I don’t understand. How could a GCP server access the private NAS? I agree the web UI should never be monitored using sentry. I can see why they would want it, but at the very least should be opt in.
It couldn’t, but it tried.
When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
31–40 of 265 posts
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#32This highlights a huge problem with LetsEncrypt and CT logs. Which is that the Internet is a bad place, with bad people looking to take advantage of you. If you use LetsEncrypt for ssl certs (which you should), that hostname gets published to the world, and that server immediately gets pummeled by requests for all sorts of fresh install pages, like wp-admin or phpmyadmin, from attackers.
> If you use LetsEncrypt for ssl certs (which you should) You meant you shouldn't right? Partially exactly for the reasons you stated later in the same sentence.
CA/B Forum policy requires every CA to publish every issued certificate in the CT logs.
So if you want a TLS certificate that's trusted by browsers, the domain name has to be published to the world, and it doesn't matter where you got your certificate, you are going to start getting requests from automated vulnerability scanners looking to exploit poorly configured or un-updated software.
Wildcards are used to work around this, since what gets published is *.example.com instead of nas.example.com, super-secret-docs.example.com, etc — but as this article shows, there are other ways that your domain name can leak.
So yes, you should use Let's Encrypt, since paying for a cert from some other CA does nothing useful.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#33Slightly surprised that this blog seems to have succumbed to inbound traffic.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#34I think people are misunderstanding. This isn't CT logs, its a wildcard certificate so it wouldn't leak the "nas" part. It's sentry catching client-side traces and calling home with them, and then picking out the hostname from the request that sent them (ie, "nas.nothing-special.whatever.example.com") and trying to poll it for whatever reason, which is going to a separate server that is catching the wildcard domain a…
Sounds like a great way to get sentry to fire off arbitrary requests to IPs you don’t own. sure hope nobody does that targeting ips (like that blacklist in masscan) that will auto report you to your isp/ans/whatever for your abusive traffic. Repeatedly.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#35Is "clown GCP Host" a technical term I am unaware of, or is the author just voicing their discontent? Seems to me that the problem is the NAS's web interface using sentry for logging/monitoring, and part of what was logged were internal hostnames (which might be named in a way that has sensitive info, e.g, the corp-and-other-corp-merger example they gave. So it wouldn't matter that it's inaccessible in a private netw…
> Is "clown GCP Host" a technical term I am unaware of, or is the author just voicing their discontent? Clown is Rachel's word for (Big Tech's) cloud.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Is "clown GCP Host" a technical term I am unaware of, or is the author just voicing their discontent? Clown is Rachel's word for (Big Tech's) cloud.
She was (or is) at Facebook, and "clowntown" and "clowny" are words you see there.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If you use LetsEncrypt for ssl certs (which you should) You meant you shouldn't right? Partially exactly for the reasons you stated later in the same sentence.
Let's Encrypt has nothing to do with this problem (of Certificate Transparency logs leaking domain names). CA/B Forum policy requires every CA to publish every issued certificate in the CT logs. So if you want a TLS certificate that's trusted by browsers, the domain name has to be published to the world, and it doesn't matter where you got your certificate, you are going to start getting requests from automated vulne…
I am not entirely aware what LE does differently, but we had very clear observation in the past about it.
Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#38Re: When internal hostnames are leaked to the clown
#39Not sure why they made the connection to sentry.io and not with CT logs. My first thought was that "*.some-subdomain." got added to the CT logs and someone is scanning *. with well known hosts, of which "nas" would be one. Curious if they have more insights into sentry.io leaking and where does it leak to...