31–40 of 107 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
An even bigger WTF is why GPS data isn't signed with some official key so spoofing is impossible.
Because an attacker can just replay legitimate broadcasts with slightly skewed time and origin and introduce huge errors into the fix.
If you want to prevent replaying as well, add a counter.
Ops.group published a report on GPS spoofing back in 2024.[1] It's bad. Ops.group is an organization for dispatchers and pilots, the people who decide the routes aircraft take and fly them. They are really angry about it. Key concerns: - The greatest safety concern is the degraded functionality of the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). The system does not operate correctly after spoofing, even if GPS coverage is…
I don't understand how "spoof-to" works. If you have to mimic a satellite then isn't everyone going to get a different location? Unless you're tracking a specific target how can you intentionally spoof them to a desired location? I'd assume the best you could do is create a fixed offset.
> The military wants to go mostly inertial and is working on better inertial systems.
Given the drift rate this is an idea for munitions but exceptionally difficult to actually operate in a vehicle.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why would that make spoofing impossible?
Because attackers wouldn't be able to send legitimate-looking data to GPS receivers any more.
(EDIT: I see the other reply thread is already asking the same thing, didn't intend to ask about the same thing)
Ops.group published a report on GPS spoofing back in 2024.[1] It's bad. Ops.group is an organization for dispatchers and pilots, the people who decide the routes aircraft take and fly them. They are really angry about it. Key concerns: - The greatest safety concern is the degraded functionality of the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). The system does not operate correctly after spoofing, even if GPS coverage is…
Bigger WTF is why critical systems still use unencrypted gps signal. It is like using plain SMTP emails for banking transactions, and relying on "sender" for authentification.
There's another frequency they could be using that is higher power but hasn't been put into production yet.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because an attacker can just replay legitimate broadcasts with slightly skewed time and origin and introduce huge errors into the fix.
Just because we can't solve all current problems doesn't mean we shouldn't solve any current problems. If you want to prevent replaying as well, add a counter.
Obviously not, but solving problems is always a cost benefit and we went from all spoofing is impossible to some spoofing is possible. What is the benefit of doing this and what is the cost?
> If you want to prevent replaying as well, add a counter.
It's not clear that would be able to prevent spoofing if the attacker could overwhelm and degrade the real signal.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Bigger WTF is why critical systems still use unencrypted gps signal. It is like using plain SMTP emails for banking transactions, and relying on "sender" for authentification.
An even bigger WTF is why GPS data isn't signed with some official key so spoofing is impossible.
Of course, they dont protect against jamming.
Is there any other more useful url? Even with ad blocking enabled this site is a mess of auto playing adverts. It makes the actual content difficult to find.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
GNSS receivers are passive devices that receive beacons broadcasted from the satellites. It's technically impossible to spy on someone with GNSS.
And 99.99% of those GNSS receivers are connected to the internet. Or are in proximity to an (American controlled/designed) internet connected device.