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1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug

blog.ammaraskar.com

31–40 of 116 posts

Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug

#31
post #16
post #3

This is a very good writeup. Zooming way out (perhaps to the point of useless observation), it's a pity that the web embedded VSCode editor is signed into GitHub at all . Defense-in-depth or not, a huge vulnerability surface arises from that original sin. It'd be like if you had a god-permissioned GitHub API token stored in world-readable plaintext on your workstation for the malicious-NPM-package-of-the-week to find…

> temporary per-repo permission scope or token that allowed only pull and push to the repo in question How about pull from the repo but only push to a staging area from which the user, but not the token, can push for real? Frankly, LLM agents should do this too. Letting your LLM push seems foolhardy to me.

That makes so much more sense.

Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug

#34

> the last time I interacted with MSRC regarding reporting a VSCode bug, it was a horrible experience where they silently fixed the bug Classic MSRC. It has figured out that researchers will report for free regardless. Why change?

MSRC doesn’t fix bugs. I don’t know the specifics of this case, but I’ve managed bug bounty programs in the past through Bountysource and HackerOne. One thing that occasionally happens is that a report makes its way to the development team before the security team has fully assessed it, in this case MSRC. At that point, a developer may decide to quietly fix the issue. Sometimes that’s driven by a concern, rational or…

Nonsense. As if there are no versions for their software releases.

This is laziness, security absolutely could verify these steps.

Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug

#35
post #16
post #3

This is a very good writeup. Zooming way out (perhaps to the point of useless observation), it's a pity that the web embedded VSCode editor is signed into GitHub at all . Defense-in-depth or not, a huge vulnerability surface arises from that original sin. It'd be like if you had a god-permissioned GitHub API token stored in world-readable plaintext on your workstation for the malicious-NPM-package-of-the-week to find…

> temporary per-repo permission scope or token that allowed only pull and push to the repo in question How about pull from the repo but only push to a staging area from which the user, but not the token, can push for real? Frankly, LLM agents should do this too. Letting your LLM push seems foolhardy to me.

Exe.dev has an integrations feature which is similar allowing you to grant access to specific repos without having give the VMs credentials. I think it’s a similar pattern to iron.sh.

I have been thinking more and more about how I might use this pattern.

Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug

#36
post #29

I had this happen to me recently github token got stolen and also cloudflare tokens guys even if you take security seriously you are going to get hit on a long enough time frame best thing to do is segregate and control damage trust no one, nothing, use orbstack, and always operate under the assumption that your token is going to get leaked at some point it knocked off my entire momentum. fortunately seemed like it w…

> created bunch of fake spam pages and trying to mine crypto Pages like GitHub pages? We’re repos being created in your account? Curious how you discovered that your tokens were pwned

repos created, cloudflare eployed thee websites, edited dns

saw a weird spam site, so damn tired went to bed thinking it was some mislick on my side

woke up next morning and loaded up my domain, it redirected and panic set in

my SEO is probably nuked even though it has been under 24 hours

Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug

#37
post #16
post #3

This is a very good writeup. Zooming way out (perhaps to the point of useless observation), it's a pity that the web embedded VSCode editor is signed into GitHub at all . Defense-in-depth or not, a huge vulnerability surface arises from that original sin. It'd be like if you had a god-permissioned GitHub API token stored in world-readable plaintext on your workstation for the malicious-NPM-package-of-the-week to find…

> temporary per-repo permission scope or token that allowed only pull and push to the repo in question How about pull from the repo but only push to a staging area from which the user, but not the token, can push for real? Frankly, LLM agents should do this too. Letting your LLM push seems foolhardy to me.

Jules is heavily restricted in what it can do to your repos.

Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug

#40

> the last time I interacted with MSRC regarding reporting a VSCode bug, it was a horrible experience where they silently fixed the bug Classic MSRC. It has figured out that researchers will report for free regardless. Why change?

MSRC doesn’t fix bugs. I don’t know the specifics of this case, but I’ve managed bug bounty programs in the past through Bountysource and HackerOne. One thing that occasionally happens is that a report makes its way to the development team before the security team has fully assessed it, in this case MSRC. At that point, a developer may decide to quietly fix the issue. Sometimes that’s driven by a concern, rational or…

If only there were some kind of system for recording the version history and viewing what changes had been made to the code between releases.
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