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Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

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Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#301
post #299

Friendly reminder that archive box exists to let you self host your own archive service. https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox I dream of a day where archivebox becomes a fleet of homelabs all over the world making it drastically harder to block them all.

Out of curiosity, does ArchiveBox integrate some way of verifying the contents of the archived page(s) are legitimate and unmodified?

ArchiveBox open source does not, but I have set it up for paying clients in the past using TLSNotary. This is actually a very hard problem and is not as simple as saving traffic hashes + original SSL certs (because HTTPS connections use a symmetric key after the initial handshake, the archivist can forge server responses and claim the server sent things that it did not).

There is only 1 reasonable approach that I know of as of today: https://tlsnotary.org/docs/intro, and it still involves trusting a third party with reputation (though it cleverly uses a zk algorithm so that the third party doesn't have to see the cleartext). Anyone claiming to provide "verifyable" web archives is likely lying or overstating it unless they are using TLSNotary or a similar approach. I've seen far to many companies make impossible claims about "signed" or "verified" web archives over the last decade, be very critial any time you see someone claiming that unless they talk explicitly about the "TLS Non-Repudiation Problem" and how they solve it: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/103645/does-ssl...

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#302

Note that association's site is made from this free template [1] with minimal editing (can see it using diff). The web hosting account at name.com (prices starting from $5/year) was registered around Jan 12, 2025 [2]. The page also contains commented out section with a part of French mobile phone number and words "Emergency Standard" (the template contained fictional number here): Emergency Standard --> [1] https://w…

Publication manager: Jean DOMINIQUE Author of response PDF to Adguard: someone named "bob" Uses Microsoft and Office 365 RNA number W691110691. Was declared on February 15, 2025, and published in the Journal Officiel on March 18, 2025 Headquartered at 131 rue de Créqui, 69006 Lyon 6 in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region, specifically in the Rhône department. Publication number: 20250011, announcement number 1688

>131 rue de Créqui, 69006 Lyon 6

Yeah, that's a postal box to host compagnies.

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#303
post #46

The amount of forces seemingly actively trying to kill the internet of old is disconcerting. Chat control, DNS as arbiter of whats allowed, walled gardens etc.

The internet will be destroyed as countries the world over seek to impose all of their silly and incompatible laws on it. The international network will fracture into multiple national networks with heavy filtering at the borders. I've been making this prediction for years now. Words can hardly capture the sadness I feel when I see evidence of its slow realization. I'm happy to have known the true internet. Truly one…

We're not doomed. More people are starting to realize the problem, and it's possible to solve if we put in some effort. A free Internet can be achieved, if we can push back against malicious laws for a little longer to buy a little more time. We need to especially defend the right to use VPNs and the ability to run servers at home.

We can create a decentralized VPN service that can't be blocked or sued by improving on SoftEther VPN, which is open-source software that can make VPN connections camouflaged as HTTPS, so it's invisible to DPI firewalls and can't be filtered.[0] It's already sort of decentralized, as it has a server discovery site called VPNGate that lists many volunteer-hosted instances.[1] But we can make this truly robust by doing a few more things. First, make a user-friendly mobile client. Second, figure out a way to broadcast and discover server lists in a decentralized manner, similar to BitTorrent, and build auto-discovery and broadcasting into the client. Third, make each client automatically host a temporary server and broadcast its IP so others may connect to it whenever it's in use. That should be enough to keep the Internet free in most countries because most forms of censorship would become impossible.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SoftEther_VPN

[1] https://www.vpngate.net/en/

In the long term, we can take things even further and build a decentralized hosting provider, like AWS/Azure but your web services don't run on a physical server that has an IP address and physical location. Instead, the entire network of physical computers around the world together behaves like a single computer: an Internet-sized virtual machine. No node knows what the entire machine is up to, but every node may store things and run programs on it. The amount of compute/storage a node contributes equals the amount of compute/storage it's allowed to use. This would truly make the Internet open and free worldwide and draw out its full potential.

For the short-term goals, there's already concrete progress. The long-term goal needs more theory work but the missing ideas are probably buried in existing literature.

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#304

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you can sue shark fins, why not a website? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Approximately...

Amazing, here is a list of other similarly hilariously-titled “in rem jurisdiction” cases: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_rem_jurisdiction#Examples Some good ones: - United States v. One Solid Gold Object in Form of a Rooster - United States v. 11 1/4 Dozen Packages of Articles Labeled in Part Mrs. Moffat's Shoo-Fly Powders for Drunkenness - South Dakota v. Fifteen Impounded Cats

My favorite one: United States v. Article Consisting of 50,000 Cardboard Boxes More or Less, Each Containing One Pair of Clacker Balls

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Article_Consi...

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#305

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Amazing, here is a list of other similarly hilariously-titled “in rem jurisdiction” cases: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_rem_jurisdiction#Examples Some good ones: - United States v. One Solid Gold Object in Form of a Rooster - United States v. 11 1/4 Dozen Packages of Articles Labeled in Part Mrs. Moffat's Shoo-Fly Powders for Drunkenness - South Dakota v. Fifteen Impounded Cats

My favorite one: United States v. Article Consisting of 50,000 Cardboard Boxes More or Less, Each Containing One Pair of Clacker Balls https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Article_Consi...

"More or Less" maybe takes the cake for me.

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#306
post #23

I still can't wrap my head around why a DNS provider is required to block websites, especially one that is not associated with ISP or used as default on any device. Oversimplifying this, it's a glorified hash map, so whoever wants to take down the illegal content should just deal with the website owner?

Presumably they have failed to do the latter and are just reaching at this point.

[deleted]

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#307
post #142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The current federal government of France? Of the EU? The article is not about the USA.

> The current federal government of France? Of the EU? The article is not about the USA. Are you sure ? They say in the article that they were not able to fing out who sent the email. Site was behind Cloudfare (so US).

Does Cloudflare only allow US customers?

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#308

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The article mentioned that this might be a mass registration address, and it seems that in France details of association founders are not published.

And also the timelines are pretty condensed... a lot is off... this does not seem genuine.. seems more like scanning csam page themselves and then going for reporting for some other hidden nefarious reason.

My thoughts exactly - in which case archive.is might have the IP address(es) of the perpetrators in their logs. Worth checking out.

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#309

How can you even sue without any legal identity? This website and an organisation does not happen to have any. Might as well be some shell company in the Carribeans with no legal standing in France. It's not even good enough for public prosecution, as the tip would then go through French services. This law is completely backwards, and worse than a SLAPP. If you cannot respond to a report in any way, it should be null…

In the U.S., “John Doe” is typically used when cannot (yet) identify the person to name as a defendant. Once the case is filed then the plaintiff can execute the necessary subpoenas to identify the defendant specifically.

Re: Our investigation into the suspicious pressure on Archive.today

#310

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I downvoted it because it's commonly said by people who do bad things, as a red herring. "People from your subreddit keep killing people" "Well at least we're not infected by the woke mind virus"/"You can't accuse us of that just because we don't agree with the hivemind"/etc. It's no different from "but her emails" etc.

If there was one thing I could make people understand: Even though bad people are saying it, doesn't mean it isn't true. Social media false flag tactics happen. People from all over all sorts of political spectrums tell the same story. The sites tell the same story. If you decide to blindly dismiss claims of abuse because you don't like the ones claiming to be abused, you create a comfy little space for abuse to happ…

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