Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's if you're generating both sides. If someone has a file and I want to generate a new file with a matching MD5, that's a lot harder.
MD5 is both vulnerable to collision attacks and targeted collision attacks. We can imagine both in the wikileaks case. You are correct that Target collision attacks are more difficult but they have been done in research for many years now[0](2006) and they are showing up in the wild as well[1](2012). [0]: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.140.... [1]: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2012/…
Wikileaks releases copies of FinFisher surveillance software
31–33 of 33 posts
Those are both chosen-prefix attacks. They're impressive, but not relevant to this case where one file is completely out of the attacker's control.
Re: Wikileaks releases copies of FinFisher surveillance software
#32Interestingly, Sophos on OS X immediately identifies the .zip as Malware/Generic-Spyware and blocks access to it:
finspy_master.zip: Permission denied
Re: Wikileaks releases copies of FinFisher surveillance software
#33I wonder why they use MD5 hashes and not something more collision attack resistant.
Collisions aren't a major risk with MD5 when you also give someone the file size (even approximate). Finding a collision in MD5 is costly, finding a collision in MD5 which is within -+10% of the actual size is extremely costly (technically possible, but maybe not in your lifetime). As to the other reply "because it is zip something something" I disagree. Zip is an extremely good format for crafting fake files which m…
That's a point I've always wondered about.
Given that most (all?) md5 collisions consist of appending or prepending data, how much more difficult would it be if you encode the size as well.
Surely the difficulty is much more. And then add the fact that it has to be semantically/syntactically similar enough to fool whatever ingests it...