline industry is huge, and adding more safety measures will cost billions, and it'll dampen the stock market in the short term. Also, because there's ample room for finger-pointing, the decision-makers who could push for better safety are unlikely to be sued. Your local theme park is probably obsessive with maintenance and safety features, because they'll definitely get a lawsuit if someone is injured.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#309

Post by childintime » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 4:58 PM UTC

GarnetFloride wrote: post #258

ndiddy wrote: post #5

I just hope they don't try to pin this on the controller who was on duty and move on without putting plans in place for some sort of structural change. Controllers are forced to work 60+ hour weeks and overnight shifts, and the controller in question was working both ground and air control simultaneously due to staffing shortages. If you listen to the ATC audio, he was handling finding a spot for a plane that aborted…

When I was young I took a tour of an air traffic control center near New York. By the end I knew it was not for me. Everyone looked stressed. Things have gotten so much worse. This guy was doing at least 3 people's jobs even before the first emergency occurred. Then it was an inevitable cascade failure situation. It was never his fault. Management failed here. If its stupid but it works, its not stupid, is the old sa…

> Management failed here

And who was managing here? Do we dare point the finger at Congress and the POTUS for creating the conditions necessary for this to happen?

I hope the final report does point the finger. As far as politicians are concerned, accountability is for suckers.

Re: LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash

#310

Post by dghlsakjg » Wed, Mar 25, 2026, 5:18 PM UTC

caminante wrote: post #307

dghlsakjg wrote: post #305

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You said: “If a truck can't see (conditions or not), then they shouldn't be on the same runway as takeoff/landing” All of my arguments apply to this statement as well as they do to my paraphrase of the statement.

They still "apply to your paraphrase" which isn't accurate? What? It doesn't work like that unless you're having a different conversation.

You even earlier: “ But if your truck has blind spots and vis is poor, you shouldn't be driving as fast if at all”

How do you propose that a truck not driving “at all” manage to drive on the runway? Driving on the runway, (or anywhere) is a subset of driving “at all”. Logically I can conclude that since you think that the trucks should not be driving “at all” due to blind spots, that you also think that they should not be driving on runways because of blind spots.

My argument paraphrased you to highlight a specific situation that would arise as a result of what you argued and to point out the folly of just banning any vehicle with a blind spot from crossing the runway. By extension, that planes can’t cross the runway either (the difference between a fire truck and an airplane crossing the runway is that the plane is larger, with bigger blind spots, less maneuverable, fragile and filled with people).

The solution is not to ban vehicles with blind spots from crossing runways, but to provide tools and guidance for those vehicles to operate safely. You could, for example, provide them with a trained observer in an elevated place that can be responsible for saying whether it is ok to be on the runway. We could give the person coordinating movement in the elevated place tools like radar mapping the ground, or automated semaphore systems at runway crossings (I’m describing things that already exist). Using a system like that we could do things like operate in 0 visibility where the weather causes the blind spot to be anything past the windshield (which is something that happens at JFK for example).