Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think there is too much confusion in the details of the actual attack. You have to steal the private key for the SAML signing certificate for an app. The correct answer would be to scope any token to only have access to what the app has access to, the second layer which is documented in their 2020 article, is to require mfa on admin actions, and the 3rd layer is to disconnect azure admin accounts from on-prem admin…
If all those other solutions are better, why does the article say this: >In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Microsoft advised customers of Microsoft 365 to disable seamless SSO in AD FS and similar products — the solution that Harris proposed three years earlier. And did Microsoft advise those other solutions prior to Solarwinds happening?
What it says is "be careful when using federated trust relationships, because if one of your trusted environments is pwned, it will be trusted by the others". That's very obvious.
And about "disable seamless SSO", I only found this: "On-premises SSO systems: Deprecate any on-premises federation and Web Access Management infrastructure and configure applications to use Azure AD." (Seems pretty basic too, especially considering how vulnerable on-prem ADs are).
The original article seems to paint this MS page as a security advisory or vulnerability notification, while it just seems to me to be a very very basic security guideline.