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OpenClaw: When AI Agents Get Full System Access. Security nightmare?

innfactory.ai

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Re: OpenClaw: When AI Agents Get Full System Access. Security nightmare?

#31

Post by sathish316 »

OpenClaw does present security risks, and the recommendations outlined in this article are apt.

That said, OpenClaw is more powerful than Claude Code due to its self-evolving agent architecture and its unfettered access to terminal and tools.

A secure way to provide access to additional non-sensitive API keys and secrets is by introducing a secure vault and ensuring OpenClaw’s skills retrieve credentials from it using time-scoped access (TTL of 15-60 mins). More details are available in this article: https://x.com/sathish316/status/2019496552419717390 . This reduces the attack surface to 15+ mins and the security can be further improved with Tailscale and sandboxing.

Re: OpenClaw: When AI Agents Get Full System Access. Security nightmare?

#32

Post by TZubiri »

OpenedClaw wrote: post #27

# 4. No shared folders to host system! Why? No one will execute files shared by the agent.

Shared folders are actually one of the best tools, it prodives a communication channel between the Agent system and other systems. You are probably sharing data one way or another, otherwise how do you even communicate with it.

Re: OpenClaw: When AI Agents Get Full System Access. Security nightmare?

#33

Post by CuriouslyC »

sathish316 wrote: post #31

OpenClaw does present security risks, and the recommendations outlined in this article are apt. That said, OpenClaw is more powerful than Claude Code due to its self-evolving agent architecture and its unfettered access to terminal and tools. A secure way to provide access to additional non-sensitive API keys and secrets is by introducing a secure vault and ensuring OpenClaw’s skills retrieve credentials from it usin…

Better to put your agent on a zero trust private network, and force it to talk to a proxy with credential injection. That proxy doesn't need to have ingress, so your surface is basically prompt injections from files/web search and supply chain attacks.
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