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A bit unrelated, but if you ever find a malicious use of Anthropic APIs like that, you can just upload the key to a GitHub Gist or a public repo - Anthropic is a GitHub scanning partner, so the key will be revoked almost instantly (you can delete the gist afterwards). It works for a lot of other providers too, including OpenAI (which also has file APIs, by the way). https://support.claude.com/en/articles/9767949-api-…
Exfiltrated without a Pwn2Own in 2 days of release and 1 day after my comment [0], despite "sandboxes", "VMs", "bubblewrap" and "allowlists". Exploited with a basic prompt injection attack. Prompt injection is the new RCE. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46601302
Securing autonomous, goal-oriented AI Agents presents inherent challenges that necessitate a departure from traditional application or network security models. The concept of containment (sandboxing) for a highly adaptive, intelligent entity is intrinsically limited. A sufficiently sophisticated agent, operating with defined goals and strategic planning, possesses the capacity to discover and exploit vulnerabilities or circumvent established security perimeters.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I was thinking about this the other day. If we did a plot of 'model ability' vs 'computational resources' what kind of relationship would we see? Is the improvement due to algorithmic improvements or just more and more hardware?
I think the harnesses are responsible for a lot of recent gains.
Check out mini-swe-agent.
In this demonstration they use a .docx with prompt injection hidden in an unreadable font size, but in the real world that would probably be unnecessary. You could upload a plain Markdown file somewhere and tell people it has a skill that will teach Claude how to negotiate their mortgage rate and plenty of people would download and use it without ever opening and reading the file. If anything you might be more succes…
Also, I'll break my own rule and make a "meta" comment here.
Imagine HN in 1999: 'Bobby Tables just dropped the production database. This is what happens when you let user input touch your queries. We TOLD you this dynamic web stuff was a mistake. Static HTML never had injection attacks. Real programmers use stored procedures and validate everything by hand.'
It's sounding more and more like this in here.
What's the chance of getting Opus 4.5-level models running locally in the future?
Probably not too far off, but then you’ll probably still want the frontier model because it will be even better. Unless we are hitting the maxima of what these things are capable of now of course. But there’s not really much indication that this is happening
This was apparent from the beginning. And until prompt injection is solved, this will happen, again and again. Also, I'll break my own rule and make a "meta" comment here. Imagine HN in 1999: 'Bobby Tables just dropped the production database. This is what happens when you let user input touch your queries. We TOLD you this dynamic web stuff was a mistake. Static HTML never had injection attacks. Real programmers use…
This was apparent from the beginning. And until prompt injection is solved, this will happen, again and again. Also, I'll break my own rule and make a "meta" comment here. Imagine HN in 1999: 'Bobby Tables just dropped the production database. This is what happens when you let user input touch your queries. We TOLD you this dynamic web stuff was a mistake. Static HTML never had injection attacks. Real programmers use…