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Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

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31–40 of 138 posts

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#31

I wish there was an article that succinctly conveys to potential users why Telegram is snakeoil and why TextSecure is the real deal.

Yesterday's article A Crypto Challenge For The Telegram Developers was a good analysis on why Telegram's challenge fails to prove anything.

Sadly, it was probably too technical for most potential users to be swayed much by it.

We need focused talking points, e.g. the fact that the NSA and other governments vacuum up all your data, and that TextSecure represents the first step toward a future in which it's very difficult for governments to do that. Whereas with Telegram, it's just as easy for them to access your conversations as it is for them to bypass SSL. Governments can and will do so. That's what users are concerned about; that's what they care about. Telegram has no defense against that argument due to their protocol's inherent vulnerability to this form of attack. Therefore it's the single most important point for to stress to any potential user.

Yet it's getting lost in the noise. Actually, I haven't seen it mentioned very much at all. Someone should do a writeup calling attention to it.

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#32

I wish there was an article that succinctly conveys to potential users why Telegram is snakeoil and why TextSecure is the real deal.

Yep. So far it was more like "Please please don't use Telegram. Please please use TextSecure.".

So you didn't understand the article here then? There's no shame on that, crypto is complex and requires study.

But please don't dismiss well written and well thought-out critiques like this one just because you didn't understand the arguments.

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, if the algorithm is so broken then it should be trivial to break it even with their limitations. Well, if the house is so badly protected, it should be trivial to break in, even with their limitations[1]. [1] Limitations include: not being allowed within 200m of the house.

I disagree You are allowed access to the encrypted data. In a real attack you may, depending on the circumstances, only have access to that (at first, at least). Probably more like "you aren't allowed to destroy any locks or doors to enter the house". Hard, but much different than staying 200m from the house.

> In a real attack you may, depending on the circumstances, only have access to that (at first, at least).

You misunderstand the whole deal.

When imagining different potential attacks on your house you can't go laying down rules that the burglars have to follow. What if there are special circumstances (that you weren't aware of) that allows the burglars to bypass your restrictions under certain conditions? You plan for the worst case scenario, always!

Take password hashing+salting for instance. You could say that it's actually safe to store plaintext passwords because outsiders don't have credentials to access the database.

You could even run a contest where to say that you will give a million dollars to anybody who can get access and steal the passwords, and then insist that since nobody has claimed that million dollars yet, plaintext passwords are clearly safe.

But we all see how foolish that would be. You plan for the worst case scenario and hash+salt your passwords. You don't plan for the "average case scenario" where "normally attackers don't have access to the database".

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#34
I think it's a brilliant move from the people behind Telegram: all cryptographers will now keep the vulnerabilities they find to themselves until March 1st. This saves them from a lot of bad press now, and probably doesn't cost them anything.

If they were serious about using their $200k for their security they should have either: a) Hired an actual independent cryptographer to do an audit. b) Set up a bug bounty program that rewards any weakness found, not just this "all-or-nothing" contest they have now.

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#35

Is there a reason why all fad "secure" products lately default to custom protocols and exotic solutions instead of using well tested and trusted solutions? Designing a protocol so that is does not leak is very hard.

Unique Selling Point

LOL.

We really need to make the world at large aware that a USP in the crypto area is a big red flag.

"We use up to date, standard protocols and crypto techniques" really ought to be the top of the marketing blurb. "Ours is better because we invented it" is really terrible.

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unique Selling Point

Well create metadata resistant protocol that communicates on set intervals of time with set length of random data when there is no real payload. This could be done on TLS with little or no effort. The math behind the crypto is strong enough. No need to harden it further. Every client sends and receives 16KB blob every 30 seconds - this way you could prevent analysis that you are communicating with someone. You could…

It seems like there is a 'No-Free-Lunch' tradeoff between bandwidth efficiency and traffic analysis resistance.

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#38

Funny how they say "oh but the attack possibilities are limited" then proceed to mention all the weaknesses in the algorithm. Well, if the algorithm is so broken then it should be trivial to break it even with their limitations. Isn't that what they say? "Oh SHA-1 is broken", great, show it. Of course, the capability to do that may be worth more than getting the $200k from the contest

>> Well, if the algorithm is so broken then it should be trivial to break it even with their limitations.

This is the critical sentence from the article - "If you want to show that a system is secure, give the adversary as much power as possible, and if they still can’t break it, the security is good."

This is at the root of modern crypto systems, and without it a system is considered broken.

It may be that within the rules of the contest, breaking one message is non-trivial. That doesn't mean that I couldn't (for instance) collect and analyse multiple individual's traffic over time, or find a way to alter data in-flight, both of which are specifically ruled out of the contest.

Re: Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest

#40

Is there a reason why all fad "secure" products lately default to custom protocols and exotic solutions instead of using well tested and trusted solutions? Designing a protocol so that is does not leak is very hard.

TextSecure is also using a protocol of its own design. I think the difference is largely the motivation at the other end. Moxie is genuinely engaged and interested in crypto and, much much more importantly, improving the trust models associated with it (see Convergence as another example). The Telegram guys seem more interested in being a 'hip' app with the latest secure IM solution. This doesn't even necessarily mean someone with far far less crypto knowledge than Moxie can't make a secure solution, it just means Telegram are suffering from a little arrogance and over-eagerness.

It's far too easy for people outside crypto circles to see cryptography as a panacea. Inside crypto circles however, it's my impression that everyone lives with a slight unease that much of the math they rely on has unproven lower bound complexity, the majority of implementations in existence are horrific, and the key management and trust models we all depend on are terrible and obscured from the users view and understanding. If you pay attention, all the rock star cryptographers spend most of their time talking about trust, not algorithms and protocols.

Designing a simple and secure crypto protocol isn't actually that hard. There are mathematical pitfalls us mortals can't hope to understand, but if you trust and understand the primitives as black boxes, and have the right mindset when analysing protocols, you can still build very secure systems. I'm a casual crypto hobbiest, and still spotted the issues raised in the Telegram protocol as soon as I looked at the diagram presented in the article. None of these weaknesses are outside of a good programmers comprehension.

So why is a custom protocol a bad idea? The same reason it's a bad idea to go and reimplement any other protocol... that problem has been solved, why are you remaking it without a strong incentive?

There are examples of crypto being used by amateurs with success though. Bitcoin has multiple extensions, like deterministic hierarchical wallets, which are easy to understand and reason about but I know for a fact weren't designed by world class crypto-experts. In that case, there was a strong incentive. Asynchronous key splitting to ensure safe generation of vanity addresses by 3rd parties is another example. Nobody should say these solutions aren't innovative and useful.

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