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Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com

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Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#31

I'm concerned that the net effect of this will be to make the Internet less secure. In most cases, webmasters will be forced to make a Faustian choice: live with the scary warning in Chrome for modern users or give up support of browsers running on Windows XP (pre-SP3) and early versions of Android (pre-2.3), since they don't support certificates with a more secure hash than SHA1. We'll likely write a blog post soon…

Not responding directly to your point (that this might make the Internet less secure), but there is also another approach -- deploying with two certificates. You can have a RSA/SHA1 certificate for older software and an ECDSA/SHA256 certificate for modern user agents. That should keep everyone happy. I dare say that, with some effort, it might even be possible to have a RSA/SHA1 and RSA/SHA256 certificate combination for the same host.

Of course, doing that is a lot of work. But at least your company is in a position to do the work once and automate it afterwards for all your customers.

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#32
I'm glad to see people move off old browsers, in general. SHA1 is far from the biggest problem with Windows XP SP2; in fact, I'd probably say SHA1 is one of the most secure aspects of the OS. The actual weaknesses in SHA1 which have been identified are very serious, but still requiring on the order of 2^61 operations to cause a collision, and there is a fairly indirect path between hash collision and end of the world for many protocols.

The problem I have is how Google is doing this. There was a pretty clearly announced date. Google used a random browser meeting's minutes to make what is essentially a major policy change, and then assumed CAs would notify their customers.

The victims here are end users and site operators; CAs benefit because people buy new certs (and at worst, it's customers who have already bought something which breaks...). There was no real incentive for CAs to communicate with sites, and they're not really known as responsive businesses anyway.

Doing this with effect during the holiday season is kind of the definition of dick move. Pushing it out 6 mo wouldn't have appreciably hurt the SHA1 migration efforts, but would have dramatically reduced pain for end users and site admins. Providing direct notice to the world (such as this blog post), so users and site admins would actually see it, is how notice should be given; not an obscure forum or relying on CAs with no business interest.

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#33

I'm concerned that the net effect of this will be to make the Internet less secure. In most cases, webmasters will be forced to make a Faustian choice: live with the scary warning in Chrome for modern users or give up support of browsers running on Windows XP (pre-SP3) and early versions of Android (pre-2.3), since they don't support certificates with a more secure hash than SHA1. We'll likely write a blog post soon…

The world will be switching to SHA-256 - Microsoft already decided that last November [1]. This is just Chrome helping out.

Obviously, XP is a problem. We're planning on prompting Chrome users on affected versions to update, both at startup and on the error page. SP3 does exist and one doesn't need to pass the Genuine Windows check to install it[2] so I think we have a good chance to getting users to update once sites stop working. Even if you're going to serve different chains based on signature_algorithms, that gets you at most a year of extra time. Maybe you should be putting effort into getting people to SP3 instead? :)

[1] https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/2880823... [2] http://support.microsoft.com/kb/322389

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#34
I think it's really crazy that certificates are now declared insecure based on their expiration date. We've deployed several certificates with a three year validity (i.e. valid after 1-Jan-2017), and since our CA could only provide SHA-1, that's what we're using. Now these certificates get marked as insecure. However, if we'd gone for a 2 year validity, we'd be fine until somewhere in 2016.

How does this help security? Why not have us replace these SHA-1 certificates somewhere in 2016?

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#35
post #31

I'm concerned that the net effect of this will be to make the Internet less secure. In most cases, webmasters will be forced to make a Faustian choice: live with the scary warning in Chrome for modern users or give up support of browsers running on Windows XP (pre-SP3) and early versions of Android (pre-2.3), since they don't support certificates with a more secure hash than SHA1. We'll likely write a blog post soon…

Not responding directly to your point (that this might make the Internet less secure), but there is also another approach -- deploying with two certificates. You can have a RSA/SHA1 certificate for older software and an ECDSA/SHA256 certificate for modern user agents. That should keep everyone happy. I dare say that, with some effort, it might even be possible to have a RSA/SHA1 and RSA/SHA256 certificate combination…

Yes, that's what we're doing at CloudFlare. However, the patches to do it in major web server platforms are best characterized as "experimental" -- which is spooky for organizations to deploy into production environments. (We plan on open sourcing any work we do to improve them.) But, given how hard it is for most web admins to even manage one certificate, configuring a server to correctly manage two is... daunting. As you suggest, this change is undoubtedly good for our business, but I think it's bad for the web.

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#36
post #14

I feel a bit uneasy with having the "unsafe" when SHA1 is technically still safe - just not as safe as, say, sha256 (which is itself probably not as safe as sha512, etc.). It would be nice to have a better "marker" for it instead of having a very fast deprecation rate.

> SHA1 is technically still safe

The linked article to Schneier's blog shows that practical attacks can be afforded as soon as 2018. It's absolutely not safe anymore, at least for that usage.

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#37
post #32

I'm glad to see people move off old browsers, in general. SHA1 is far from the biggest problem with Windows XP SP2; in fact, I'd probably say SHA1 is one of the most secure aspects of the OS. The actual weaknesses in SHA1 which have been identified are very serious, but still requiring on the order of 2^61 operations to cause a collision, and there is a fairly indirect path between hash collision and end of the world…

This was already announced by Microsoft last year: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/2880823...

Unfortunately, many CAs decided to ignore it, presumably on the assumption that Microsoft would be forced to back down. We've done this dance with MD5 and 1024-bit certificates and we know how it goes. Here's a quick list of CAs that issued more than 2000 certificates extending into 2017 with SHA-1:

GlobalSign nv-sa: 75,312 GoDaddy: 41,606 GeoTrust: 40,429 Comodo: 37,789 Verisign: 34,927 Terena: 9,444 Thawte: 8,735 Internet2: 8,637 Network Solutions: 8,077 Entrust: 5,542 AlphaSSL: 3,458

We would all have liked CAs to have acted either when the Baseline was updated (2011) or when Microsoft laid down dates (Nov 2013) or when Chrome talked about doing this at the CA/B Forum meeting earlier this year. It is unfortunate that that 2016/2017 dates are being ignored.

If you run a site and want to be insulated from this sort you might want to consider getting one year certificates. CAs like to sell multiple years of course but doing renewal once every three (or more) years means that you have a significant risk of loosing the institutional knowledge of how to do it. (E.g. the renewal remainder email goes to someone who left last year and you then have a panic when it expires). Additionally, very long lived certificates are not insulated from from these sorts of changes and you may need to replace them during their lifetime anyway.

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#38
post #33

I'm concerned that the net effect of this will be to make the Internet less secure. In most cases, webmasters will be forced to make a Faustian choice: live with the scary warning in Chrome for modern users or give up support of browsers running on Windows XP (pre-SP3) and early versions of Android (pre-2.3), since they don't support certificates with a more secure hash than SHA1. We'll likely write a blog post soon…

The world will be switching to SHA-256 - Microsoft already decided that last November [1]. This is just Chrome helping out. Obviously, XP is a problem. We're planning on prompting Chrome users on affected versions to update, both at startup and on the error page. SP3 does exist and one doesn't need to pass the Genuine Windows check to install it[2] so I think we have a good chance to getting users to update once site…

While I'm a huge fan of what you're doing in terms of crypto at Google, it's hard for me to see this decision as anything other than reckless. I think we'll be able to show a number of empirical examples of how, over the coming months, it will make the web a less secure place as sites that we're just now starting to convince to adopt crypto will stop.

I do at least hope that you will make efforts to alert more of the general public of what's coming and how they can prepare ahead of time. While at CloudFlare we follow the crypto lists closely and know there have been discussions for some time, dropping this news quietly for general public consumption on the Google blog on a Friday afternoon was... an odd choice.

And, for the record, for the last two years we've made it one-click simple for any of the millions of sites on CloudFlare to alert their users to move off out-of-date browsers:

https://www.cloudflare.com/apps/abetterbrowser

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#39
Anybody know what the easiest way to determine if your certificate is affected? I looked at my certificate and it says Signature Algorithm is "SHA-1 with RSA Encryption". Is this affected? When I viewed the certificate for google.com it also said "SHA-1 with RSA Encryption".

Re: Gradually sunsetting SHA-1

#40

Anybody know what the easiest way to determine if your certificate is affected? I looked at my certificate and it says Signature Algorithm is "SHA-1 with RSA Encryption". Is this affected? When I viewed the certificate for google.com it also said "SHA-1 with RSA Encryption".

Yes. Both those certificates are affected. If I had to guess, Google will begin issuing a non-SHA1 cert to modern browser users and a SHA1 certificate to older browsers before the end of September. I wish I could give you easy advice on how to do that yourself.
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