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Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

telnyx.com

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Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#32

2FA needs to be required for publishing packages. An attacker compromising someone's CI should not give them free reign to publish malicious packages at any time they want.

In a lot of cases, it's not really clear whose second factor would authorize publishing a package that was uploaded from a CI/CD system. Is it any project owner? Anyone from the same GitHub organization? etc.

> An attacker compromising someone's CI should not give them free reign to publish malicious packages at any time they want.

Agreed, that's why a lot of packaging ecosystems (including PyPI) have moved towards schemes that involve self-scoping, self-expiring tokens. The CI can still publish, but the attacker can no longer exfiltrate the publishing credential and use it indefinitely later.

(These schemes are not mandatory, because they can't be.)

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#33
post #23

For those using uv , you can at least partially protect yourself against such attacks by adding this to your pyproject.toml : [tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days" or this to your ~/.config/uv/uv.toml : exclude-newer = "7 days" This will prevent uv picking up any package version released within the last 7 days, hopefully allowing enough time for the community to detect any malware and yank the package version before you…

Nice feature. However uv is suspect at the moment, in the sense that it is designed as a pip replacement to overcome issues that only exist when supply chains are of a size that isn't safe to have.

So any project that has UV and any developer that tries to get uv into a project is on average less safe than a project that just uses pip and a requirements.txt

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#35

2FA needs to be required for publishing packages. An attacker compromising someone's CI should not give them free reign to publish malicious packages at any time they want.

but then how can we deploy our vibe coded PRs we didn't review at a pace of 40 deploys per day?

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#36

At this point, I'm not updating anything using Python. Not that I had the option anyway, because everything using Python breaks if you update it. You know they've given up on backward comparability and version control, when the solution is: run everything in a VM, with its own installation. Apparently it's also needed for security, but the VMs aren't really set up to be secure. I don't get why everything math heavy u…

Agree. I was working on an open source package, noticed something weird, and noticed the size of the uv.lock and got a bit scared.

It's a pandemic, I will be hardening my security, and rotating my keys just in case.

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#38
post #33
post #23

For those using uv , you can at least partially protect yourself against such attacks by adding this to your pyproject.toml : [tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days" or this to your ~/.config/uv/uv.toml : exclude-newer = "7 days" This will prevent uv picking up any package version released within the last 7 days, hopefully allowing enough time for the community to detect any malware and yank the package version before you…

Nice feature. However uv is suspect at the moment, in the sense that it is designed as a pip replacement to overcome issues that only exist when supply chains are of a size that isn't safe to have. So any project that has UV and any developer that tries to get uv into a project is on average less safe than a project that just uses pip and a requirements.txt

I really am not able to follow this line of reasoning, I am not sure if what you said makes sense and how it relates to uv having a security feature to be on average less safe :/
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