Earlier quoted context omitted.
Graydon also created monotone, which was a big influence on git. http://www.monotone.ca/monotone.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotone_%28software%29#Monoto...
I think Monotone was an alternative to BitKeeper and BitKeeper was the inspiration of Git and Mercurial. It even seems to suggest that in the link you posted.
Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
31–40 of 99 posts
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#32"It is the responsibility of each node v to ensure Q(v) does not violate quorum intersection". ::Sigh:: This sounds like it does not even speak to one of the major fundamental issues of their approach; which I pointed out in 2013 ( https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=144471.msg1548672#ms... ) and appeared to play a critical role in Stellar's spontaneously faulting, and has been avoided in ripple by using effectiv…
You are correct that safety requires overlapping quorums. However, the trust decisions are public, as this is what allows participants to discover quorums. The scenario you describe of two groups of 100 participants overlapping at one node might or might not be a problem. The most likely cause of such a topology is a Sybil attack, in which an attacker with one seat at the table gloms an extra 99 nodes onto the system…
The person who is being attacked cares, right? Is there a way for a Stellar node to realize that it has been partitioned from the real network?
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#33Is this protocol isomorphic to bitshare's Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS) [1]? Seems to have the same qualities. *[1] https://bitshares.org/delegates
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#34I'm getting very frustrated by this presentation, it's all "This is so amazing, it satisfies so many criteria, there's a big problem with financial institutions" I can only read those lines so much before I get the feeling of being whitewashed. How does it work? Where is the data? I'm reading the white paper now, but I felt compelled to post this comment after I read through yet another 10 paragraphs of exactly what…
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are correct that safety requires overlapping quorums. However, the trust decisions are public, as this is what allows participants to discover quorums. The scenario you describe of two groups of 100 participants overlapping at one node might or might not be a problem. The most likely cause of such a topology is a Sybil attack, in which an attacker with one seat at the table gloms an extra 99 nodes onto the system…
The attackers' 100 nodes might of course diverge if they are so configured, but nobody will care. The person who is being attacked cares, right? Is there a way for a Stellar node to realize that it has been partitioned from the real network?
There's one sense in which FBA is stronger than the Internet analogy, however, it that is is actually testing transitive reachability. So instead of just making sure you can talk to those 50 web sites, you actually make sure all of those 50 web sites can talk to all the sites they consider important, and so on, until you get the transitive closure, which is basically the notion of an FBA quorum.
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#36Are they talking about computer verified proofs? I wonder, are researchers able to prove the correctness of distributed algorithms the same way they would prove sequential algorithms (for instance, using some type of Hoare logic and sat solver/ proof assistant).
[0] http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/lamport/tla/fo...
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#37Are they talking about computer verified proofs? I wonder, are researchers able to prove the correctness of distributed algorithms the same way they would prove sequential algorithms (for instance, using some type of Hoare logic and sat solver/ proof assistant).
To me, though, it would be more interesting to prove the implementation correct. Rather than trying to prove an existing C++ implementation correct, it's probably more feasible to reimplement the algorithm within Coq and extract to runnable code. Verdi already supports that, but unfortunately it doesn't support disk state.
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#38I'm finding the graphic novel explaining federated consensus to be really entertaining: https://www.stellar.org/stories/adventures-in-galactic-conse...
We know it’s part of our jobs to make these ideas understandable. That way more people can join the dialogue and think of ways this infrastructure can be used to build services for their communities, which may be really far from the nearest computer science program. So we decided to add a lighter approach in hopes of making it fun for people to learn.
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#39I'm excited for the ideas here and have been following Stellar. But I'm hugely disappointed to see that they went with C and C++ for their new core codebase. This is the kind of code that needs strong safety, security, and correctness guarantees, and here in 2015 we have several mature languages with better safety & correctness guarantees. C# and Java are both mature and mainstream, and either would have been a sane…
If a program is formally proven to be correct, it doesn't matter what language it's written in.
Re: Stellar Consensus Protocol: Proof and Code
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I believe the same kind of attacks to be plausible with the Bitcoin network This isn't anyone elses understanding. Can you suggest a mechanism by which it would be possible for a minority conspiracy to perpetually exclude a transaction in Bitcoin?
Well in bitcoin, of course, trust would map to computing power.