This is from April 28th, it was patched in 15.0R-p7.
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Local privilege escalation via execve()
31–40 of 116 posts
Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
Anyone relying on a 30+ year old monolith kernel written in C to not have some exploitable LPEs lurking should stay in basket weaving and out of sysadmin.
Yep. You should treat any system where non-admins regularly login as basically insecure/owned and rig your architecture appropriately. TBH -- I don't have any of these kinds of boxes anymore. Who is really running anything like this in 2026 and for what purpose?
The systems should be cut off from sensitive administrative data, but a malicious student would at the very least have access to the other students' data with an LPE.
Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#33Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#34Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#35> IV. Workaround > No workaround is available. Oh dear.
Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
A not-insignificant chunk of the userbase of the various BSDs is there because they were turned off of Linux after controversial things like Gnome 3, systemd being shoved down users' throats despite being a broken mess, wayland (though nobody was as arrogant about wayland as Poettering was about systemd), etc. All that to say, the BSD userbase as a sizeable subset that are there for countercultural reasons, rather th…
I also use a mix. I moved to FreeBSD initially after a rough period w/Linux in the late 90's. Today, my FreeBSD machines are all VMs running on Linux hosts!
Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
> V. Solution > Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot the system. Not everyone can just freebsd-update and reboot, so yes, "Oh dear." is a good response to this.
Anyone relying on a 30+ year old monolith kernel written in C to not have some exploitable LPEs lurking should stay in basket weaving and out of sysadmin.
Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
A not-insignificant chunk of the userbase of the various BSDs is there because they were turned off of Linux after controversial things like Gnome 3, systemd being shoved down users' throats despite being a broken mess, wayland (though nobody was as arrogant about wayland as Poettering was about systemd), etc. All that to say, the BSD userbase as a sizeable subset that are there for countercultural reasons, rather th…
The person 'bragging' was not a countercultural user, but rather the FreeBSD engineering lead. They were, however, talking about FreeBSD's response to security vulnerabilities, in contrast to Linux's response. > thus not immune from the types of bugs that stem from that lineage They never claimed that FreeBSD didn't have vulnerabilities. I honestly have no idea why grandparent decided to bring up their comment when i…
Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
Anyone relying on a 30+ year old monolith kernel written in C to not have some exploitable LPEs lurking should stay in basket weaving and out of sysadmin.
Not sure why the snark but if people are running FreeBSD then they should be...basket weaving instead of using it? Yes, the correct solution is to patch and reboot but not everyone is in a place to jump and do that which is why a temp workaround, if possible, would be welcome