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How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

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Re: How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

#31
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Didn't the article specifically state that the FBI transferred coins from his wallet to their own?

Yes. According to the paper they not only transferred the money, and they did it in 445 chunks of 324 bitcoins each (and one chunk with the remainder). 324 spells FBI on a phone keypad.

Why would they sign the transaction that way?

Re: How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

#32
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. According to the paper they not only transferred the money, and they did it in 445 chunks of 324 bitcoins each (and one chunk with the remainder). 324 spells FBI on a phone keypad.

Why would they sign the transaction that way?

To send a message / gloat.

Re: How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

#33
Just to reference some of the interesting bits to actual transactions/addresses:

Satoshi address - https://blockchain.info/address/12higDjoCCNXSA95xZMWUdPvXNmk...

Satoshi -> DPR transfer - https://blockchain.info/tx/cdcaaa0ff1446d41aae5d32c23da1ff33...

Re: How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

#36
post #27

Through a brutal reign of imaginary murders.

To play devil's advocate, Ulbricht likely felt (perhaps even "knew") that the murders he ordered were successfully carried out. And intent is usually what matters most in American criminal law.

He probably did truly feel like he was an extremely powerful druglord, even if in reality he was a nerd with a laptop.

Re: How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

#37
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can somebody explain to me how the FBI could seize his bitcoins without knowing his password? My passwords for such things are long, written nowhere, and I enter them on oddball platforms and applications (e.g. not Windows). Is that not enough?

It's suspected that computer forensics managed to recover the private key of an unencrypted wallet from his disk. The sequence of events would be: He previously used an unencrypted wallet. Then he encrypted it and deleted his old wallet.dat. Then he forgot to zero out his "deleted files" area of his filesystem, so the old wallet.dat was recoverable via forensics.

So obvious, yet, easy to forget

This is a big gaping hole in using GPG for example

It either prints the content (if it's a text file this is ok), or you have to save it to be useful.

And then you erase it and think it's enough.

Re: How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

#39
post #38

1. Inrtoduction I stopped reading there...

You should have kept reading --it's every other word. I liked the "Reopened on Novebmer 6th 2013".

The rigorousness of the argument and research is comparable to that of the proofreading.

Re: How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? [pdf]

#40
post #30

The important things to note about the relation between DPR and SN: * There was an account/wallet that was created a week after Bitcoin mining 'commenced' in 2009. * SN was known to have been active in the early mining. However so was Hal Finney (inventor of RPOW). They refer to it as the founder's wallet, but I think it would be more appropriate to think of it as the wallet of an early miner. * This early miner's ac…

I'd make a reasonable bet that those motions were to one of the early exchanges, — based on the timing, maybe Britcoin. I'd consider it doubtful that the later owner of those funds was the same as the earlier one. I'm not sure why they'd hypothesize that someone who apparently used Bitcoin only some time after it was widely made public, and then used it in a rather poor manner anonymity wise (the aggregation), was th…

I agree. When Shamir wrote the first Bitcoin paper over a year ago, we in the Bitcoin community eagerly awaited the paper, looking forward to the revelation of some obscure new security flaw, or other issue.

Imagine our surprise when we realized that not only did the paper not reveal anything new (Satoshi mined many of the early coins -- Eureka!), but that in order to do their analysis, they scraped the entire blockchain explorer web site to access Bitcoin's transaction history, and then commented on how difficult it was to access that history.

So little was their research and understanding of how Bitcoin works, that they misunderstood its most fundamental property: the shared public ledger that sits on the desktop of anyone running the reference Bitcoin client.

Unfortunately, it looks like they're after publicity, and not new knowledge. A big disappointment.

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