31–40 of 40 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
(Ignoring all the safety stuff in other replies) These are tunnels over 3km long. You can't have cops down there without breathing apparatus - even if the extractors were safely operating.
Why would it be safe for people driving vehicles, but not for police officers?
"... growing whisper within the security industry in Melbourne that there weak security might have been breached from China. ..." ~ http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4605335 Any idea what type of systems they are running?
In IT security here in Melbourne, first I've heard of it. Also why would network security specialists need to fly over 30 hours from Europe? We also have some pretty capable teams on the ground here already. Given the time frame of when it happened it's more likely a change that has been borked in some way with difficulties in rolling back.
I've done work at CityLink, and their IT shop is just totally clueless. This does not surprise me one bit. This is the same company that was doing "mirroring" with Veritas Volume Manager across a metro fibre link, rather than using their TrueCopy licenses. For no reason. Two fibre cuts rendered their entire production database (tolling) environment inoperable and nearly irrecoverable, on two separate occasions. I wor…
I've worked with State Transit in NSW (buses & ferries) and they were awful. The most embarrassing part was the UNIX team and Windows team refusing to talk to each other even though they were only one cubicle partition away from each other so any communication had to go up through two levels of management and back down. The scariest part was every single database of user information was transformed from another datab…
It's silly really.
I've done work at CityLink, and their IT shop is just totally clueless. This does not surprise me one bit. This is the same company that was doing "mirroring" with Veritas Volume Manager across a metro fibre link, rather than using their TrueCopy licenses. For no reason. Two fibre cuts rendered their entire production database (tolling) environment inoperable and nearly irrecoverable, on two separate occasions. I wor…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The fact that their safety systems (Which anyone would expect to be separate from the traffic control systems) are also affected makes me wonder about the "computer glitch" angle.
Like 99% of news reported computere glitch's it is some human mess up that caused it, either by design or error or a homer moment were somebody pressed the wrong button. Could even be somebody overloading the electrical phases in the datacentre and tripped the UPS into action for it to barth at the imbalance (seen that one). This is why they say computer glitch and count on the majority of non technical people to not…
If the system allowed the user to do something that impacted safetey in such a way, then the computer glitch is that the computer should stop that sort of thing happening. Human error happens a lot and you have to account for it in your designs.
Of course there are times when you have to trust the user because it is not practical to do those tests (in which case the human should have procedure to follow that mitigates the risk), and instances where the user wil override the checks (when the machines say "I really don't think you should do X because Y, click 'I understand the consequences of my propsosed action' to proceeed") - then it is genuinly human error is something goes wrong.
I've done work at CityLink, and their IT shop is just totally clueless. This does not surprise me one bit. This is the same company that was doing "mirroring" with Veritas Volume Manager across a metro fibre link, rather than using their TrueCopy licenses. For no reason. Two fibre cuts rendered their entire production database (tolling) environment inoperable and nearly irrecoverable, on two separate occasions. I wor…
Although I had some responsibility for the tunnel safety systems at the time, we never touched them knowing that any problems would result in the road being closed.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
They have fume extractor fans in the tunnels. If they aren't on, CO poisoning for everyone.
One would hope that the "fail safe" scenario for fume extractor fans would be "Blow at full speed"
Earlier quoted context omitted.
In IT security here in Melbourne, first I've heard of it. Also why would network security specialists need to fly over 30 hours from Europe? We also have some pretty capable teams on the ground here already. Given the time frame of when it happened it's more likely a change that has been borked in some way with difficulties in rolling back.
thx for the insight @bennysaurus. That's what I dislike about rumours, especially with so little info and in areas I lack understanding.
Finding further information about it: looks like a core switch died with the backup not kicking in. 12 hours to work around is a but much though.
I've done work at CityLink, and their IT shop is just totally clueless. This does not surprise me one bit. This is the same company that was doing "mirroring" with Veritas Volume Manager across a metro fibre link, rather than using their TrueCopy licenses. For no reason. Two fibre cuts rendered their entire production database (tolling) environment inoperable and nearly irrecoverable, on two separate occasions. I wor…
You got movie tickets! A long time ago (13 years) the production database was irrecoverable! I got backups working just a week before tolling finally started. Failure of that system would ultimately result in the tollway becoming a freeway (allowing for buffering of data at the gantries, etc. etc.) Although I had some responsibility for the tunnel safety systems at the time, we never touched them knowing that any pro…