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Kremlin security agencies buying typewriters "to avoid leaks"

bbc.co.uk

31–35 of 35 posts

Re: Kremlin security agencies buying typewriters "to avoid leaks"

#31
post #8

Accompanying the article is a stock picture of an olive Olivetti Lettera 32. It's got its cover missing, poor thing, and it appears to have had a photoshop job to remove the label at the front. It looks like this is an Italian QZERTY version, which makes sense because the olive green is rare with other keyboard layouts. Millions were sold. They're nice machines - I have one with a cursive font that gives me a headach…

I have an Olivetti... Studio, IIRC, that you can pry from my cold hands. Lovely machine. It had a sister; unfortunately, we recently lost her to a flood. I would have preferred a rescue/rehabilitation, but it wasn't my call -- and, past a point, there's only so much you can hang onto. Kind of negating my original point... But, that's nostalgia. I don't want to live on one, but a good typewriter is a bit of a monument…

Look at the picture of the showroom - the Apple store of its time perhaps? http://idreamlo-tech.blogspot.be/2012/07/olivetti-studio-44-...

Their Venice showroom is a museum now: http://www.negoziolivetti.it/photogallery-0

Re: Kremlin security agencies buying typewriters "to avoid leaks"

#32
> Unlike printers, every typewriter had its own individual typing pattern which made it possible to link every document to a particular machine

Many printers have this capability. Researchers cracked and published one of the codes way back in 2005 [1] [2]. Whether the manufacturers would provide the coding scheme to Russian intelligence services is another question.

[1] https://www.eff.org/issues/printers

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printer_steganography

Re: Kremlin security agencies buying typewriters "to avoid leaks"

#33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is fascinating! Let me understand one thing: The sheep dip station is network connected to the sealed computer? Doesn't that still pose a risk and violate the principle? It seems you'd be better off checking at the dip station and then reimporting on the sealed computer. Then again, I suppose in that case you could have malware that detects what system it's on and decides not to activate on the dip station :)

I think you misunderstood iuguy's description. > unconnected system I understood this to be a literal description. I presume that this sheep dip station is maintained and updated, from time to time. However, that would be done using controlled, vetted media. And, if something goes wrong there, it has to been in the nature of something that will cause the masking of problems existing on the written/finalized media tha…

If ewe think the sheep dip station is connected to anything, then you're wrong.

Re: Kremlin security agencies buying typewriters "to avoid leaks"

#34
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you misunderstood iuguy's description. > unconnected system I understood this to be a literal description. I presume that this sheep dip station is maintained and updated, from time to time. However, that would be done using controlled, vetted media. And, if something goes wrong there, it has to been in the nature of something that will cause the masking of problems existing on the written/finalized media tha…

If ewe think the sheep dip station is connected to anything, then you're wrong.

Bah... ;-)
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