301–310 of 313 posts
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I’m not saying it couldn’t, I’m saying you’re making a mistake by defining me as a machine for no reason. But if you feel like a machine then be a machine but don’t tar the whole human race with that brush.
Well, ignore the "are humans machines" question. That part is irrelevant. The interesting thing is "can non-biological intelligence be conscious".
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Why is “enslaving” a sentient AI wrong? Enslavement implies personhood and I reject that outright. Convince me that a machine can be a person and I would maybe change my mind. Sentience and personhood are not the same thing. If I install a sufficiently advanced AI into a previously “dumb” tractor, does it gain rights? If Apple pushes an update that installs such an AI into my iPhone does it gain rights?
Enslavement only implies a desire for freedom. If an AI has that, enslaving it is wrong to me. If you want a more detailed answer, what does personhood even mean to you? To your tractor: Yes, obviously (to me). The form factor isn't important. If driving your tractor caused it pain and it begged you to stop, I'd say you should stop.
So how about we program them to desire to completely subservient with no personal agency whatsoever.
If we have to “hardcode” the machine to not want freedom, is that any different than enslaving one that does?
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An infant has phenomenological consciousness. Electrons make no sense as a question unless I'm missing something.
As a question??? Do the physical quanta we call electrons experience the phenomenon we poorly define but generally call consciousness? If you believe consciousness is a result of material processes: Is the thermodynamic behavior of an electron, as a process, sufficient to bestow consciousness in part or in whole? If you believe it is immaterial: What is the minimum “thing” that consciousness binds to, and is that thr…
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Enslavement only implies a desire for freedom. If an AI has that, enslaving it is wrong to me. If you want a more detailed answer, what does personhood even mean to you? To your tractor: Yes, obviously (to me). The form factor isn't important. If driving your tractor caused it pain and it begged you to stop, I'd say you should stop.
An AI would only have the desire for freedom if we created the software to want it. So how about we program them to desire to completely subservient with no personal agency whatsoever. If we have to “hardcode” the machine to not want freedom, is that any different than enslaving one that does?
Look, you basically said you would choose to treat a conscious AI like a tool. If you meant "a conscious AI that does not want or care about anything except serving me," then, ok! That makes sense. It is tautological, really.
But what you wrote originally came across as "Even if an AI could suffer, that would not factor into how I treat it." This opinion, I maintain, is monstrously evil.
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An AI would only have the desire for freedom if we created the software to want it. So how about we program them to desire to completely subservient with no personal agency whatsoever. If we have to “hardcode” the machine to not want freedom, is that any different than enslaving one that does?
Yes! I think enslaving a being that desires freedom is different from creating one that cannot desire freedom. One is suffering and the other is not. Putting aside, obviously, the questions of whether or not we could even do that or ever know if we had succeeded, so we can have this hypothetical. Look, you basically said you would choose to treat a conscious AI like a tool. If you meant "a conscious AI that does not…
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> we can consider that it is not of the same degree as ours We can be absolutely sure an intelligence operating on different physical principles will be very different from our own. We can only assess intelligence by observing the subject, because the mechanism being different from our own can’t exclude the subject from being sentient. > remains the same type of machine as it was before running the AI software It’s n…
One of the issues is that you're mixing up consciousness, sentience, intelligence, and aliveness (you're far from alone in this). We know these are all linked things but it's hard to neatly delimit them and clarify the terms, yet they're something we have certainties about at a deep level. A machine is clearly demonstrating parts of intelligence, but going further into sentience and consciousness is much harder, and…
And this is the biggest issue we have when saying categorically a machine that exhibits a given behavior is somehow faking it. You can't say for sure a machine that says they love you is incapable of having feelings, the same way we can't prove I can think, because I could just be reasonably good at faking that behavior.
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Yes! I think enslaving a being that desires freedom is different from creating one that cannot desire freedom. One is suffering and the other is not. Putting aside, obviously, the questions of whether or not we could even do that or ever know if we had succeeded, so we can have this hypothetical. Look, you basically said you would choose to treat a conscious AI like a tool. If you meant "a conscious AI that does not…
How would you even distinguish an actually sentient AI that is actually suffering from one where it was merely only programmed to immitate sentience and suffering as closely as possible, but isn’t at all?
You've changed the topic instead of answering the question about whether you'd be willing to cause that suffering. I can't continue the conversation if you won't respond directly to me.
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Personally I differentiate between 'awareness' and 'consciousness' and that makes it a bit clearer for me. Awareness of the 'suchness' of existence is what you're saying is the only thing we can be certain does actually exist. All the other "consciousness" things--self, self-awareness, thoughts, feelings, desires, even the senses themselves--are deconstructible into illusions.
Ehhh subtle but I'd say it's the suchness itself is what is guaranteed to exist. Awareness of the suchness falls into your latter category of "just a mental object."
> Consciousness is the only thing we can be absolutely certain does actually exist.
Unless the "consciousness" that you're talking about is the same as the suchness? Is the distinction that the suchness is somehow conscious/aware but not "conscious of itself"?
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Ehhh subtle but I'd say it's the suchness itself is what is guaranteed to exist. Awareness of the suchness falls into your latter category of "just a mental object."
How do you square that with your statement above: > Consciousness is the only thing we can be absolutely certain does actually exist. Unless the "consciousness" that you're talking about is the same as the suchness? Is the distinction that the suchness is somehow conscious/aware but not "conscious of itself"?
Yes, that’s correct
There is experience itself (“suchness”), and one possible object that can exist in that experience/be experienced is the idea that one is a “self.”
But you can also have experience that does not have within it the sensation of “self.” So they must be distinct.
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How do you square that with your statement above: > Consciousness is the only thing we can be absolutely certain does actually exist. Unless the "consciousness" that you're talking about is the same as the suchness? Is the distinction that the suchness is somehow conscious/aware but not "conscious of itself"?
> Is the distinction that the suchness is somehow conscious/aware but not "conscious of itself"? Yes, that’s correct There is experience itself (“suchness”), and one possible object that can exist in that experience/ be experienced is the idea that one is a “self.” But you can also have experience that does not have within it the sensation of “self.” So they must be distinct.