From reading the service description, this is an encrypted messaging service that happens to have email notifications. I can't write messages with my preferred mail client, can't read messages with my preferred mail client and I can't access my (old) messages while offline. non-protonmail-users will receive a notification with a link that they received a message, not the actual message that they can keep for archivin…
ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
31–40 of 51 posts
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#32> https://protonmail.ch/blog/protonmail-threat-model/ I'm always skeptical of browser/JS based crypto, but it is nice to see that they're at least upfront with the risks involved in doing such a thing. They probably downplay the risk of a MITM attack a little much, but otherwise I'm glad to see they're realistic about possible weaknesses of the platform.
Yes, but they are clearly playing a bit fast-and-loose with things here. The whole point of end-to-end encryption is that it's a "trust no third parties" model (other than whoever provided your crypto software, which you can verify anyway). This is slightly better than Lavabit, but you're still trusting ProtonMail, who are providing the crypto implementation to your browser every time you use it. Depending on how it'…
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#33The security details page[1] makes for interesting reading. Hopefully the new norm is 'E2E' encryption. It's actually starting to feel inevitable, and the hopelessness that followed in the wake of the 'Summer of Security' is perhaps evaporating bit by bit, through universal encryption, bit by bit. - [1] https://protonmail.ch/pages/security_details.php
It's nice, but suffer from similar problems as all web apps: They have your encrypted keys, all they have to do is send you a different "client" (change the js/ui) the next time you log in, and they can snoop your encryption password. They can of course be forced to do this. I also wonder about their claim to "expire" mails -- I assume they mean only for mails internal to protonmail -- as any other expiry would have…
I understood 'expiring' mails to mean those accessed directly on their servers, following notification by email, subsequently deleted at the pre-agreed time. I could just have an active imagination.
Don't get me wrong, I'm not fully sold on the outfit, particularly for practical reasons, but am intrigued.
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#34[0] https://twitter.com/StackSmashing/status/474214532114812928
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#35From reading the service description, this is an encrypted messaging service that happens to have email notifications. I can't write messages with my preferred mail client, can't read messages with my preferred mail client and I can't access my (old) messages while offline. non-protonmail-users will receive a notification with a link that they received a message, not the actual message that they can keep for archivin…
If you used your preferred mail client, it wouldn't be encrypted end to end. This isn't a resolvable difference without running a local mail server decrypting the messages.
No? Both S/MIME and GPG provide E2E encryption and work with traditional mail clients. Both provide offline access. They also have their problems, but that's another story.
My point is: This is a neat system. It certainly has it's own set of advantages and disadvantages, but it's a centralized system that does not work very much like mail. So don't call it mail.
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#36I wonder how they will stand up against requests from the swiss government regarding lawful intercept access. Which, for larger providers is mandatory to participate in.
So it really depends on your threat model. This service is somewhat more secure than Lavabit, but incrementally and not by leaps and bounds. It also constrains the attack model (in the Lavabit model they could be coerced to give the plaintext directly, in this case they would need to be coerced to actively steal their users' private keys).
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#37And none of the employees are US citizens that can be compelled by the US government in a way that they're not allowed to talk about it (even to other employees) to compromise the security of the service? I'm not sure that having a Swiss company makes any difference in a case where people have ties to the US. Does anyone else know better than me on this topic? edit: It looks like the goal is that you don't even have…
Sorry to say, but that goal is unachievable with that setup. They provide you with the code that does the decryption. It's a simple thing to enable that code to send back the decryption password and store it on their servers. So every time you decrypt a message, you'd either have to evaluate all the javascript they send your browser, or put your messages at risk.
There's a similar problem with GPG/SMIME implementations: I have to trust the people writing that decryption code, but that's a bit simpler - they can't easily target me directly and the churn is much lower.
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#38From the threat model article here: https://protonmail.ch/blog/protonmail-threat-model/
"NOT RECOMMENDED:
Edward Snowden – If you are Edward Snowden, or the next Edward Snowden, we would not recommend that you use ProtonMail. And in case Mr. Snowden was foolish enough to try, we have already blocked the username snowden@protonmail.ch"
Re: ProtonMail: End-to-end encrypted email
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, but they are clearly playing a bit fast-and-loose with things here. The whole point of end-to-end encryption is that it's a "trust no third parties" model (other than whoever provided your crypto software, which you can verify anyway). This is slightly better than Lavabit, but you're still trusting ProtonMail, who are providing the crypto implementation to your browser every time you use it. Depending on how it'…
Do you trust OpenSSL?
Good question, but one with no influence on whether I trust protonmail. The threat model is different: Openssl is so widely deployed that all is lost for me if it's broken. I'd assume protonmail uses it for it's SSL connections (the webserver pretends to be an apache). If there's an exploit, the attacker can at any time MITM my connection to protonmail and at his discretion inject javascript that captures my decryption password or message.