Earlier quoted context omitted.
you're assuming that blue teams and engineers are sitting around twiddling their thumbs
Most companies in the world do not have “blue teams”. They barely have any kind of security employee.
First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
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Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#32Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most companies in the world do not have “blue teams”. They barely have any kind of security employee.
They've got a guy (who they're considering laying off)
Don't worry the LLMs that are replacing him, are also replacing the hackers too. Pretty soon (if not already), it will just be LLMs fighting LLMs.
Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#34Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#35[flagged]
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Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#36Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
Upon further reading on data only attacks ( https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/data-only-at... ) This makes more sense. You don't trigger MTE since you're not doing anything for force MTE to take action the program isn't actually changing. My other question would be, why didn't apple use fbounds checking here? They've been doing it aggressively everywhere else. MTE plus fbounds checking everywhere should…
could be a different type of data only attack, which doesnt override the boundaries
Well it’s memory corruption so I think it’s pretty safe to assume it’s a bounds issue. I’m not sure if it’s possible to get this with something like type confusion tho I could be wrong here.
Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#38Re: First public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple M5
#39[flagged]