* “all your money lives on the internet and it’s safe” * “internet voting is insecure” who wins?
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Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
31–40 of 532 posts
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#32Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#33You know, kind of an interesting test here. This was posted 13 minutes ago and the comments so far are mostly all supportive of not wanting internet/insecure voting methods, all supportive of pen and paper. I wonder if after an hour or two the propaganda hoses will have been turned on and all the top comments start to have the reverse messaging in them, saying internet voting is perfectly fine, and such initial comme…
So you are saying that the humans are fast and the propaganda bots are slow?
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#34I live in an economy where people vote with pencils on paper in cardboard booths and at scalable cost, it just works. Obviously the cost also has to scale linearly for the 200+m voter economies, and time becomes a factor, but for community acceptance I still think paper and pen/pencil beats machine hands down. (this is Australia. we have compulsory attendance at voting booths for eligible citizens, you can spoil your…
Australia really uses erasable pencil markings to vote?
I would feel much better if they required ink.
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#35The most important feature of public elections is trust. Efficiency is one of the least important feature. When we moved away from paper voting with public oversight of counting to electronic voting we significantly deteriorated trust, we made it significantly easier for a hostile government to fake votes, all for marginal improvements in efficiency which don't actually matter. Moving to internet voting will further…
Mostly agree, but we don’t have to give up the benefits of direct digital tabulation for quick results. I would like a paper audit trail. Print my ballot-as-cast for on a paper roll that scrolls by under a window. I can verify it before leaving the voting booth. Recounts and challenges can be a computer scan of the paper roll. None of this is hard. Costs a bit more, but buys trust in the system.
That's how it works in Cook County and a lot of other places: it's touchscreen voting, using "ballot marking devices", which produce a paper ballot you hand to an EJ to submit.
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#36The most important feature of public elections is trust. Efficiency is one of the least important feature. When we moved away from paper voting with public oversight of counting to electronic voting we significantly deteriorated trust, we made it significantly easier for a hostile government to fake votes, all for marginal improvements in efficiency which don't actually matter. Moving to internet voting will further…
What if some level of efficiency (not necessarily internet) improves turnout and participation?
At least in the US, I think there are a number of suggestions that are made repeatedly each cycle here. Like "it should be a paid federal holiday", and not putting onerous requirements on voters. Automatic registration. The list goes on.
But I what is written over and over is more on the lines of "I don't trust the process". I cannot blame anyone for not trusting Internet voting: I am a professional SWE, and it would be impossible for me to establish that any such system isn't pwned. Too much code to audit, hardware that's impossible to audit. But it's pretty trivial to demonstrate to the layperson how paper voting works, and how poll observers can prevent that process from being subverted.
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#37The most important feature of public elections is trust. Efficiency is one of the least important feature. When we moved away from paper voting with public oversight of counting to electronic voting we significantly deteriorated trust, we made it significantly easier for a hostile government to fake votes, all for marginal improvements in efficiency which don't actually matter. Moving to internet voting will further…
Just do both like we do here in GA. You vote on a computer, it prints out a piece of paper, you walk the paper over to some kind of scanner, and then it is deposited into a giant trash can. (maybe they keep the paper records, idk) - these are the dominion systems.
(memories..)
When I lived in NYC there was a giant lever you got to use - it was pretty fun - but positioning the actual paper was kind of tricky.
I think Georgia used to have Diebold machines where you would get a little receipt but I'm pretty sure they were very hackable. Anyway half of them were always broken.
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#38The most important feature of public elections is trust. Efficiency is one of the least important feature. When we moved away from paper voting with public oversight of counting to electronic voting we significantly deteriorated trust, we made it significantly easier for a hostile government to fake votes, all for marginal improvements in efficiency which don't actually matter. Moving to internet voting will further…
Mostly agree, but we don’t have to give up the benefits of direct digital tabulation for quick results. I would like a paper audit trail. Print my ballot-as-cast for on a paper roll that scrolls by under a window. I can verify it before leaving the voting booth. Recounts and challenges can be a computer scan of the paper roll. None of this is hard. Costs a bit more, but buys trust in the system.
This is the system used in the majority of the United States. Direct-recording electronic voting systems were never that common, briefly peaked after the Help America Vote Act as the least expensive option to meet accessibility requirements, and have become less common since then as many election administrators have switched to either prectinct tabulators or direct-recording with voter-verified paper audit trail.
In the 2026 election, only 1.3% of voters were registered in jurisdictions that use direct-recording electronic machines without a voter verifiable paper audit trail (https://verifiedvoting.org/verifier/#mode/navigate/map/voteE...). 67.8% of voters are registered in precincts that primarily use hand-marked ballots, and the balance mostly use BMDs to generate premarked ballots.
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#39* “all your money lives on the internet and it’s safe” * “internet voting is insecure” who wins?
Second is also possible in jurisdictions that issue id cards with cryptographic layer AND ability with the companion app to only prove a scope of the identity.
Without saying too much about my home country I believe it's doable.
Re: Internet voting is insecure and should not be used in public elections
#40The most important feature of public elections is trust. Efficiency is one of the least important feature. When we moved away from paper voting with public oversight of counting to electronic voting we significantly deteriorated trust, we made it significantly easier for a hostile government to fake votes, all for marginal improvements in efficiency which don't actually matter. Moving to internet voting will further…
Mostly agree, but we don’t have to give up the benefits of direct digital tabulation for quick results. I would like a paper audit trail. Print my ballot-as-cast for on a paper roll that scrolls by under a window. I can verify it before leaving the voting booth. Recounts and challenges can be a computer scan of the paper roll. None of this is hard. Costs a bit more, but buys trust in the system.
You don't necessarily need any sort of electronic counting for quick results. Federal elections in Australia are usually called late on the voting day and I imagine the same is true for other countries that are paper-only.