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Password managers less secure than promised

ethz.ch

31–40 of 87 posts

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#31

What a sane idea to store all your secrets in one place.... for attackers to get ahold of them in one move.

Why does the federal reserve keep all that gold in one place? It’s far better to have a ridiculously secure store than it is to have to reuse passwords across a hundred sites (nobody here can remember a hundred unique high entropy passwords). I trust the cryptography far more than my brain to handle these things.

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#33
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I mostly agree! However, I plan on posting an article on HN soon discussing some of the issues with the .kdbx file format that KeePass and derivatives use within the next couple of days. KeePass has such great potential, but falls short compared to some of its (local) competitors.

Which local competitors do you recommend? Is a text file one of them?

I don’t recommend any of them. Some of them have critical metadata leakage issues (Pass and derivatives, which leak the number of accounts & their names) and most others are not open source—an immediate disqualification for a local password manager. KeePassXC is my choice on desktop. Keepassium on iOS.

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#34
post #16

> cloud-based password managers. Enough said. This kind of stuff should be offline only. If you need to access your password database on multiple devices, set up a LAN and/or a Wireguard tunnel for remote access.

At least a KeePass file via Cloud Storage seems like a somewhat sane tradeoff between security and convenience.

What you're proposing where you're adding a backdoor to your home network (via Wireguard) that needs to be maintained/hardened, and then still needing a LAN hosting solution for the actual database running 24-hour, is neither convenient nor secure (least of all because of layer 1 / fire / theft).

This is a fragile solution which isn't solving any particular problem; but certainly introducing multiple new exciting potential problems.

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#35
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What to do if my house catches on fire, including my computer where the passwords are stored?

Well, the same issue exists for your BitWarden recovery keys or 2fa method. You need to have proper and redundant off site backups for anything valuable.

Not exactly. I need to have those offsite, but they are not modified at the same frequency as passwords.

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#36
post #27

The article is nearly useless for users of the software who want to know how their data may have been affected. The researchers' website is more descriptive, especilly wrt specific findings. https://zkae.io/

1Password comes out looking relatively good here.

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#37
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, the same issue exists for your BitWarden recovery keys or 2fa method. You need to have proper and redundant off site backups for anything valuable.

Not exactly. I need to have those offsite, but they are not modified at the same frequency as passwords.

How often do your change your passwords? Assuming they are decently long and all that, why would you change them at all other than when a site gets breached?

The only reason my Keepass database changes is because I make new accounts on sites every now and then, and that's a fairly rare thing these days. And if I get so ungodly unlucky that my house burns down before my off-site database is updated to have that new account listed, I'll still have access to the email that account is associated with, so I can still recover the account either way.

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#38
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

KeePassXC can even still be online, too; example: https://logandark.net/passwords.kdbx It's not centralized, of course; you still have to download the entire database, and then potentially upload the entire database again for any changes; but it doesn't have these vulnerabilities.

Haha this was a powermove. It is genuinely great that since it’s just a file you can host it anywhere you want. S3, WebDAV, your own site. I personally use copyparty and WireGuard for my kdbx file. I find it better than syncthing because there’s an obvious master copy (edited in place), and there’s no good way to keep syncthing running all the time on iOS, which can lead to sync conflicts.

Just how do you use copyparty and wireguard for this if you kindly elaborate on that please

Re: Password managers less secure than promised

#39
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, the same issue exists for your BitWarden recovery keys or 2fa method. You need to have proper and redundant off site backups for anything valuable.

Not exactly. I need to have those offsite, but they are not modified at the same frequency as passwords.

Fair enough, but it’s genuinely super easy to have a regular copy of your password manager saved in the cloud. You can also have a less frequently updated version stored somewhere physical that isn’t your house. My house burning down has never been a concern for me, as I’ve taken the proper precautions for my data.
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