Earlier quoted context omitted.
Actually there is a significant push to more effective products coming from the reinsurance companies that underwrite cyber risks. Most of them come with a checklist of things you need to have before they sign you at any reasonable price. The more we get government regulation for fines in cases of breaches etc. the more this trend will accelerate.
The thing is that real security isn't something that a checklist can guarantee. You have to build it into the product architecture and mindset of every engineer that works on the project. At every single stage, you have to be thinking "How do I minimize this attack surface? What inputs might come in that I don't expect? What are the ways that this code might be exploited that I haven't thought about? What privileges…
Is it not possible to have secure software components that only work when assembled in secure ways? Why not?
Conversely, what security claims about a component can one rely upon, without verifying it oneself?
How would a non-professional verify claims of security professionals, who have a strong interest in people depending upon their work and not challenging its utility?