This is a very good writeup. Zooming way out (perhaps to the point of useless observation), it's a pity that the web embedded VSCode editor is signed into GitHub at all . Defense-in-depth or not, a huge vulnerability surface arises from that original sin. It'd be like if you had a god-permissioned GitHub API token stored in world-readable plaintext on your workstation for the malicious-NPM-package-of-the-week to find…
> temporary per-repo permission scope or token that allowed only pull and push to the repo in question How about pull from the repo but only push to a staging area from which the user, but not the token, can push for real? Frankly, LLM agents should do this too. Letting your LLM push seems foolhardy to me.
1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
31–40 of 116 posts
Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#32Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#33If you like VSCode but don't like Microsoft, try Zed (zed.dev).
Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#34> the last time I interacted with MSRC regarding reporting a VSCode bug, it was a horrible experience where they silently fixed the bug Classic MSRC. It has figured out that researchers will report for free regardless. Why change?
MSRC doesn’t fix bugs. I don’t know the specifics of this case, but I’ve managed bug bounty programs in the past through Bountysource and HackerOne. One thing that occasionally happens is that a report makes its way to the development team before the security team has fully assessed it, in this case MSRC. At that point, a developer may decide to quietly fix the issue. Sometimes that’s driven by a concern, rational or…
This is laziness, security absolutely could verify these steps.
Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#35This is a very good writeup. Zooming way out (perhaps to the point of useless observation), it's a pity that the web embedded VSCode editor is signed into GitHub at all . Defense-in-depth or not, a huge vulnerability surface arises from that original sin. It'd be like if you had a god-permissioned GitHub API token stored in world-readable plaintext on your workstation for the malicious-NPM-package-of-the-week to find…
> temporary per-repo permission scope or token that allowed only pull and push to the repo in question How about pull from the repo but only push to a staging area from which the user, but not the token, can push for real? Frankly, LLM agents should do this too. Letting your LLM push seems foolhardy to me.
I have been thinking more and more about how I might use this pattern.
Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#36I had this happen to me recently github token got stolen and also cloudflare tokens guys even if you take security seriously you are going to get hit on a long enough time frame best thing to do is segregate and control damage trust no one, nothing, use orbstack, and always operate under the assumption that your token is going to get leaked at some point it knocked off my entire momentum. fortunately seemed like it w…
> created bunch of fake spam pages and trying to mine crypto Pages like GitHub pages? We’re repos being created in your account? Curious how you discovered that your tokens were pwned
saw a weird spam site, so damn tired went to bed thinking it was some mislick on my side
woke up next morning and loaded up my domain, it redirected and panic set in
my SEO is probably nuked even though it has been under 24 hours
Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#37This is a very good writeup. Zooming way out (perhaps to the point of useless observation), it's a pity that the web embedded VSCode editor is signed into GitHub at all . Defense-in-depth or not, a huge vulnerability surface arises from that original sin. It'd be like if you had a god-permissioned GitHub API token stored in world-readable plaintext on your workstation for the malicious-NPM-package-of-the-week to find…
> temporary per-repo permission scope or token that allowed only pull and push to the repo in question How about pull from the repo but only push to a staging area from which the user, but not the token, can push for real? Frankly, LLM agents should do this too. Letting your LLM push seems foolhardy to me.
Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#38Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#39Re: 1-Click GitHub Token Stealing via a VSCode Bug
#40> the last time I interacted with MSRC regarding reporting a VSCode bug, it was a horrible experience where they silently fixed the bug Classic MSRC. It has figured out that researchers will report for free regardless. Why change?
MSRC doesn’t fix bugs. I don’t know the specifics of this case, but I’ve managed bug bounty programs in the past through Bountysource and HackerOne. One thing that occasionally happens is that a report makes its way to the development team before the security team has fully assessed it, in this case MSRC. At that point, a developer may decide to quietly fix the issue. Sometimes that’s driven by a concern, rational or…